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Making inferences in case of attitudes

Anto Unt

Published May 19, 2010• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Autoriõiguse tõttu puudub väitekirja elektroonilisest versioonist autori artikkel "The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and common sense" (lk. 14-30), mis ilmus rmt.-s: Estonian studies in the history and philosophy of science / edited by Rein Vihalemm. Dordrecht [etc.] : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. Lk 242–267.

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Autoriõiguse tõttu puudub väitekirja elektroonilisest versioonist autori artikkel "The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and common sense" (lk. 14-30), mis ilmus rmt.-s: Estonian studies in the history and philosophy of science / edited by Rein Vihalemm. Dordrecht [etc.] : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. Lk 242–267.
The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.
`Science is rooted in conversations.' The word is from Heisenberg but it becomes with Mara Beller a thesis for reconsidering the philosophy and history of science: how conversations were a cradle for the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is the main topic of this book. This `dialogical' approach is moreover assumed to be quite general and it is proposed as a guideline for future investigations in the history of science. This work will certainly be important among historians of science. Its most valuable content is a wealth of information picked up from many sources, including the correspondence between the actors and later registered commentaries by many witnesses. There will be also undoubtedly much discussion of its conclusions and theses. They are extremely strong since, to mention but a few, one is told that the success of the Copenhagen interpretation is the result of a `fierce' propaganda strategy, and that Bohr could not really master physics (because of a weakness in mathematics), while the idea of complementarity, after a long discussion, is dismissed as `mythology'. Such new ideas will certainly find an enthusiastic approval from the adeherents of `new is beautiful', and will give rise to much discussion. What is missing most, however, in this book is a consideration of recent intensive renewals of interpretation arising from advances in both experiments and theory. The resulting conclusions are clearly different from Beller's: now that there are demonstrative versions of interpretation, one can fully appreciate why it was so difficult to justify logically and philosophically the Copenhagen interpretation (accordingly Bohr's stature would be enhanced rather than slighted). Mara Beller's inclination towards excessive statements is finally crowned when she says that her philosophical analysis `demonstrates the possibility and the need of a viable alternative to the orthodox interpretation' (most probably Bohmian mechanics). To have such an Aristotelian confidence in the power of philosophy and to be so assertive in a book where neither the word or notion of `decoherence' is mentioned indicate in my opinion the real nature of that book: too provocative to be wise.