Modular design is a common approach for dealing with complex tasks in modern cryptology. The critical of this approach is to design a secure hybrid protocol. In this paper, we study password-based key exchange in the three-party setting within the UC framework and design a hybrid protocol that UC-securely realizes such task. Next we partition the task into two sub-tasks, three-party key distribution and password-based two-party key exchange, and propose relevant two ideal functionalities, F3pKD, FpwKE. Finally, we present a (F3pKD, FpwKE) -hybrid protocol for password-based three-party key exchange that is proved to be UC-secure with respect to non-adaptive party corruption.
Modular design is a common approach for dealing with complex tasks in modern cryptology. The critical of this approach is to design a secure hybrid protocol. In this paper, we study password-based key exchange in the three-party setting within the UC framework and design a hybrid protocol that UC-securely realizes such task. Next we partition the task into two sub-tasks, three-party key distribution and password-based two-party key exchange, and propose relevant two ideal functionalities, F3pKD, FpwKE. Finally, we present a (F3pKD, FpwKE) -hybrid protocol for password-based three-party key exchange that is proved to be UC-secure with respect to non-adaptive party corruption.
Modular design is a common approach for dealing with complex tasks in modern cryptology. The critical of this approach is that designing a secure hybrid protocol. In this paper, we study password-based key exchange in the three-party setting within the UC framework and design a hybrid protocol that UC-securely realizes such task. That is, we firstly define an appropriate ideal functionality F3-pwKE for password-based three-party key exchange. Next we partition the task into two sub-tasks, three-party key distribution and password-based two-party key exchange, and propose relevant two ideal functionalities, F3-KD, FpwKE. Finally, we present a (F3-KD, FpwKE) -hybrid protocol for password-based three-party key exchange that is proved to be UC-secure with respect to nonadaptive party corruption. Keywords—Password-based, Universally composable, Key exchange, Three-party setting, Hybrid protocol
In this paper, we formulate and realize a definition of security for three-party key distribution within the universally composable (UC) framework. That is, an appropriate ideal functionality that captures the basic security requirements of three-party key distribution is formulated. We show that UC definition of security for three-party key distribution protocol is strictly more stringent than a previous definition of security which is termed AKE-security. Finally, we present a real-life protocol that securely realizes the formulated ideal functionality with respect to non-adaptive adversaries. Keywords—Key distribution, Universally composable, AKEsecurity
In this paper, we formulate and realize a definition of security for three-party key distribution within the universally composable (UC) framework. That is, an appropriate ideal functionality that captures the basic security requirements of three-party key distribution is formulated. We show that UC definition of security for three-party key distribution protocol is strictly more stringent than a previous definition of security which is termed AKE-security. Finally, we present a real-life protocol that securely realizes the formulated ideal functionality with respect to non-adaptive adversaries
A Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol allows two parties to agree upon a cryptographic key, when the only information shared in advance is a low-entropy password. The standard security notion for PAKE (Canetti et al., Eurocrypt 2005) is in the Universally Composable (UC) framework. We show that unlike most UC security notions, UC PAKE does not imply correctness. While Canetti et al. has briefly noticed this issue, we present the first comprehensive study of correctness in UC PAKE: We show that TrivialPAKE, a no-message protocol that does not satisfy correctness, is a UC PAKE; We propose nine approaches to guaranteeing correctness in the UC security notion of PAKE, and show that seven of them are equivalent, whereas the other two are unachievable; We prove that a direct solution, namely changing the UC PAKE functionality to incorporate correctness, is impossible; Finally, we show how to naturally incorporate correctness by changing the model—we view PAKE as a three-party protocol, with the man-in-the-middle adversary as the third party. In this way, we hope to shed some light on the very nature of UC-security in the man-in-the-middle setting.
Abstract. This paper analyzes group communication within the universally composable framework. We first propose the group communication model, identity-based signcrytion mod-el and group key distribution model in the UC framework by designing the ideal functionality FSAGCOM, FIDSC and FGKD, respectively. Then, we construct a UC secure identity-based signcryption protocol πIDSC. Moreover, we shows that the identity-based signcryption πIDSC securely realizes the ideal functionality FIDSC if and only if the corresponding protocol ID-SC is secure. Finally, based on the identity-based protocol, we propose a group communica-tion scheme πSAGCOM, which can securely realizes the ideal functionality FSAGCOM in the (FIDSC,FGKD)-hybrid model.
The Universal Composability (UC) framework provides provable security guaranties for harsh application environment, where we want to construct protocols which keep security guarantees even when they are concurrently composed with arbitrary number of arbitrary (even hostile) protocols.This is a very strong guarantee.The UC-framework inherently supports the modular design, which allows secure composition of arbitrary number of UC-secure components with an arbitrary protocol.In contrast, traditional analysis and design is a stand alone analysis where security of a single instance is considered, i.e. an instance which is not in potential interaction with any concurrent instances.Furthermore, a typical traditional analysis is informal, i.e. without a formal proof.In spite of these facts, beyond the task of key-exchange this technology have not really took the attention of the community of applied cryptography.From practitioner's point of view the UC-world may seem more or less an academic interest of theoretical cryptographers.Accordingly we take a pragmatic approach, where we concentrate on meaningful compromises between the assumed adversarial strength, ideality wishes and realization complexity while keeping provable security guarantees within the UC-framework.We believe that even modest but provable goals (especially, if tunable to application scenarios) are interesting if a wider penetration of the UC-technology is desired into the daily-practice of protocol applications.