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Advanced series on mathematical psychology

Einstein, Bohm, and Leggett–Garg

Guido Bacciagaluppi

Published Nov 24, 2015• 7 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In a recent paper, I have analysed and criticised Leggett and Garg’s argument to the effect that macroscopic realism contradicts quantum mechanics, by contrasting their assumptions to the example of Bell’s stochastic pilot-wave theories, and have applied Dzhafarov and Kujala’s analysis of contextuality in the presence of signalling to the case of the Leggett–Garg inequalities. In this chapter, I discuss more in general the motivations for macroscopic realism, taking a cue from Einstein’s criticism of the Bohm theory, then go on to summarise my previous results, with a few additional comments on other recent work on Leggett and Garg. [To appear in: E. Dzhafarov (ed.), Contextuality from Quantum Physics to Psychology (Singapore: World Scientific).]

DOI
10.1142/9789814730617_0004

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Introduction Our aim in this chapter is to extend the Bell inequality discussion in Chapter 17 to its temporal analogue, known as the Leggett–Garg (LG) inequality . Bell inequalities involve spatial nonlocality, that is, signal observations distributed over space. It was shown by Leggett and Garg that analogous inequalities involving temporal nonlocality can be formulated (Leggett and Garg, 1985). We shall discuss one of these, known as the LG inequality . We saw in Chapter 17 that Bell inequalities are based on certain classical mechanics (CM) assumptions about the nature of reality. Likewise, the LG inequality is based on two CM principles that are not incorporated into quantum mechanics (QM). Definition 19.1 The principle of macrorealism asserts that if a macroscopic (that is, large-scale) system under observation (SUO) can be observed to be in one of two or more macroscopically distinct states, then it will always be in one or another of those states at any given time, not in a quantum superposition of those states, even when it is not being observed. This principle is a foundational principle in CM but is incompatible with QM in at least two ways. First, it is vacuous, as it asserts the truth of a proposition in the absence of empirical validation: how can we define the concept of always , without introducing counterfactuality? Second, it is violated in quantum theory, for instance, in path integral calculations. This principle in embedded in the nexus of issues explored in this book. The quantized detector network (QDN) version of it takes the form “If any SUO can be observed in any number of possible states, then it will be observed in one of them in any run.” This is a near tautology. The classical version says the same thing but makes an additional assertion about something going on in the absence of observation, which is the vacuous element that QM cannot accept. Definition 19.2 The principle of noninvasive measurability asserts that the actual state an SUO is in can always be determined cost-free, that is, without having any effect on that state or on its subsequent dynamical evolution. This principle is subtle. We experience its apparent validity all the time in our ordinary lives: we look at objects and they appear not to change by those acts of observation.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Nov 28, 2017•0 citations
In a recent paper, I have analysed and criticised Leggett and Garg’s argument to the effect that macroscopic realism contradicts quantum mechanics, by contrasting their assumptions to the example of Bell’s stochastic pilot-wave theories, and have applied Dzhafarov and Kujala’s analysis of contextuality in the presence of signalling to the case of the Leggett–Garg inequalities. In this chapter, I discuss more in general the motivations for macroscopic realism, taking a cue from Einstein’s criticism of the Bohm theory, then go on to summarise my previous results, with a few additional comments on other recent work on Leggett and Garg. [To appear in: E. Dzhafarov (ed.), Contextuality from Quantum Physics to Psychology (Singapore: World Scientific).]
In this paper we first analyse Leggett and Garg's argument to the effect that macroscopic realism contradicts quantum mechanics. After making explicit all the assumptions in Leggett and Garg's reasoning, we argue against the plausibility of their auxiliary assumption of non-invasive measurability, using Bell's construction of stochastic pilot-wave theories as a counterexample. Violations of the Leggett-Garg inequality thus do not provide a good argument against macrorealism per se. We then apply Dzhafarov and Kujala's analysis of contextuality in the presence of signalling to the case of the Leggett-Garg inequalities, with rather surprising results. An analogy with pilot-wave theory again helps to clarify the situation.
In this paper I attempt to broaden Feyerabend scholarship by asking whether and how Feyerabend's philosophy of science, in particular his commitments to realism and pluralism about scientific theories as well as anarchism about scientific methods, is borne out in multidisciplinary research concerning the Leggett–Garg inequalities. These inequalities were derived explicitly to be a temporal analogue to Bell's inequalities: the viability of macroscopic realism is tested against the predictions of quantum mechanics by performing a series measurements on a macroscopic variable of one system at different time intervals, then evaluating correlations among resultant values. In the nearly forty years since Leggett and Garg's paper, questions continue to be raised whether common tests of these inequalities reveal genuine violations or merely experimental disturbances. There is also much debate about what genuine violations in fact signify, if (as most agree) they are not straight-forwardly analogous to Bell tests. Taking this fascinating and as yet largely unsettled episode from physics as a case study, I derive three Feyerabendian lessons that demonstrate the relevance of his views even today.
