Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Scientific Reports

Effects of adaptive degrees of trust on coevolution of quantum strategies on scale-free networks

Qiang Li, Minyou Chen, Matjaž Perc, Azhar Iqbal, Derek Abbott

Published Oct 15, 2013• 36 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We study the impact of adaptive degrees of trust on the evolution of cooperation in the quantum prisoner's dilemma game. In addition to the strategies, links between players are also subject to evolution. Starting with a scale-free interaction network, players adjust trust towards their neighbors based on received payoffs. The latter governs the strategy adoption process, while trust governs the rewiring of links. As soon as the degree of trust towards a neighbor drops to zero, the link is rewired to another randomly chosen player within the network. We find that for small temptations to defect cooperators always dominate, while for intermediate and strong temptations a single quantum strategy is able to outperform all other strategies. In general, reciprocal trust remains within close relationships and favors the dominance of a single strategy. Due to coevolution, the power-law degree distributions transform to Poisson distributions.

DOI
10.1038/srep02949

Related papers

Entanglement Guarantees Emergence of Cooperation in Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma Games on Networks

Angsheng Li, Xi Yong

It was known that cooperation of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games fails to emerge in homogenous networks such as random graphs. Here we proposed a quantum prisoner's dilemma game. The game consists of two players, in which each player has three choices of strategy: cooperator (C), defector (D) and super cooperator (denoted by Q). We found that quantum entanglement guarantees emergence of a new cooperation, the super cooperation of the quantum prisoner's dilemma games, and that entanglement is the mechanism of guaranteed emergence of cooperation of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on networks. We showed that for a game with temptation b, there exists a threshold arccos √b/b for a measurement of entanglement, beyond which, (super) cooperation of evolutionary quantum prisoner's dilemma games is guaranteed to quickly emerge, giving rise to stochastic convergence of the cooperations, that if the entanglement degree γ is less than the threshold arccos √b/b, then the equilibrium frequency of cooperations of the games is positively correlated to the entanglement degree γ, and that if γ is less than arccos √b/b and b is beyond some boundary, then the equilibrium frequency of cooperations of the games on random graphs decreases as the average degree of the graphs increases.

Scientific Reports•Sep 5, 2014•56 citations

Entanglement plays an important role in evolutionary generalized prisoner's dilemma game on small-world networks

Xi Yong, Hongliang Sun, Juan Li

Cooperation is a fundamental aspect of biological systems and human society. In this work, we propose a generalized prisoner's dilemma quantum game and study the game on Watts-Strogatz small-world network (WS model) with different values of entanglement. Here entanglement is used as a metaphor to study relationship between players. In a single step, each player has three strategies to choose: cooperation, defection and adopting a special quantum strategy first introduced by Eisert (denoted by Q). The person who chooses the quantum strategy Q can be regarded as a super cooperator. In prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation is very hard to emerge on relatively homogeneous networks, such as random graphs and WS model. Our experimental results show that in generalized prisoners dilemma quantum game, entanglement can guarantee emergence of super cooperators and greatly increase the payoff of the whole network. Even on homogeneous networks with very large inducement value(b is close to 2), the frequency of cooperators can still exceeds 70%. This work provides a new insight into understanding cooperation when considering the role of relationship between cooperators.

IEEE Advanced Information Management, Communicates, Electronic and Automation Control Conference (IMCEC)•Oct 1, 2016•5 citations

Emergence of Super Cooperation of Prisoner’s Dilemma Games on Scale-Free Networks

