Quantum mechanics has provided philosophers of science with many counterintuitive insights and interpretive puzzles, but little has been written about the role that time plays in the theory. One reason for this is the celebrated argument of Wolfgang Pauli against the inclusion of time as an observable of the theory, which has been seen as a demonstration that time may only enter the theory as a classical parameter. Against this orthodoxy I argue that there are good reasons to expect certain kinds of 'time observables' to find a representation within quantum theory, including clock operators (which provide the means to measure the passage of time) and event time operators, which provide predictions for the time at which a particular event occurs, such as the appearance of a dot on a luminescent screen. I contend that these time operators deserve full status as observables of the theory, and on reflection provide a uniquely compelling reason to expand the set of observables allowed by the standard formalism of quantum mechanics. In addition, I provide a novel association of event time operators with conditional probabilities, and propose a temporally extended form of quantum theory to better accommodate the time of an event as an observable quantity. This leads to a proposal to interpret quantum theory within an event ontology, inspired by Bertrand Russell's Analysis of Matter. On this basis I mount a defense of Russell's relational theory of time against a recent attack.
Quantum mechanics has provided philosophers of science with many counterintuitive insights and interpretive puzzles, but little has been written about the role that time plays in the theory. One reason for this is the celebrated argument of Wolfgang Pauli against the inclusion of time as an observable of the theory, which has been seen as a demonstration that time may only enter the theory as a classical parameter. Against this orthodoxy I argue that there are good reasons to expect certain kinds of 'time observables' to find a representation within quantum theory, including clock operators (which provide the means to measure the passage of time) and event time operators, which provide predictions for the time at which a particular event occurs, such as the appearance of a dot on a luminescent screen. I contend that these time operators deserve full status as observables of the theory, and on reflection provide a uniquely compelling reason to expand the set of observables allowed by the standard formalism of quantum mechanics. In addition, I provide a novel association of event time operators with conditional probabilities, and propose a temporally extended form of quantum theory to better accommodate the time of an event as an observable quantity. This leads to a proposal to interpret quantum theory within an event ontology, inspired by Bertrand Russell's Analysis of Matter. On this basis I mount a defense of Russell's relational theory of time against a recent attack.
Although time is one of our most intuitive physical concepts, its understanding at the fundamental level is still an open question in physics. For instance, time in quantum mechanics and general relativity are two distinct and incompatible entities. While relativity deals with events (points in spacetime), with time being observer dependent and dynamical, quantum mechanics describes physical systems by treating time as an independent parameter. To resolve this conflict, in this work, we extend the classical concept of an event to the quantum domain by defining an event as a transfer of information between physical systems. Then, by describing the universe from the perspective of a certain observer, we introduce quantum states of events with space-time-symmetric wave functions that predict the joint probability distribution of a measurement (observation) at $(t,\stackrel{P\vec}{x})$. Under these circumstances, without assuming collapse, we propose that a well-defined instant of time, like any other observable, arises from a single event, thus being an observer-dependent property. In this manner, we obtain a stationary quantum state written as a sum of a sequence of normalized states of events with increasing memories. As a consequence, a counterfactual asymmetry along this sequence of events gives rise to the flow of time as being successive ``snapshots'' from the observer's perspective. In this proposal, which contrasts strikingly to the view in which time is an illusion, it is the many distinguishable states in which the observer stores information that makes the existence of time possible.
The treatment of time in relativity does not conform to that in quantum theory. In the context of quantum gravity this is called "the problem of time". A crucial difference is that time t may be seen as an observable in relativity theory, just like position x, whereas in quantum theory t is a parameter, in contrast to the observable x. Aiming to resolve the discrepancy, a formalization of time in the spirit of Kant's Copernican revolution is suggested, where it is required that the treatment of time in physics agree with our cognition. This leads to reconsideration of the notions of identity and change of objects, as well as the nature of physical states and their evolution. The formalization has two components: sequential time n and relational time t. The evolution of physical states is described in terms of n, which is updated each time an event occurs. The role of t is to quantify distances between events in space-time. There is a space-time associated with each n, in which t represents the knowledge at time n about temporal distances between present and past events. A universal ordering of events in terms of n can be postulated even though distances t are relativistic. In short, it is argued that time as a sequential flow of events should be separated from time as a measure of distance between events. In physical models, these aspects of time can be expressed as one evolution parameter and one observable, respectively.
In quantum mechanics, time plays a role unlike any other observable. We find that measuring whether an event happened, and measuring when an event happened are fundamentally different - the two measurements do not correspond to compatible observables and interfere with each other. We also propose a basic limitation on measurements of the arrival time of a free particle given by 1/Ek where Ek is the particle's kinetic energy. The temporal order of events is also an ambiguous concept in quantum mechanics. It is not always possible to determine whether one event lies in the future or past of another event. One cannot measure whether one particle arrives to a particular location before or after another particle if they arrive within a time of 1/E of each other, where E is the total kinetic energy of the two particles. These new inaccuracy limitations are dynamical in nature, and fundamentally different from the Heisenberg uncertainty relations. They refer to individual measurements of a single quantity. It is hoped that by understanding the role of time in quantum mechanics, we may gain new insight into the role of time in a quantum theory of gravity.
The purpose of my Thesis is to gain a better understanding of the nature of time and the problems associated with time. For example, I aim to explore the problem associated with the energy-time uncertainty relation due to the lack of a universal operator for time. Using Jan Hilgevoord's work, I will explore the idea that if a measure of time is to be obtained in quantum mechanics, then time has to be a property of physical systems that can only be measured in relation to other systems. As such, time cannot be independent of physical systems. This implies that there cannot be time without physical systems. As a result, I will show how the philosophical position of "Relationism with Respect to Time" provides an accurate account of the nature of time that is consistent with observations made in physics. In order to achieve this, I will: 1) present Hilgevoord's argument about the problems of time in quantum mechanics; 2) provide an account of the ontology of time based on Hilgevoord's work; and 3) provide an analysis of the implications of what I am proposing in connection to Einstein's theory of special and general relativity in hopes of showing that his insights can and should be applied to quantum mechanics.
Time is used in non-relativistic quantum theory as a classical concept. On the one hand, time is the parameter entering Schrödinger's equation and measured by an external laboratory clock. But it could be considered that time also plays the role of an observable when a given event occurs (e.g., when a particle crosses through a potential barrier), and one would expect that like every observable, it should be represented in the theory by an operator whose properties are predictors of the outcome of time measurements made on physical systems. Several time operators have been proposed in different publications, but still, there is not a widely accepted consensus. That subject, among others concerned with time in quantum mechanics, is analyzed in the present chapter, where we focus on the analysis of time-reversal symmetry in non-relativistic quantum systems. The search for symmetries in Physics helps to study the structure of theories. Briefly speaking, a symmetry is a transformation that does not change the structure of the theory. We start with the analysis of Schrödinger’s Equation verifying that for obtaining a time-symmetric description of the dynamics of a particle, the operation of time-reversal must include conjugation represented by the action of an antiunitary operator acting over a wave function. In particular, we analyze quantum systems whose evolution is determined by a set of external parameters varying cyclically, discussing how even though these parameters return to their initial values, the state of the system acquires a geometric phase, which depends on the path followed by the external parameters in the parameter space and which in general can be associated with the lack of the time-reversal symmetry of the system.
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical