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IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences

A Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for Credential Services

SeongHan Shin, Kazukuni Kobara, H. IMAI

Published Jan 1, 2008• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a leakage-resilient and proactive authenticated key exchange (called LRP-AKE) protocol for credential services which provides not only a higher level of security against leakage of stored secrets but also secrecy of private key with respect to the involving server. And we show that the LRP-AKE protocol is provably secure in the random oracle model with the reduction to the computational Difie-Hellman problem. In addition, we discuss about some possible applications of the LRP-AKE protocol.

DOI
10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.1.139

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Nowadays many crucial network applications rely on the existence of a confidential channel established by authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols over public networks.With the rapid development of cyber technology, novel attacks to cryptosystem emerge in an endless stream.This has also led to the development of AKE solutions to provide increasingly stronger security guarantees.In this thesis we focus on provision of practical constructions for AKE protocols which are provably secure in a strong sense without resorting to random oracles.We first we present three new efficient compilers to generically turn passively secure key exchange protocols (KE) into authenticated key exchange protocols (AKE) where security also holds in the presence of active adversaries.Our compilers are not only a useful tool for the design of new AKE systems with many additional security properties in a modular and less error-prone fashion, but they also help to relax the assumptions on existing, practical key exchange mechanisms which are not known to be provably secure AKE protocols.Security of our compilers is shown in a strong modified CK model where the adversary is allowed to reveal either long-term secret key or state information of the protocol participants.On the second, we study the open problem on constructing eCK secure two party AKE protocol without random oracles and NAXOS trick.A generic construction satisfying those requirements is given based on well-known cryptographic primitives following the guideline of efficiency.Then a concrete protocol is proposed which is the first eCK secure protocol in the standard model under both standard assumptions and post-specified peer setting (i.e.without knowing any cryptographic information about its communication peer).Both proposed schemes can be more efficiently implemented with secure device than previous works which are eCK secure in the standard model, where the secure device might be normally used to store the long-term private key and to implement codes of protocol which need to be resilience of state leakage.Finally, we generalize our one-round two party AKE construction to group case that yields an efficient tripartite AKE protocol based on bilinear maps and a candidate group AKE protocol (with more than three members) based on multilinear maps.Up to now they are the first solutions which can be proved secure in the g-eCK model without random oracles.Meanwhile we make first step to show how to simplify the security proof for one-round group AKE under g-eCK model.i

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Authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol for client–server environments is a significant cryptographic primitive that provides communication confidentiality and mutual authentication between clients and servers. In an Internet of Things (IoT) environment, clients typically employ IoT devices with limited computing capability to interact with servers through the Internet. Numerous AKE protocols suitable for IoT devices, called AKE-IoT protocols, have been proposed. Recently, side-channel attacks have been conducted to defeat traditional cryptographic protocols because a side-channel adversary can retrieve partial content of long-term or short-term secret keys. Several leakage-resilient AKE (LRAKE) protocols were presented to counteract such attacks. Unfortunately, the existing LRAKE protocols are not suitable for IoT devices because expensive pairing operations are required for client sides. In this article, we propose the first efficient LRAKE protocol suitable for IoT devices, named LRAKE-IoT. By the unbalanced computation method, no pairing operation is required for client sides in our protocol. In the generic bilinear pairing group model, security analysis is conducted to demonstrate the security of the proposed protocol in the continuous-leakage-resilient extended-Canetti–Krawczyk model. Finally, computational experiences on two IoT devices are given to show that the proposed protocol is well-suited for IoT devices.

