Secure multi-party computation (MPC, for short) is a powerful cryptographic concept which lets mutually distrusting parties collaborate without compromising their private information (beyond what is required by the functionality for which they collaborate). The functionality allowed in such a collaboration is so general that MPC subsumes virtually all other cryptographic tasks. Much of the two and a half decades of cryptographic research can be seen as striving towards the Holy Grail of realizing secure MPC in the most challenging scenario in which the parties carry out multiple tasks concurrently, the entire communication is adversarially controlled and there are no universally trusted entities.
In this thesis, for the first time we show how to realize secure MPC in such a general setting. Our contribution can be considered three-fold: (1) Definition of security. We present a new framework—called Los Angeles Network aware security—for defining security of MPC protocols. This builds on Canetti's Universally Composable security framework, under which it was known that very few distributed tasks can be carried out securely (unless globally trusted entities were used by the protocol). (2) Protocols and proofs. We build a new protocol for Multi-Party Computation which uses no globally trusted entities, and prove that it is secure in the Los Angeles Network aware security framework, under certain complexity theoretic assumptions. The high-level structure of the protocol and proof of security resembles that in previous works on Multi-Party Computation, but we employ novel approaches in designing the lower level elements of our protocol. (3) Complexity theoretic assumptions. We introduce new complexity theoretic assumptions, and show their use in proving the security of our protocols. The assumptions we make are somewhat different from those used in previous works. We informally argue why our assumptions are reasonable.
Also, we introduce an extension to the Los Angeles Network aware security framework—called monitored security—to obtain a greater security-efficiency trade off. We show how Network aware security guarantees, albeit weak, can be given under this framework for much more efficient and simpler protocols.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC, for short) is a powerful cryptographic concept which lets mutually distrusting parties collaborate without compromising their private information (beyond what is required by the functionality for which they collaborate). The functionality allowed in such a collaboration is so general that MPC subsumes virtually all other cryptographic tasks. Much of the two and a half decades of cryptographic research can be seen as striving towards the Holy Grail of realizing secure MPC in the most challenging scenario in which the parties carry out multiple tasks concurrently, the entire communication is adversarially controlled and there are no universally trusted entities.
In this thesis, for the first time we show how to realize secure MPC in such a general setting. Our contribution can be considered three-fold: (1) Definition of security. We present a new framework—called Los Angeles Network aware security—for defining security of MPC protocols. This builds on Canetti's Universally Composable security framework, under which it was known that very few distributed tasks can be carried out securely (unless globally trusted entities were used by the protocol). (2) Protocols and proofs. We build a new protocol for Multi-Party Computation which uses no globally trusted entities, and prove that it is secure in the Los Angeles Network aware security framework, under certain complexity theoretic assumptions. The high-level structure of the protocol and proof of security resembles that in previous works on Multi-Party Computation, but we employ novel approaches in designing the lower level elements of our protocol. (3) Complexity theoretic assumptions. We introduce new complexity theoretic assumptions, and show their use in proving the security of our protocols. The assumptions we make are somewhat different from those used in previous works. We informally argue why our assumptions are reasonable.
Also, we introduce an extension to the Los Angeles Network aware security framework—called monitored security—to obtain a greater security-efficiency trade off. We show how Network aware security guarantees, albeit weak, can be given under this framework for much more efficient and simpler protocols.