Angsheng Li, Xi Yong

Recently, the authors proposed a quantum prisoner's dilemma game based on the spatial game of Nowak and May, and showed that the game can be played classically. By using this idea, we proposed three generalized prisoner's dilemma (GPD, for short) games based on the weak Prisoner's dilemma game, the full prisoner's dilemma game and the normalized Prisoner's dilemma game, written by GPDW, GPDF and GPDN respectively. Our games consist of two players, each of which has three strategies: cooperator (C), defector (D) and super cooperator (denoted by Q), and have a parameter γ to measure the entangled relationship between the two players. We found that our generalised prisoner's dilemma games have new Nash equilibrium principles, that entanglement is the principle of emergence and convergence (i.e., guaranteed emergence) of super cooperation in evolutions of our generalised prisoner's dilemma games on scale-free networks, that entanglement provides a threshold for a phase transition of super cooperation in evolutions of our generalised prisoner's dilemma games on scale-free networks, that the role of heterogeneity of the scale-free networks in cooperations and super cooperations is very limited, and that well-defined structures of scale-free networks allow coexistence of cooperators and super cooperators in the evolutions of the weak version of our generalised prisoner's dilemma games.

PLoS ONE•Feb 2, 2015•13 citations

The impact of honesty and trickery on a Bayesian quantum prisoners’ dilemma game*

Boyang Liu, Xin Bing Zhao, Hong‐Yi Dai +4 more

To explore the influence of quantum information on the common social problem of honesty and trickery, we propose a Bayesian model for the quantum prisoners’ dilemma game. In this model, the players’ strategy formation is regarded as a negotiation of their move contract based on their types of decision policies, honesty or trickery. Although the implementation of quantum information cannot eliminate tricky players, players in our model can always end up with higher payoffs than in the classical game. For a good proportion of a credibility parameter value, a rational player will take an honest action, which is in remarkable contrast to the observation that players tend to defect in the classical prisoners’ dilemma game. This research suggests that honesty will be promoted to enhance cooperation with the assistance of quantum information resources.

Chinese Physics B•Apr 23, 2020•3 citations

Prisoner's Dilemma in Quantum Perspective

Charnaditya Padakandla Venkata

It is known that quantum strategies change the range of possible payoffs for the players in the prisoner's dilemma. In this paper, we examine the effect of the degree of entanglement in determining the payoffs. When both players play quantum strategies, we show that the payoff for both players is unaffected by the entanglement value and it leads to a new Nash equilibrium.

•May 1, 2022•0 citations

Evolution of quantum and classical strategies on networks by group interactions

Qiang Li, Azhar Iqbal, Minyou Chen +1 more

In this paper, quantum strategies are introduced within evolutionary games in order to investigate the evolution of quantum and classical strategies on networks in the public goods game. Comparing the results of evolution on a scale-free network and a square lattice, we find that a quantum strategy outperforms the classical strategies, regardless of the network. Moreover, a quantum strategy dominates the population earlier in group interactions than it does in pairwise interactions. In particular, if the hub node in a scale-free network is occupied by a cooperator initially, the strategy of cooperation will prevail in the population. However, in other situations, a quantum strategy can defeat the classical ones and finally becomes the dominant strategy in the population.

