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Analysis of the influence of the rate of spies' measure on the quantum transmission

Brahim Ouchao, El Hassan El Kinani

Published Jan 1, 2012• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In this paper, we will study the influence of spies rate measure on the quantum transmission by using the entropy measures and java simulation. The quantum transmission adopted here is the BB84 protocol (Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard). In particular, we estimate the measurement error rate which indicate the presence of spies and we analyze the influence of the the spies rate of measures of on the transmission

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Statistical Analysis of Common Qubits between Alice and Bob in BB84 Protocol

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In this paper a statistical analysis of common qubits(photon) transmitted by Alice and received by Bob in the same basis using BB84 protocol with and without the presence of eavesdroppers are studied. The simulation used here is based on java language for transmission of the polarized photon between Alice and Bob via quantum channel (BB84 Protocol coding in Java).

•Jan 1, 2011•3 citations

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An attempt to eavesdrop on a quantum cryptographic channel reveals itself through errors it inevitably introduces into the transmission. We investigate the relationship between the induced error rate and the maximum amount of information the eavesdropper can extract, in both the two-state B92 [B92 refers to the work of C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992)] and the four-state BB84 [BB84 refers to the work of C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984), pp. 175--179] quantum cryptographic protocols. In each case, the optimal eavesdropping method that on average yields the most information for a given error rate is explicitly constructed. Analysis is limited to eavesdropping strategies where each bit of the quantum transmission is attacked individually and independently from other bits. Subject to this restriction, however, we believe that all attacks not forbidden by physical laws are covered. Unlike previous work, the eavesdropper's advantage is measured in terms of Renyi (rather than Shannon) information, and with respect only to bits received error-free by Bob (rather than all bits). This alters both the maximum extractable information and the optimal eavesdropping attack. The result can be used directly at the privacy amplification stage of the protocol to accomplish secure communication over a noisy channel.

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The BB84 protocol

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The publication of the BB84 protocol by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [10] marks the beginning of quantum key distribution. Since then, many other protocols have been invented. Yet, BB84 keeps a privileged place in the list of existing protocols: it is the one most analyzed and most often implemented, including those used in commercial products, e.g., [91, 113]. In this chapter, I define the BB84 protocol, although I already described it informally in Section 1.1. The physical implementation is then investigated. Finally, I analyze the eavesdropping strategies against BB84 and deduce the secret key rate. Description Alice chooses binary key elements randomly and independently, denoted by the random variable X ∈ χ = {0, 1}. In this protocol, there are two encoding rules, numbered by i ∈ {1, 2}. Alice randomly and independently chooses which encoding rule she uses for each key element. In case 1, Alice prepares a qubit from the basis {|0〉, |1〉} as In case 2, Alice prepares a qubit from the basis {|+〉, |−〉} as On his side, Bob measures either Z or X , yielding the result Y Z or Y X , choosing at random which observable he measures. After sending a predefined number of qubits, Alice reveals to Bob the encoding rule for each of them. They proceed with sifting, that is, they discard the key elements for which Alice used case 1 (or case 2) and Bob measured Z (or X ). For the remaining (sifted) key elements, we denote Bob's sifted measurements by Y .

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Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security by exploiting the principles of quantum mechanics. Among QKD protocols, the BB84 scheme remains the most widely adopted for both theoretical research and practical implementation. A critical parameter determining the reliability and security of BB84 is the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), which quantifies errors in the sifted key arising from channel noise or potential eavesdropping. This paper presents a systematic review and analysis of QBER within the BB84 protocol, examining its calculation, statistical estimation methods, and role in detecting eavesdropping activity. Simulation results, corroborated by reported experimental observations, reveal a near-linear relationship between eavesdropping intensity and QBER, with values approaching 25% under full intercept-resend attacks. Four confidence interval estimation methods, Wald, Wilson, Clopper-Pearson, and Hoeffding's inequality, are compared for robust QBER analysis in finite-key scenarios. Protocol enhancements, including decoy-state methods, hybrid cryptographic models, and quantum-resistant authentication, are discussed as mechanisms to mitigate errors and strengthen resilience across fiber, free-space, underwater, and satellite QKD systems. Open challenges in distinguishing noise-induced errors from malicious eavesdropping, and the role of adaptive error correction and machine-learning-assisted QBER estimation in future quantum networks, are identified as key directions for further research.