Secure multi-party computation is a conceptual framework in which distrusting parties engage in a protocol to securely perform a computational task. Depending on the precise model of security, different sets of tasks admit secure protocols. We take a complexity-theoretic approach to studying the inherent difficulty of securely realizing tasks in various standard security models. * We give the first alternate characterization of secure realizability in the framework of universally composable (UC) security. This is the first characterization in any model to consider completely arbitrary computational tasks and completely arbitrary communication channels. * The most long-standing class of computational tasks studied are those in which two parties evaluate a deterministic function. For these tasks, we give the first complete, combinatorial characterizations of secure realizability in the passive, standalone, and universally composable security models, against computationally unbounded adversaries. * Say that a task G has ``as much cryptographic complexity'' as another task F if there is a secure protocol for F that uses access to a secure implementation of G. We show that there is an infinite hierarchy of tasks with strictly increasing cryptographic complexities, with respect to computationally unbounded security. We also show that there exist tasks whose cryptographic complexities are incomparable. * In contrast, we show that under a standard cryptographic assumption, there exist only two distinct levels of cryptographic complexity with respect to polynomial-time security. Every task either has a trivial protocol using plain communication channels, or is complete (i.e., given access to a secure implementation of this task, there are secure protocols for all other tasks). This is the first result to derive a characterization of completeness for a class of arbitrary interactive tasks. In light of these characterizations, the only tasks which are securely realizable in the demanding framework of universal composition are those related to secure communication. Indeed, the framework has been used to define the security of encryption schemes, which has allowed for modular design and analysis of protocols. We consider a similar approach for homomorphic encryption schemes. A homomorphic scheme is one in which anyone can obtain an encryption of f(m_1, ..., m_n), given only the encryptions of unknown messages m_1, ..., m_n, for a specific set of functions f. * We give a construction of a homomorphic encryption scheme in which the allowed homomorphic operation is as full-featured as possible --- namely, one can derive a correctly-distributed encryption of f(m) given an encryption of unknown message m, for some functions f --- yet it is computationally infeasible to generate a ciphertext that is related to other ciphertexts in any other way. Our contributions involve developing new appropriate security definitions as well as new constructions. * We show that schemes with such powerful security guarantees can be used to build conceptually simple, efficient, UC-secure protocols for verifiable computations on encrypted data. We show protocols for two tasks related to aggregating encrypted data.
Most existing work on secure multi-party computation (MPC) ignores a key idiosyncrasy of modern communication networks, that there are a limited number of communication paths between any two nodes, many of which might even be corrupted. The problem becomes particularly acute in the information-theoretic setting, where the lack of trusted setups (and the cryptographic primitives they enable) makes communication over sparse networks more challenging. The work by Garay and Ostrovsky [EUROCRYPT’08] on almost-everywhere MPC (AE-MPC), introduced “best-possible security” properties for MPC over such incomplete networks, where necessarily some of the honest parties may be excluded from the computation. In this work, we provide a universally composable definition of almost-everywhere security , which allows us to automatically and accurately capture the guarantees of AE-MPC (as well as AE-communication, the analogous “best-possible security” version of secure communication) in the Universal Composability (UC) framework of Canetti. Our results offer the first simulation-based treatment of this important but under-investigated problem, along with the first simulation-based proof of AE-MPC. To achieve that goal, we state and prove a general composition theorem, which makes precise the level or “quality” of AE-security that is obtained when a protocol’s hybrids are replaced with almost-everywhere components.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) enables distrustful parties to jointly perform computations while guaranteeing both the privacy of their inputs and the correctness of the computation.
This thesis explores two aspects of secure multi-party computation: adaptive security and round efficiency. Adaptive security is concerned with an adversary that adaptively determines who and when to corrupt during the course of the computation. Even though this is a very natural and realistic assumption about the adversary, most of the MPC literature addresses security only against a static adversary — an adversary that chooses (and fixes) which parties to corrupt before the protocol starts executing. A protocol is called round-efficient if it runs in a small number of rounds. Constructing such protocols is important since efficiency of a protocol is greatly influenced by its round complexity.
The security in this thesis is formulated in the universal composability (UC) framework introduced by Canetti [Can01]. Protocols secure in the UC framework remain secure even when executed concurrently with other arbitrary protocols running in some larger network, and can be used as subroutines of larger protocols in a modular fashion. This property is important considering that nowadays many protocols are executed concurrently with others in the Internet.
With the focus on adaptive security and round efficiency, we obtain the following results:
(1) We show that with access to an ideal commitment functionality, there exists a protocol that UC realizes any well-formed multi-party functionality against a malicious, adaptive adversary that may corrupt any number of parties, with black-box access to any protocol that UC realizes oblivious transfer against a semi-honest, adaptive adversary.
(2) We show that there exists a protocol that UC realizes oblivious transfer against a semi-honest, adaptive adversary, with black-box access to a cryptographic primitive called a trapdoor simulatable cryptosystem, which is a natural relaxation of a simulatable cryptosystem introduced by Damgard and Nielsen [3N00].
We also show that the primitive can be constructed based on hardness of factoring.
(3) We present a single-message protocol that UC realizes two-party computing with encrypted data (a variant of secure two-party computation), based on the DDH assumption and non- interactive zero-knowledge arguments. The protocol achieves security against a malicious, static adversary.
(4) We present two round-efficient protocols that UC realize multi-party computing with encrypted data (a variant of secure multi-party computation), based on the DDH assumption and non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments. The first (resp. second) protocol requires one round (resp. two rounds) with appropriate preprocessing, which is independent of the exact circuit and actual inputs of the specific instance problem to solve — only the bound on the circuit size is known. Although the first protocol is more round-efficient, the preprocessing of the second is sometimes better under some efficiency considerations. Both protocols achieve security against a malicious, static adversary that may corrupt up to all but one parties.
The need for Cryptography arises out of the following fundamental question: can we perform useful computation while ensuring that an adversary does not learn anything about our private sensitive data? The notion of secure multiparty computation (MPC) \\cite{Yao82,GMW87} is a unifying framework for general secure protocols. MPC allows mutually distrusting parties to jointly evaluate any efficiently computable function on their private inputs in such a manner that each party does not learn anything beyond the output of the function. In this thesis, we study the question of building MPC protocols in various security models from standard cryptographic assumptions while minimizing the number of rounds of interaction amongst parties. In the first part of this thesis, (in a joint work with Vipul Goyal, Abhishek Jain, Yael Kalai, Dakshita Khurana and Amit Sahai, CRYPTO 2018) we construct the first round-optimal (i.e., four round) MPC protocol for general functions based on polynomially hard DDH (or QR or Nth-Residuosity) in the plain model where parties have access to no trusted setup. We further show how to overcome the four-round barrier for MPC by constructing a three-round protocol for ``list coin-tossing'' -- a slight relaxation of coin-tossing that suffices for most conceivable applications -- based on polynomially hard DDH (or QR or Nth-Residuosity). This result generalizes to randomized input-less functionalities. Previously, four round MPC protocols required sub-exponential-time hardness assumptions and no multi-party three-round protocols were known for any relaxed security notions with polynomial-time simulation against malicious adversaries. In order to build these protocols, we devise a new {\\em partitioned simulation} technique for MPC where the simulator uses different strategies for simulating the view of aborting adversaries and non-aborting adversaries. The protagonist of this technique is a new notion of {\\em promise zero knowledge} (ZK) where the ZK property only holds against non-aborting verifiers. We show how to realize promise ZK in three rounds in the simultaneous-message model assuming polynomially hard DDH (or QR or Nth-Residuosity). We also rely upon a new {\\em leveled rewinding security} technique that can be viewed as a polynomial-time alternative to leveled complexity leveraging for achieving ``non-malleability'' across different primitives. Then, we also we study the round complexity of concurrently secure multi-party computation (MPC) with super-polynomial simulation (SPS) in the plain model (in a joint work with Vipul Goyal, Abhishek Jain, Dakshita Khurana and Amit Sahai, TCC 2017). In the plain model, there are known explicit attacks that show that concurrently secure MPC with polynomial simulation is impossible to achieve; SPS security is the most widely studied model for concurrently secure MPC in the plain model. We construct a three-round concurrent MPC with SPS security against Byzantine adversaries, assuming sub-exponentially secure DDH and LWE. Prior to our work, the best known round complexity for SPS concurrent MPC was around twenty, although to the best of our knowledge, no previous work even gave an approximation of the constant round complexity that is sufficient for concurrent MPC.In the second part of the thesis, (in a joint work with Abhishek Jain, Rafail Ostrovsky and Ivan Visconti, ASIACRYPT 2018), we study the problem of non-interactive secure computation in the stateless hardware token model where parties have access to physical hardware as part of a trusted setup phase. The notion of non-interactive secure computation (NISC) first introduced in the work of Ishai et al. [EUROCRYPT 2011] studies the following problem: Suppose a receiver R wishes to publish an encryption of her secret input y so that any sender S with input x can then send a message m that reveals f(x,y) to R (for some function f). Here, m can be viewed as an encryption of f(x,y) that can be decrypted by R. NISC requires security against both malicious senders and receivers, and also requires the receiver's message to be reusable across multiple computations (w.r.t. a fixed input of the receiver). All previous solutions to this problem necessarily rely upon OT (or specific number-theoretic assumptions) even in the common reference string model or the random oracle model or to achieve weaker notions of security such as super-polynomial-time simulation. In this work, we construct a NISC protocol based on the minimal assumption of one way functions, in the stateless hardware token model. Our construction achieves UC security and requires a single token sent by the receiver to the sender.