New Journal of Physics•Oct 19, 2012•17 citations
We study the impact of adaptive degrees of trust on the evolution of cooperation in the quantum prisoner's dilemma game. In addition to the strategies, links between players are also subject to evolution. Starting with a scale-free interaction network, players adjust trust towards their neighbors based on received payoffs. The latter governs the strategy adoption process, while trust governs the rewiring of links. As soon as the degree of trust towards a neighbor drops to zero, the link is rewired to another randomly chosen player within the network. We find that for small temptations to defect cooperators always dominate, while for intermediate and strong temptations a single quantum strategy is able to outperform all other strategies. In general, reciprocal trust remains within close relationships and favors the dominance of a single strategy. Due to coevolution, the power-law degree distributions transform to Poisson distributions.
It was known that cooperation of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games fails to emerge in homogenous networks such as random graphs. Here we proposed a quantum prisoner's dilemma game. The game consists of two players, in which each player has three choices of strategy: cooperator (C), defector (D) and super cooperator (denoted by Q). We found that quantum entanglement guarantees emergence of a new cooperation, the super cooperation of the quantum prisoner's dilemma games, and that entanglement is the mechanism of guaranteed emergence of cooperation of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on networks. We showed that for a game with temptation b, there exists a threshold arccos √b/b for a measurement of entanglement, beyond which, (super) cooperation of evolutionary quantum prisoner's dilemma games is guaranteed to quickly emerge, giving rise to stochastic convergence of the cooperations, that if the entanglement degree γ is less than the threshold arccos √b/b, then the equilibrium frequency of cooperations of the games is positively correlated to the entanglement degree γ, and that if γ is less than arccos √b/b and b is beyond some boundary, then the equilibrium frequency of cooperations of the games on random graphs decreases as the average degree of the graphs increases.
Cooperation is a fundamental aspect of biological systems and human society. In this work, we propose a generalized prisoner's dilemma quantum game and study the game on Watts-Strogatz small-world network (WS model) with different values of entanglement. Here entanglement is used as a metaphor to study relationship between players. In a single step, each player has three strategies to choose: cooperation, defection and adopting a special quantum strategy first introduced by Eisert (denoted by Q). The person who chooses the quantum strategy Q can be regarded as a super cooperator. In prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation is very hard to emerge on relatively homogeneous networks, such as random graphs and WS model. Our experimental results show that in generalized prisoners dilemma quantum game, entanglement can guarantee emergence of super cooperators and greatly increase the payoff of the whole network. Even on homogeneous networks with very large inducement value(b is close to 2), the frequency of cooperators can still exceeds 70%. This work provides a new insight into understanding cooperation when considering the role of relationship between cooperators.
Recently, the authors proposed a quantum prisoner's dilemma game based on the spatial game of Nowak and May, and showed that the game can be played classically. By using this idea, we proposed three generalized prisoner's dilemma (GPD, for short) games based on the weak Prisoner's dilemma game, the full prisoner's dilemma game and the normalized Prisoner's dilemma game, written by GPDW, GPDF and GPDN respectively. Our games consist of two players, each of which has three strategies: cooperator (C), defector (D) and super cooperator (denoted by Q), and have a parameter γ to measure the entangled relationship between the two players. We found that our generalised prisoner's dilemma games have new Nash equilibrium principles, that entanglement is the principle of emergence and convergence (i.e., guaranteed emergence) of super cooperation in evolutions of our generalised prisoner's dilemma games on scale-free networks, that entanglement provides a threshold for a phase transition of super cooperation in evolutions of our generalised prisoner's dilemma games on scale-free networks, that the role of heterogeneity of the scale-free networks in cooperations and super cooperations is very limited, and that well-defined structures of scale-free networks allow coexistence of cooperators and super cooperators in the evolutions of the weak version of our generalised prisoner's dilemma games.
To explore the influence of quantum information on the common social problem of honesty and trickery, we propose a Bayesian model for the quantum prisoners’ dilemma game. In this model, the players’ strategy formation is regarded as a negotiation of their move contract based on their types of decision policies, honesty or trickery. Although the implementation of quantum information cannot eliminate tricky players, players in our model can always end up with higher payoffs than in the classical game. For a good proportion of a credibility parameter value, a rational player will take an honest action, which is in remarkable contrast to the observation that players tend to defect in the classical prisoners’ dilemma game. This research suggests that honesty will be promoted to enhance cooperation with the assistance of quantum information resources.
In this paper, quantum strategies are introduced within evolutionary games in order to investigate the evolution of quantum and classical strategies on networks in the public goods game. Comparing the results of evolution on a scale-free network and a square lattice, we find that a quantum strategy outperforms the classical strategies, regardless of the network. Moreover, a quantum strategy dominates the population earlier in group interactions than it does in pairwise interactions. In particular, if the hub node in a scale-free network is occupied by a cooperator initially, the strategy of cooperation will prevail in the population. However, in other situations, a quantum strategy can defeat the classical ones and finally becomes the dominant strategy in the population.