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Nonlocality and the Epistemic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Yemima Ben‐Menahem

Published Jul 15, 2015• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

According to the current epistemic interpretation of quantum probabilities, the quantum correlations manifesting nonlocality can be derived from purely probabilistic and information-theoretic constraints. As such, they do not constitute a spacetime phenomenon and cannot lead to conflict between QM and any spatial-temporal constraints. This paper compares recent epistemic interpretations with earlier probabilistic interpretations, noting their merits as well as the difficulties they encounter. In particular, the implications of the recent PBR theorem are examined. While generally seen as undermining the epistemic interpretation, I argue that the PBR theorem actually suggests an epistemic position more radical than previously ones. This review of probabilistic interpretations enables reassessment of the epistemic theorist's attempt to disentangle nonlocality from spacetime considerations

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According to the current epistemic interpretation of quantum probabilities, the quantum correlations manifesting nonlocality can be derived from purely probabilistic and information-theoretic constraints. As such, they do not constitute a spacetime phenomenon and cannot lead to conflict between QM and any spatial-temporal constraints. This paper compares recent epistemic interpretations with earlier probabilistic interpretations, noting their merits as well as the difficulties they encounter. In particular, the implications of the recent PBR theorem are examined. While generally seen as undermining the epistemic interpretation, I argue that the PBR theorem actually suggests an epistemic position more radical than previously ones. This review of probabilistic interpretations enables reassessment of the epistemic theorist's attempt to disentangle nonlocality from spacetime considerations
I argue for a realist interpretation of the quantum state. I begin by reviewing and critically evaluating two arguments for an antirealist interpretation of the quantum state, the first derived from the so-called ‘measurement problem’, and the second from the concept of local causality. I argue that existing antirealist interpretations do not solve the measurement problem. Furthermore, I argue that it is possible to construct a local, realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, using methods borrowed from quantum field theory and based on John S. Bell’s concept of ‘local beables’.\nIf the quantum state is interpreted subjectively, then the probabilities it associates with experimental outcomes are themselves subjective. I address the prospects for developing a subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanical probabilities based on the Quantum de Finetti Representation Theorem. Epistemic interpretations of the quantum state can be divided into those that are epistemic with respect to underlying ontic states, and those that are epistemic with respect to measurement outcomes. The Pusey Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) theorem places serious constraints on the former family of interpretations. I identify an important explanatory gap in the latter sort of interpretation. In particular, if the quantum state is a subjective representation of beliefs about future experimental outcomes, then it is not clear why those experimenters who use quantum mechanics should be better able to negotiate the world than those who do not.\nI then turn to the task of articulating a positive argument for the thesis of quantum state realism. I begin by articulating a minimal set of conditions that any realist interpretation must meet. One assumption built into the PBR result is that systems prepared in a given quantum state have a well-defined set of physical properties, which may be completely or incompletely described by the quantum state. Antirealist interpretations that reject this assumption are therefore compatible with the PBR result. A compelling case for quantum state realism must therefore be made on more general grounds. I consider two concrete examples of phenomena described by quantum mechanics that strongly suggest that the quantum state is genuinely representational in character.
Quantum correlations, such as entanglement, are fundamental to quantum mechanics and a key resource for quantum technologies. However, their full quantitative description and axiomatic foundations remain unresolved. Recent studies suggest that the origin of nonlocal correlations lies in principles tied to quantum uncertainty. In particular, a recent paper [1] introduced the principle of Relativistic Independence (RI), which asserts that observers with spacelike separation cannot influence each other's uncertainty relations. This principle provides a novel bound intertwining local and nonlocal correlations:
Abstract This chapter explores a serious epistemic problem for the class of ‘orthodox interpretations’ (including QBism, neo-Copenhagen interpretations, pragmatic interpretations and some versions of relational quantum mechanics) and discusses various possible attempts at a solution. I contend that the difficulty of making sense of intersubjectivity in orthodox interpretations makes these approaches self-undermining. I argue that these approaches forbid observers from sharing information with one another or even past versions of themselves, and explain why information-sharing is an essential feature of scientific practice and scientific epistemology. I also discuss some ‘Extended Wigner’s Friend’ theorems which have recently attracted interest in quantum foundations, arguing that we must interpret these theorems in light of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge.
Quantum mechanics lacks an intuitive interpretation, which is the cause of a generally formalistic approach to its use. This in turn has led to a certain insensitivity to the actual meaning of many words used in its description and interpretation. Herein, we analyze carefully the possible mathematical meanings of those terms used in analysis of EPR’s contention, that Quantum Mechanics is incomplete, as well as Bell’s work descendant therefrom. As a result, many inconsistencies and errors in contemporary discussions of nonlocality, as well as in Bell’s Ansatz with respect to the laws of probability, are identified. Evading these errors precludes serious conflicts between Quantum Mechanics and both Special Relativity and Philosophy.
Abstract According to Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) the wave function ψ\psiψ ψ is considered neither a concrete physical item evolving in spacetime, nor an object representing the absolute state of a certain quantum system. In this interpretative framework, ψ\psiψ ψ is defined as a computational device encoding observers’ information; hence, RQM offers a somewhat epistemic view of the wave function. This perspective seems to be at odds with the PBR theorem, a formal result excluding that wave functions represent knowledge of an underlying reality described by some ontic state. In this paper we argue that RQM is not affected by the conclusions of PBR’s argument; consequently, the alleged inconsistency can be dissolved. To do that, we will thoroughly discuss the very foundations of the PBR theorem, i.e. Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization of ontological models, showing that their implicit assumptions about the nature of the ontic state are incompatible with the main tenets of RQM. Then, we will ask whether it is possible to derive a relational PBR-type result, answering in the negative. This conclusion shows some limitations of this theorem not yet discussed in the literature.