The confidentiality of the spectral implementation of the Y00 quantum encryption protocol is investigated, against ciphertext only and known plaintext attacks. A generic framework is proposed for developing a secure encryption scheme based on a single multiport encoder/decoder.
A novel implementation of quantum-noise optical cryptography is proposed, which is based on a simplified architecture that allows long-haul, high-speed transmission in a fiber optical network. By using a single multiport encoder/decoder and 16 phase shifters, this new approach can provide the same confidentiality as other implementations of Yuen's encryption protocol, which use a larger number of phase or polarization coherent states. Data confidentiality and error probability for authorized and unauthorized receivers are carefully analyzed.
We study in detail the problem of encryption of quantum information. We present an attack on a private quantum channel (PQC) which applies when partial classical description of a ciphertext is known (the so-called known-ciphertext attack) and we show how this situation can be avoided. The quantum analogue of the known plaintext attack is also discussed. We determine how correlations between quantum systems can be encrypted and we conclude that two PQCs on the subsystems form a PQC on the whole composite system. Finally, some applications of the PQC are suggested and a security of a noisy channel is discussed.
It is shown that the security, against known-plaintext attacks, of the Yuen 2000 (Y00) quantum-encryption protocol can be considered via the wire-tap channel model assuming that the heterodyne measurement yields the sample for security evaluation. Employing the results reported on the wire-tap channel, a generic framework is proposed for developing secure Y00 instantiations. The proposed framework employs a dedicated encoding which together with inherent quantum noise at the attacker's side provides Y00 security.
This paper analysis the security of the optical encryption scheme based on the classical double random phase encoding. We describe a known-plaintext attack which can be used to successfully access the encryption key with the pre-knowledge of only one arbiturary pair of known plaintext-ciphertext. A phase retrieval algorithm is employed in this attack. Computer simulations are made to demonstrate the effectiveness. The results show that even implementing only one round of iteration in the phase retrieval, an attacker can obtain a clear decoded plaintext (a gray-scale image) from an intercept ciphertext.