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Complete physical simulation of the entangling-probe attack on the BB84 protocol

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Quantum Electronics and Laser Science Conference•May 1, 2007•1 citation
In this paper, we will study the influence of spies
rate measure on the quantum transmission by using the entropy
measures and java simulation. The quantum transmission
adopted here is the BB84 protocol (Charles Bennett and Gilles
Brassard). In particular, we estimate the measurement error
rate which indicate the presence of spies and we analyze the influence
of the the spies rate of measures of on the transmission
An attempt to eavesdrop on a quantum cryptographic channel reveals itself through errors it inevitably introduces into the transmission. We investigate the relationship between the induced error rate and the maximum amount of information the eavesdropper can extract, in both the two-state B92 [B92 refers to the work of C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992)] and the four-state BB84 [BB84 refers to the work of C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984), pp. 175--179] quantum cryptographic protocols. In each case, the optimal eavesdropping method that on average yields the most information for a given error rate is explicitly constructed. Analysis is limited to eavesdropping strategies where each bit of the quantum transmission is attacked individually and independently from other bits. Subject to this restriction, however, we believe that all attacks not forbidden by physical laws are covered. Unlike previous work, the eavesdropper's advantage is measured in terms of Renyi (rather than Shannon) information, and with respect only to bits received error-free by Bob (rather than all bits). This alters both the maximum extractable information and the optimal eavesdropping attack. The result can be used directly at the privacy amplification stage of the protocol to accomplish secure communication over a noisy channel.
The publication of the BB84 protocol by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [10] marks the beginning of quantum key distribution. Since then, many other protocols have been invented. Yet, BB84 keeps a privileged place in the list of existing protocols: it is the one most analyzed and most often implemented, including those used in commercial products, e.g., [91, 113]. In this chapter, I define the BB84 protocol, although I already described it informally in Section 1.1. The physical implementation is then investigated. Finally, I analyze the eavesdropping strategies against BB84 and deduce the secret key rate. Description Alice chooses binary key elements randomly and independently, denoted by the random variable X ∈ χ = {0, 1}. In this protocol, there are two encoding rules, numbered by i ∈ {1, 2}. Alice randomly and independently chooses which encoding rule she uses for each key element. In case 1, Alice prepares a qubit from the basis {|0〉, |1〉} as In case 2, Alice prepares a qubit from the basis {|+〉, |−〉} as On his side, Bob measures either Z or X , yielding the result Y Z or Y X , choosing at random which observable he measures. After sending a predefined number of qubits, Alice reveals to Bob the encoding rule for each of them. They proceed with sifting, that is, they discard the key elements for which Alice used case 1 (or case 2) and Bob measured Z (or X ). For the remaining (sifted) key elements, we denote Bob's sifted measurements by Y .
In the BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, the communicating parties do a quantum bit error rate (QBER) test to determine whether there is an eavesdropper trying to gain information about the secret key. However, the QBER is not only influenced by the eavesdropper’s strategies, but also by the imperfections of the physical devices and the channel through which the quantum states propagate. We developed a simple channel model with error parameters describing the channel and the potential polarization switching in the transmitter, to see how those effects influence the QBER in a polarization-qubit BB84 implementation. Certain well-defined probabilistic channel models are compared to see which is responsible for the highest error probability.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security by exploiting the principles of quantum mechanics. Among QKD protocols, the BB84 scheme remains the most widely adopted for both theoretical research and practical implementation. A critical parameter determining the reliability and security of BB84 is the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), which quantifies errors in the sifted key arising from channel noise or potential eavesdropping. This paper presents a systematic review and analysis of QBER within the BB84 protocol, examining its calculation, statistical estimation methods, and role in detecting eavesdropping activity. Simulation results, corroborated by reported experimental observations, reveal a near-linear relationship between eavesdropping intensity and QBER, with values approaching 25% under full intercept-resend attacks. Four confidence interval estimation methods, Wald, Wilson, Clopper-Pearson, and Hoeffding's inequality, are compared for robust QBER analysis in finite-key scenarios. Protocol enhancements, including decoy-state methods, hybrid cryptographic models, and quantum-resistant authentication, are discussed as mechanisms to mitigate errors and strengthen resilience across fiber, free-space, underwater, and satellite QKD systems. Open challenges in distinguishing noise-induced errors from malicious eavesdropping, and the role of adaptive error correction and machine-learning-assisted QBER estimation in future quantum networks, are identified as key directions for further research.