Quantum measurement theory has a peculiar nature with its TWO processes of assertibility, by proof and by measurement, which is beyond formal logic. This two-sortedness with respect to assertibility is discussed in terms of developments of many--sorted logics, sometimes referred to as Logica Magna. Although useful insights are obtained this way, we argue that there is a nonseparability of inferribility and measurability that is understandable first with a shift from logic to language in its systemic conception. That is, from a Logica Magna to a Systema Magnum understood as a truly systemic whole of complementary description and interpretation processes. In introspective quantum mechanics as a Systema Magnum, the nonseparability sheds light on interconnections between formalism and experimentalism which, for example, helps a critical understanding of Deutsch’s hypothesis of a programmable experimentability ("quantum computation").
Quantum measurement theory has a peculiar nature with its TWO processes of assertibility, by proof and by measurement, which is beyond formal logic. This two-sortedness with respect to assertibility is discussed in terms of developments of many--sorted logics, sometimes referred to as Logica Magna. Although useful insights are obtained this way, we argue that there is a nonseparability of inferribility and measurability that is understandable first with a shift from logic to language in its systemic conception. That is, from a Logica Magna to a Systema Magnum understood as a truly systemic whole of complementary description and interpretation processes. In introspective quantum mechanics as a Systema Magnum, the nonseparability sheds light on interconnections between formalism and experimentalism which, for example, helps a critical understanding of Deutsch’s hypothesis of a programmable experimentability ("quantum computation").
Quantum measurement theories are interesting mainly because of the fundamental questions. Since quantum mechanics is primarily a theory of small, simple systems, it could a priori be expected that a full description of this formalism would be possible in a language that would refer only to the objective properties of such small systems. Unless quantum physics is objectively false in some of its predictions, limitations of such a kind are unavoidable. The chapter argues that such limitations extend to systems of arbitrary finite size and of arbitrary complexity. As a matter of fact, this is the first and perhaps the most significant conclusion in investigation of the conceptual foundations of quantum physics. An equally tenable standpoint is to assert that truly infinite systems have special features of their own that make them fall outside the realm of elementary quantum mechanics. Implicitly or explicitly, nonseparability is indeed present in all the various interpretations of the quantum rules which have been set forth.
Scholars have wondered for a long time whether quantum mechanics (QM) subtends a quantum concept of truth which originates quantum logic (QL) and is radically different from the classical (Tarskian) concept of truth. We show in this paper that QL can be interpreted as a pragmatic language of pragmatically decidable assertive formulas, which formalize statements about physical systems that are empirically justified or unjustified in the framework of QM. According to this interpretation, QL formalizes properties of the metalinguistic concept of empirical justification within QM rather than properties of a quantum concept of truth. This conclusion agrees with a general integrationist perspective, according to which nonstandard logics can be interpreted as theories of metalinguistic concepts different from truth, avoiding competition with classical notions and preserving the globality of logic. By the way, some elucidations of the standard concept of quantum truth are also obtained.
Quantum physics provides us with a formalism with which we can try to understand the microscopic world. However, the underpinning concepts of the basic principles of quantum mechanics itself are surprisingly ill understood. Even the ubiquitous concept of the wavefunction collapsing post measurement, lives outside the formal theory of quantum mechanics and must be taken as a postulate. The Schr\"odinger equation, which governs the evolution of quantum systems, does not describe the system during the measurement process. This is referred to as the measurement problem, and has been debated since the inception of quantum theory. Many different interpretations of quantum mechanics try to elucidate what happens during wavefunction collapse, such as the famous many-worlds interpretation. However, these interpretations either give rise to the same physical outcome or simply are not testable, and so cannot be physically differentiated from one another. We attempt to gain insight into the measurement problem through experiments involving sequential measurements, both in the weak and strong regime. We find surprising outcomes such as the persistence of time-ordering asymmetry in the weak measurement limit, and the survival of coherence in the strong measurement limit.