In 1985, Leggett and Garg put forward the concept of macroscopic realism (macrorealism) and, in analogy to Bell's theorem, derived a necessary condition in terms of inequalities, which are now known as the Leggett-Garg inequalities. In this paper, we discuss another necessary condition called no-signaling in time. It solely bases on comparing the probability distribution for a macrovariable at some time for the cases where previously a measurement has or has not been performed. Although the concept is analogous to the no-signaling condition in the case of Bell tests, it can be violated according to quantum mechanical predictions even in situations where no violation of Leggett-Garg inequalities is possible.
The descriptions of the quantum realm and the macroscopic classical world di�er signi �cantly not only in their mathematical formulations, but also in their foundational concepts and philosophical consequences. The assumptions of local realism, non-contextuality and macroscopic realism (macro-realism) along with the quantum mechanical violations of these assumptions are discussed. A complete generalization is provided of Wigner's argument inferring quantum nonlocality, originally restricted for the EPR-Bohm entangled state, based on assuming joint probability distributions for all the relevant dichotomic observables. Such Generalized Wigner Inequality (GWI) turns out to be the N-partite local realist inequality which is violated by quantum mechanics for all pure entangled states for any N. We then exploit the non-trivial manifestation of quantum non-locality via local contextuality on three qubit system. Here, we propose an experimental scheme to realize this feature by deriving a new local realist inequality. The way quantum entanglement can be used for global contextual value assigning is discussed in a quantum pseudo-telepathy game. In the second part of this report, we formulate Leggett-Garg inequality (LGI) in terms of joint probability and demonstrate its quantum mechanical violation for two state oscillation, which is initial state dependent, unlike the case of standard LGI. It has been shown that, the newly formulated LGI reveals robustness against unsharp measurement for testing compatibility between macro-realism and quantum mechanics. Finally we show that, the recently proposed No-signaling in time condition, contradicts with quantum mechanical predictions for any degree of unsharpness in measurement.
Macroscopic Realism (MR) says that a macroscopic system is always determinately in one or other of the macroscopically distinguishable states available to it. The Leggett-Garg (LG) inequality was derived to allow experimental test of whether or not this doctrine is true; it is also often thought of as a temporal version of a Bell-inequality. Despite recent interest in the inequality, controversy remains regarding what would be shown by its violation. Here we resolve this controversy, which arises due to an insufficiently general and model-independent approach to the question so far. We argue that LG's initial characterisation of MR does not pick out a particularly natural realist position, so we articulate an operationally well-defined and well-motivated position in its place. We show that much weaker conditions than LG's are sufficient to derive the inequality: in the first instance, its violation only demonstrates that certain measurements fail to be non-disturbing at the operational level. We articulate three distinct species of MR-ist position, and argue that it is only the first of these which can be refuted by LG inequality violation. This first position is an attractive one, so ruling it out remains of interest, however. A crucial role is played in LG's argument by the assumption of noninvasive measurability. We show that this notion is ambiguous between the weaker notion of disturbance at the operational level, and the stronger notion of invasiveness at the ontic level of properties of the system. Ontic noninvasiveness would be required to rule out MR per se but this property is not entailed by MR, and its presence cannot be established in a model-independent way. It follows that despite the formal parallels, Bell's and LG's inequalities are not methodologically on a par. We close with some reflections on the implications of our analysis for the pedagogy of quantum superposition.
Introduction Our aim in this chapter is to extend the Bell inequality discussion in Chapter 17 to its temporal analogue, known as the Leggett–Garg (LG) inequality . Bell inequalities involve spatial nonlocality, that is, signal observations distributed over space. It was shown by Leggett and Garg that analogous inequalities involving temporal nonlocality can be formulated (Leggett and Garg, 1985). We shall discuss one of these, known as the LG inequality . We saw in Chapter 17 that Bell inequalities are based on certain classical mechanics (CM) assumptions about the nature of reality. Likewise, the LG inequality is based on two CM principles that are not incorporated into quantum mechanics (QM). Definition 19.1 The principle of macrorealism asserts that if a macroscopic (that is, large-scale) system under observation (SUO) can be observed to be in one of two or more macroscopically distinct states, then it will always be in one or another of those states at any given time, not in a quantum superposition of those states, even when it is not being observed. This principle is a foundational principle in CM but is incompatible with QM in at least two ways. First, it is vacuous, as it asserts the truth of a proposition in the absence of empirical validation: how can we define the concept of always , without introducing counterfactuality? Second, it is violated in quantum theory, for instance, in path integral calculations. This principle in embedded in the nexus of issues explored in this book. The quantized detector network (QDN) version of it takes the form “If any SUO can be observed in any number of possible states, then it will be observed in one of them in any run.” This is a near tautology. The classical version says the same thing but makes an additional assertion about something going on in the absence of observation, which is the vacuous element that QM cannot accept. Definition 19.2 The principle of noninvasive measurability asserts that the actual state an SUO is in can always be determined cost-free, that is, without having any effect on that state or on its subsequent dynamical evolution. This principle is subtle. We experience its apparent validity all the time in our ordinary lives: we look at objects and they appear not to change by those acts of observation.