IEEE Systems Journal•Nov 30, 2020•22 citations
In this paper, we propose a leakage-resilient and proactive authenticated key exchange (called LRP-AKE) protocol for credential services which provides not only a higher level of security against leakage of stored secrets but also secrecy of private key with respect to the involving server. And we show that the LRP-AKE protocol is provably secure in the random oracle model with the reduction to the computational Difie-Hellman problem. In addition, we discuss about some possible applications of the LRP-AKE protocol.
Abstract. In this paper, we prove the security of the RSA-AKE protocol [9] in the random oracle model. The proof states that the RSA-AKE protocol is secure against an adversary who gets the client’s stored secret or the server’s RSA private key. 1 To our best knowledge, the RSA-AKE protocol is the most efficient among their kinds (i.e., RSA and password based AKE protocols). The other security properties and efficiency measurements of the RSA-AKE protocol remain the same as in [9]. 1 The protocol is the same as [9], but we corrected the security proof partially. The attacks appeared in [10] are no longer available in the proof since the adversary has access to either the client’s stored secret or the server’s private key, not both of them. 2 1 The Model and Security Definitions In this section we introduce an extended model building on [1, 5] and security definitions for the LR-AKE security and perfect forward secrecy. We denote by C and S two parties that participate in a key exchange protocol P. Each of them may have several instances called oracles involved in distinct, possibly concurrent, executions of P where we
Secure channels can be realized by an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol that generates authenticated session keys between the involving parties. In [32], Shin et al., proposed a new kind of AKE (RSA-AKE) protocol whose goal is to provide high efficiency and security against leakage of stored secrets as much as possible. Let us consider more powerful attacks where an adversary completely controls the communications and the stored secrets (the latter is denoted by “replacement” attacks). In this paper, we first show that the RSA-AKE protocol [32] is no longer secure against such an adversary. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) we propose an RSA-based leakage-resilient AKE (RSA-AKE2) protocol that is secure against active attacks as well as replacement attacks; (2) we prove that the RSA-AKE2 protocol is secure against replacement attacks based on the number theory results; (3) we show that it is provably secure in the random oracle model, by showing the reduction to the RSA one-wayness, under an extended model that covers active attacks and replacement attacks; (4) in terms of efficiency, the RSA-AKE2 protocol is comparable to [32] in the sense that the client needs to compute only one modular multiplication with pre-computation; and (5) we also discuss about extensions of the RSA-AKE2 protocol for several security properties (i.e., synchronization of stored secrets, privacy of client and solution to server compromise-impersonation attacks).
Secure channels, indispensable to many applications, can be established by using an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol where the involving parties authenticate one another and then share authenticated session keys over insecure networks. In this paper, we introduce a new type of AKE protocols that are especially designed to minimize the damages caused by leakages of stored secrets. Such protocols are called Leakage-Resilient AKE (LR-AKE) protocols, whose motivation, design principles, several constructions, security analysis and applications are explained in detail.
Certificate-based public key cryptography (CB-PKC) removes the problem of certificate management in traditional public key systems and avoids the key escrow problem in identity-based public key systems. In the past, many authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols based on CB-PKC systems, called CB-AKE, were proposed to be applied to secure communications between two remote participants. However, these existing CB-AKE protocols become insecure since attackers could compute and obtain the whole secret key from some partial leaked information of the secret key by side channel attacks. In this paper, our goal is to propose thefirstfirstfirstCB-AKE protocol with the property to resist side channel attacks, called leakage-resilient CB-AKE (LR-CB-AKE). The proposed LR-CB-AKE protocol is formally proven to be secure in the generic bilinear group (GBG) model under the discrete logarithm (DL) and computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumptions.
Nowadays many crucial network applications rely on the existence of a confidential channel established by authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols over public networks.With the rapid development of cyber technology, novel attacks to cryptosystem emerge in an endless stream.This has also led to the development of AKE solutions to provide increasingly stronger security guarantees.In this thesis we focus on provision of practical constructions for AKE protocols which are provably secure in a strong sense without resorting to random oracles.We first we present three new efficient compilers to generically turn passively secure key exchange protocols (KE) into authenticated key exchange protocols (AKE) where security also holds in the presence of active adversaries.Our compilers are not only a useful tool for the design of new AKE systems with many additional security properties in a modular and less error-prone fashion, but they also help to relax the assumptions on existing, practical key exchange mechanisms which are not known to be provably secure AKE protocols.Security of our compilers is shown in a strong modified CK model where the adversary is allowed to reveal either long-term secret key or state information of the protocol participants.On the second, we study the open problem on constructing eCK secure two party AKE protocol without random oracles and NAXOS trick.A generic construction satisfying those requirements is given based on well-known cryptographic primitives following the guideline of efficiency.Then a concrete protocol is proposed which is the first eCK secure protocol in the standard model under both standard assumptions and post-specified peer setting (i.e.without knowing any cryptographic information about its communication peer).Both proposed schemes can be more efficiently implemented with secure device than previous works which are eCK secure in the standard model, where the secure device might be normally used to store the long-term private key and to implement codes of protocol which need to be resilience of state leakage.Finally, we generalize our one-round two party AKE construction to group case that yields an efficient tripartite AKE protocol based on bilinear maps and a candidate group AKE protocol (with more than three members) based on multilinear maps.Up to now they are the first solutions which can be proved secure in the g-eCK model without random oracles.Meanwhile we make first step to show how to simplify the security proof for one-round group AKE under g-eCK model.i
Authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol for client–server environments is a significant cryptographic primitive that provides communication confidentiality and mutual authentication between clients and servers. In an Internet of Things (IoT) environment, clients typically employ IoT devices with limited computing capability to interact with servers through the Internet. Numerous AKE protocols suitable for IoT devices, called AKE-IoT protocols, have been proposed. Recently, side-channel attacks have been conducted to defeat traditional cryptographic protocols because a side-channel adversary can retrieve partial content of long-term or short-term secret keys. Several leakage-resilient AKE (LRAKE) protocols were presented to counteract such attacks. Unfortunately, the existing LRAKE protocols are not suitable for IoT devices because expensive pairing operations are required for client sides. In this article, we propose the first efficient LRAKE protocol suitable for IoT devices, named LRAKE-IoT. By the unbalanced computation method, no pairing operation is required for client sides in our protocol. In the generic bilinear pairing group model, security analysis is conducted to demonstrate the security of the proposed protocol in the continuous-leakage-resilient extended-Canetti–Krawczyk model. Finally, computational experiences on two IoT devices are given to show that the proposed protocol is well-suited for IoT devices.