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Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science

Quantum money from knots

Edward Farhi, David Gosset, Avinatan Hassidim, Andrew Lutomirski, Peter W. Shor

Published Jan 8, 2012• 98 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum money is a cryptographic protocol in which a mint can produce a quantum state, no one else can copy the state, and anyone (with a quantum computer) can verify that the state came from the mint. We present a concrete quantum money scheme based on superpositions of diagrams that encode oriented links with the same Alexander polynomial. We expect our scheme to be secure against computationally bounded adversaries.

DOI
10.1145/2090236.2090260

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Quantum money is a cryptographic protocol in which a mint can produce a quantum state, no one else can copy the state, and anyone (with a quantum computer) can verify that the state came from the mint. We present a concrete quantum money scheme based on superpositions of diagrams that encode oriented links with the same Alexander polynomial. We expect our scheme to be secure against computationally bounded adversaries.
Public-key quantum money is a cryptographic protocol in which a bank can create quantum states which anyone can verify but no one except possibly the bank can clone or forge. There are no secure public-key quantum money schemes in the literature; as we show in this paper, the only previously published scheme [1] is insecure. We introduce a category of quantum money protocols which we call collision-free. For these protocols, even the bank cannot prepare multiple identical-looking pieces of quantum money. We present a blueprint for how such a protocol might work as well as a concrete example which we believe may be insecure.
Private quantum money allows a bank to mint quantum money states that it can later verify, but that no one else can forge. In classically verifiable quantum money -- introduced by Gavinsky (CCC 2012) -- the verification is done via an interactive protocol between the bank and the user, where the communication is classical, and the computational resources required of the bank are classical. In this work, we consider memoryless interactive protocols in which the minting is likewise classical, and construct a private money scheme that achieves these two notions simultaneously (i.e., classical verification and classical minting). We call such a construction a private semi-quantum money scheme, since all the requirements from the bank in terms of computation and communication are classical.
Public verification of quantum money has been one of the central objects in quantum cryptography ever since Wiesner's pioneering idea of using quantum mechanics to construct banknotes against counterfeiting. So far, we do not know any publicly-verifiable quantum money scheme that is provably secure from standard assumptions. In this work, we provide both negative and positive results for publicly verifiable quantum money. **In the first part, we give a general theorem, showing that a certain natural class of quantum money schemes from lattices cannot be secure. We use this theorem to break the recent quantum money scheme of Khesin, Lu, and Shor. **In the second part, we propose a framework for building quantum money and quantum lightning we call invariant money which abstracts some of the ideas of quantum money from knots by Farhi et al.(ITCS'12). In addition to formalizing this framework, we provide concrete hard computational problems loosely inspired by classical knowledge-of-exponent assumptions, whose hardness would imply the security of quantum lightning, a strengthening of quantum money where not even the bank can duplicate banknotes. **We discuss potential instantiations of our framework, including an oracle construction using cryptographic group actions and instantiations from rerandomizable functional encryption, isogenies over elliptic curves, and knots.
Prior studies on quantum money from knots, and the invariant money framework that generalizes it, anchor their security on the hardness of path-finding. However, we show that the hardness of path-finding is proven to be necessary for security under certain conditions. In other conditions, this assumption is not a direct anchoring hardness problem such that breaking it allows an adversary to forge a banknote directly. In particular, for quantum money from knots, even when the path-finding assumption does not hold, an adversary still cannot directly forge a banknote. The adversary needs to additionally prepare the uniform superposition over the paths it finds, which we show is as hard as the original problem. Existing security proofs supplement path-finding hardness with knowledge-of-path assumptions. While this combination is sufficient, it may not be necessary. We identify an assumption pair, preparation assumption and transfer assumption, that is both necessary and sufficient for the security of every invariant money scheme. Breaking either assumption directly enables a forgery. The preparation assumption says that no efficient algorithm, given the serial number of a banknote and one object measured from it, prepares a state that verification accepts. While quantum money security gives a forger one quantum state and asks for two that pass, our assumption concerns a problem that takes only classical inputs and asks for one quantum state that passes. This assumption is equivalent to security against forgers that measure their banknote first. Given that its inputs are classical, it is falsifiable and can be attacked and bounded like other computational problems. The transfer assumption covers forgers that keep the banknote coherent, stating that every such forger only has an advantage over the measure-first adversary by at most a polynomial factor.