Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Springer eBooks

Three-Valued Logic and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Hans Reichenbach

Published Jan 1, 1975• 9 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-94-010-1795-4_4

Related papers

Many-Valued Interpretation of the Logic of Quantum Mechanics

Jarosław Pykacz

Springer eBooks•Jan 1, 1997•3 citations

Quantum Physics, Fuzzy Sets and Logic: Steps Towards a Many-Valued Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Jarosław Pykacz

SpringerBriefs in physics•Jan 1, 2015•29 citations

Current Epistemological Problems and the use of a Three-Valued Logic in Quantum Mechanics

Hans Reinchenbach

Springer eBooks•Jan 1, 1978•1 citation

Reichenbach's interpretation of quantum mechanics

Paul K. Feyerabend

In section 3 of his paper ‘Three-valued logic’, Hilary Putnam deals with Reichenbach's attempt to interpret quantum mechanics on the basis of three-valued logic, and he uses some arguments of his own in order to show that this attempt is ‘a move in the direction of simplifying the whole system of laws’ (171). I believe that the Reichenbach–Putnam procedure cannot be defended and that it leads to undesirable consequences. There are the reasons for my belief:

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Oct 29, 1981•1 citation

How Reichenbach Solved the Quantum Measurement Problem

Thomas Bonk

Reichenbach's interpretation of quantum mechanics has been narrowly reduced to the advocacy of a three-valued logic. His interpretation rests, though, on the same rich epistemological framework that shapes his influential analysis of space-time theories. Different interpretations of the quantum formalism, with their conflicting ontologies and causes, emerge in this view as “equivalent descriptions”. One casualty of the conventionalist approach is the measurement problem. I give reasons for why Reichenbach's view on the nature of interpretations of quantum theory cannot be defended.

dialectica•Jan 1, 2001•0 citations

Quantum Logic and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

R. I. G. Hughes

There is no such thing as “The Quantum Logical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”. Rather, there is a cluster of interpretations, all of which can be described as “quantum logical”. Here I provide a general framework for discussing interpretations of this kind, and then locate various suggestions within it. The presentation owes much to van Fraassen (see, in particular, van Fraassen 1974 ); his “modal interpretation” is one of those I discuss, along with those of Jauch, Putnam and Kochen. I begin by rehearsing some orthodox quantum theory. Within quantum mechanics we deal with a set 0 of measurable quantities, orobservables(position, momentum, components of spin and so on). Experiment can determine the value of an observable for a given system: the values so determined will be real numbers. A maximal amount of information about what the result would be for a given system, whatever experiment we chose to perform on it, is available once we know thestateof the system.

PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association•Jan 1, 1980•4 citations
Reichenbach's interpretation of quantum mechanics has been narrowly reduced to the advocacy of a three-valued logic. His interpretation rests, though, on the same rich epistemological framework that shapes his influential analysis of space-time theories. Different interpretations of the quantum formalism, with their conflicting ontologies and causes, emerge in this view as “equivalent descriptions”. One casualty of the conventionalist approach is the measurement problem. I give reasons for why Reichenbach's view on the nature of interpretations of quantum theory cannot be defended.
There is no such thing as “The Quantum Logical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”. Rather, there is a cluster of interpretations, all of which can be described as “quantum logical”. Here I provide a general framework for discussing interpretations of this kind, and then locate various suggestions within it. The presentation owes much to van Fraassen (see, in particular, van Fraassen 1974 ); his “modal interpretation” is one of those I discuss, along with those of Jauch, Putnam and Kochen. I begin by rehearsing some orthodox quantum theory. Within quantum mechanics we deal with a set 0 of measurable quantities, orobservables(position, momentum, components of spin and so on). Experiment can determine the value of an observable for a given system: the values so determined will be real numbers. A maximal amount of information about what the result would be for a given system, whatever experiment we chose to perform on it, is available once we know thestateof the system.