In a large variety of disciplines, fundamental studies often straddle in self-referential situations, in need of relativization to language and complementaristic resolution. In such attempts, the languages at play are hardly visible themselves. Only shadows of language, somewhat characteristic of the various disciplines, become visible and tractable. We select two domains, quantum mechanics and cybernetics, for a comparative study of their complementarity concepts with consequence for understandings of observability, describability, and objectivity. In particular, we compare Bohr–Pauli's ‘non-detachability of the observer’ and von Foerster's aphorisms for objectivity. In quantum mechanics, with its emphasis on experimentability and measurability, Bohr's primary view of complementarity takes the form of a tension between definability and measurability. In cybernetics, we have a central interest in inferribility above the more constructive measurability, and the linguistic complementarity takes the form of a tension between describability and interpretability. In quests for a complete quantum mechanical measurement language, we face an interesting situation, that of simulating semantic measurability by syntactic inferribility. It calls for a cybernetic tie, whereby the two processes of assertibility, by measurability and by provability, become united under complementarity. Although semantic and syntactic processes are complementary within the measurement language, they may be unfolded in levels of constructivity, allowing identification of the lowest levels. Namely, identification of the constructivity level of a basic measurement sentence, i.e., a sentence which can be affirmed by a direct measurement (without involving further inferences), with the lowest constructivity level of syntactic provability. We exemplify with an explanation of a recent challenge against Bohr's wave–particle compementarity. Namely, by the so called double-prism experiment of Ghose, Home, and Agarwal. We find the experiment quite interesting, not because of the alleged challenge, but by realizing that its interpretation requires a levelled approach to quantum theory.
We present a formulation of quantum mechanics based on a logic representing some aspects of the behaviour of the measurement process. With such an approach, we make no direct mention of quantum states, and thus avoid the problems associated to this rather evasive notion. We then study some properties of the models of this logic, and deduce some characteristics that any model (and hence any formulation of quantum mechanics compatible with its prediction and relying on a notion of measurement) should verify. The main results we obtain are that in the case of a Hilbert space of dimension at least 3, no model can lead to the prediction with certainty of more than one atomic outcome. Moreover, if the Hilbert space is finite dimensional, then we are able to precisely describe the structure of the predictions of any model of our logic. As a consequence, we finally show that all the models of our logic make exactly the same predictions regarding whether a given sequence of outcomes is possible or not.
My aim in this dissertation is to defend a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics.Firstly, I present considerations based on certain general features of theories in the natural sciences which indicate that realism affords a better account of those theories than instrumentalism.In particular, I consider certain issues surrounding the cognitive status of theories, including the role of models, the status of scientific explanation, and the referential character of theoretical terms.Secondly, I develop a detailed realist theory of measurement based on the notion of quantity terms as designators of objective properties of, and relations among, existing entities.I contrast this with the leading instrumentalist theories of measurement, and I argue that the realist theory is the better account of both the logic and practice of scientific measurement.Finally, I consider a number of objections to realism that arise because of certain theoretical features peculiar to quantum mechanics.In the course of this discussion, I consider crucial experimental evidence for the "dual" nature of microentities, various criteria of reality proposed by philosophers of science, the peculiar features of quantum mechanical measurement, and the status of causality in quantum mechanics.I argue that while certain realist viii ix interpretations of the quantum theory, namely the wave and wavicle interpretations, are unsatisfactory, an interpreta tion which construes micro-entities as existing particles is a tenable account.CHAPTER I ignored the considerations which arise at those more general levels of inquiry, but one can not adequately assess the status of quantum mechanics with respect to both realism and instrumentalism apart from those considerations.In the second two chapters of the dissertation, I shall argue that realist interpretations of quantitative theories in the natural sciences are preferable to instrumentalist interpretations.Then in the remainder of the dissertation, I shall go on to argue that realism is tenable at the quantum mechanical level despite the features peculiar to that theory.CHAPTER II THE COGNITIVE STATUS OF THEORIES transitions from one set of experiential statements to another.This view is in marked contrast to that of the realist who regards such terms as referential.This divergence in opinion between realists and instrumentalists about the referential character of theoretical terms leads to a related dispute over the role of models in the inter pretation of scientific theories.Before contrasting the various philosophical positions on this issue, it will be necessary to sort out different senses of the term "model."Upon inspecting the literature surrounding this dispute, it seems that much of the controversy about the role of models stems from a failure to make such distinctions.I will begin this task by distinguishing between 13 model-structures and model-objects.A model-structure is a definitely specifiable schema of mathematical-logical relationships which is exhibited by and can be abstracted from a set of objects.Any set of objects which exhibits a model-structure constitutes a set of model-objects.With respect to any particular scientific theory, there may be a variety of model-objects that scientists employ for various purposes.For example, in the kinetic theory of gases, one can distinguish the following.Firstly, there is the set of molecules themselves, the theoretical entities which we shall 13.For further detail in this regard, see Henry C. Byerly, "Model-Structures and Model-Objects," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.Vol. 20, 1969, pp.135-144.i In fact, if one were to make that claim, I do not see how it could be supported without again falling prey to Maxwell's criticism cited above.And if one is simply troubled by the "ontological risk" involved in asserting the existence of theoretical entities because of the tentativeness of the corresponding theories, it should be noted that the risk of being wrong is a small price to pay for the potentially deeper understanding of nature that scientific theories afford us in the light of realist commitments.