The notion of secure computation is central to cryptography. Introduced in the seminal works of Yao [FOCS'82, FOCS'86] and Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [STOC'87], secure multiparty computation allows a group of (mutually) distrustful parties to jointly compute any functionality over their individual private inputs in such a manner that the honest parties obtain the correct outputs and no group of malicious parties learn anything beyond their inputs and the prescribed outputs. General feasibility results for secure computation were given by Yao [FOCS'86] and Goldreich et al. [STOC'87] more than two decades ago. Subsequent to these works, designing secure computation protocols that can tolerate more powerful adversaries and satisfy stronger notions of security has been a very active area of research. In this dissertation, we study two such new frontiers in the area of secure computation.
In the first part of this dissertation, we initiate a study of designing leakage-resilient interactive protocols. Specifically, we consider the scenario where an adversary, in addition to corrupting a subset of parties, can leak (potentially via physical attacks) arbitrary information from the secret state of any honest party. This is in contrast to the standard notion of secure computation where it is assumed that the adversary only has black-box'' access to the honest parties. In particular, we formalize a meaningful definition of leakage-resilient zero knowledge proof systems and provide constructions that satisfy our notion. We also discuss various applications of our results.
The second part of this dissertation concerns with the general question of whether it is possible to securely run cryptographic protocols over an insecure network environment such as the Internet. It is well-known that the standard notion of secure computation is only relevant to the stand-alone setting where a single protocol is being executed in isolation; as such it does not guarantee security when multiple protocol sessions may be executed concurrently under the control of an adversary who is present across all sessions. We consider the open problem of constructing secure password-based authenticated key exchange protocols in such a setting in the plain model (i.e., without assuming any trusted infrastructure or random oracles). We give the first construction of such a protocol based on standard cryptographic assumptions. Our results are in fact much more general, and extend to other functionalities w.r.t. a (necessarily) weakened notion of concurrently secure computation.
The results presented in this dissertation stem from two papers which are joint works with Sanjam Garg and Amit Sahai, and with Vipul Goyal and Rafail Ostrovsky, respectively.
Multiparty computation (MPC) is a powerful and generic cryptographic framework capable of realizing essentially any cryptographic task (functionality) while preserving privacy and robustness. In the MPC model, a group of mutually distrustful parties seek to jointly compute a function f of their privately held inputs x1, ..., xn, while revealing no information about those inputs beyond what is entailed by the function output(s). Some portion of these players may be corrupted, controlled by a centralized adversary who directs their (mis)behavior and seeks to gain information on private inputs or to disrupt the protocol execution.
In this work, we examine the resource requirements of information-theoretically secure multiparty computation. In particular, we look at trade-offs involving what we call assumptions, by which we mean two aspects of the model's setup: (1) the extent to which parties are connected by secure, pairwise communication channels; and (2) the usage (as a black box) of a channel—a primitive which enforces consistency among views by allowing a single party to send a message to all other parties which is guaranteed to be consistent, even if the broadcaster is corrupted.
Part I of this work focuses on the first network-model assumption, that of the graph's connectivity by pairwise channels. We show upper and lower bounds on communication complexity in the Secure Message Transmission with Public Discussion (SMT-PD) model, as a function of the threshold of corrupted parties. The SMT-PD model, which abstracts the problem of secure communication over a partially connected network, includes two components: a public and a set of simple channels. We show significant improvements in both areas: on the channel, we reduce communication to logarithmic in terms of the message's bit-length m, where the previous best result was linear in m; on the simple channels, we reduce from O(mn) to O(mn/(n−t)), where n is the number of simple channels and t is a bound on the number of corrupted channels. Using tools from information theory, we show this amount of simple-wire communication is essentially optimal. Finally, we give an amortized solution which drastically improves communication over channel when the protocol is repeated many times sequentially.
Part II shifts focus to the second network-model assumption, the use of an atomic broadcast primitive. Here we show that three broadcast rounds suffice for general secure computation, while two broadcast rounds are necessary. In particular we show that even for the natural and important functionality of Weak Secret Sharing—a type of distributed commitment—there is no protocol which uses only a single broadcast and achieves better than an explicit constant probability of success (so the protocol's success cannot be a function of a security parameter).