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International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)

Secrecy Capacity of Wireless LAN

Ryuzou Nishi, Yoshiaki Hori, Kouichi Sakurai

Published Jan 1, 2009• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We address secure secret key distribution in wireless communication systems. There is the secrecy capacity concept that it can distribute information which the third parties can not eavesdrop because of the noise over the distribution channel. Then, we address secure secret key distribution in wireless communication systems using secrecy capacity concept. Wireless channel is noisier compared with wired channel. Specifically, we investigate about wiretap channel coding that it can implement in the existing wireless LAN systems. We have investigated the coding parameters and the conditions that it can implement.

DOI
10.1109/ares.2009.91

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•Nov 2, 2004•15 citations
We address secure secret key distribution in wireless communication systems. There is the secrecy capacity concept that it can distribute information which the third parties can not eavesdrop because of the noise over the distribution channel. Then, we address secure secret key distribution in wireless communication systems using secrecy capacity concept. Wireless channel is noisier compared with wired channel. Specifically, we investigate about wiretap channel coding that it can implement in the existing wireless LAN systems. We have investigated the coding parameters and the conditions that it can implement.
Wire-tap channel coding allows information-theoretically secure communication between legitimate sender and receiver in presence of an eavesdropper Eve, whose channel is subject to noise. A secrecy capacity for their communication is equal to capacity of the channel connecting them, minus capacity of Eve's channel, when the channels are assumed independent and affected by additive white Gaussian noise. In order to increase the secrecy capacity, we propose to employ a coding scheme using matched filter. The legitimate parties are assumed to share a pre-shared key of the matched filter, secretly from Eve. Hereby, the legitimate parties can use it to increase the capacity of their channel, while Eve cannot. We propose to apply this scheme to indoor wireless communication over IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN, analyze advantages of our construction and discuss an appropriate selection of coding scheme fitting the IEEE 802.11 protocol specification.
We investigate an approach to physical-layer security based on the premise that the coding mechanism for secrecy over noisy channels is fundamentally tied to the notion of resolvability. Instead of considering capacity-based constructions, which associate to each message a sub-code whose rate approaches the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel, we consider resolvability-based constructions, which associate to each message a sub-code whose rate is beyond the resolvability of the eavesdropper’s channel. We provide evidence that resolvability is a more powerful and perhaps more fundamental coding mechanism for secrecy by developing results that hold for strong secrecy metrics and arbitrary channels. Specifically, we show that, at least for binary symmetric wiretap channels, random capacity-based constructions fail to approach the strong secrecy capacity while resolvability-based constructions achieve it. We then obtain the secrecy-capacity region of arbitrary broadcast channels with confidential messages and a cost constraint for strong secrecy metrics, which generalizes existing results. Finally, we specialize our results to study the secrecy capacity of wireless channels with perfect channel state information, compound and mixed channels, as well as the secret-key capacity of source models for secret-key agreement. By tying secrecy to resolvability, we obtain achievable rates for stronger secrecy metrics and with simpler proofs than previously derived. Index Terms information-theoretic security, wiretap channel, secret-key agreement, information-spectrum, resolv-ability, wireless channels.
Ensuring data privacy of wireless communication systems has been a challenging problem for various reasons. The simplicity of eavesdropping on wireless transmissions makes the barrier to entry lower for wireless than for wired systems. Due to size and power constraints, wireless systems are sometimes unable to implement the complex cryptographic algorithms that can ensure the privacy of their data, leaving them with weaker schemes that are more easily exploited. However, the wireless security problem has one distinct advantage over the wired problem in that the channel seen by the eavesdropper is not usually correlated with the channel seen by the intended receiver. Recent research in the community has suggested that the randomness inherent in the wireless channel may be exploited to create secret keys dynamically, making simple wireless cryptographic schemes extremely strong and in some applications providing perfect secrecy. In this paper, we present some information theory bounds on key lengths for various wireless channel models and discuss the impact such physical channel-derived dynamic re-keying would have on various applications. We also present some thoughts on proving out the concepts in actual systems.
The location-specific channel state information can be exploited to generate secret keys for wireless system services, In the multipath wireless environment. Its secrecy capacity was usually studied with the wiretap channel model. This paper proposes a side channel model which is even more threatening to the security of the physical layer randomness based secret keys. We present the information-theoretic analysis of the side channel model, and compare it with the wire-tap model. The analysis indicates that the secret key capacity of the side-channel will be lower than that of the wire-tap channel, especially with a fading scenario. We conduct MATLAB simulation of physical layer randomness based key generation and SPICE simulation of key extraction to observe the side channel leakage of the circuit. The simulation results confirm the consistency of the key bits, thus verifying the feasibility of our proposed side-channel attack scheme against the physical layer security.
Wireless networking has kept evolving with additional features and increasing capacity. Meanwhile, inherent characteristics of wireless networking make it more vulnerable than wired networks. In this thesis we present an extensive and comprehensive review of physical layer security in wireless networking. Different from cryptography, physical layer security, emerging from the information theoretic assessment of secrecy, could leverage the properties of wireless channel for security purpose, by either enabling secret communication without the need of keys, or facilitating the key agreement process. Hence we categorize existing literature into two main branches, namely keyless security and key-based security. We elaborate the evolution of this area from the early theoretic works on the wiretap channel, to its generalizations to more complicated scenarios including multiple-user, multiple-access and multiple-antenna systems, and introduce not only theoretical results but practical implementations. We critically and systematically examine the existing knowledge by analyzing the fundamental mechanics for each approach. Hence we are able to highlight advantages and limitations of proposed techniques, as well their interrelations, and bring insights into future developments of this area.
With the advent of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, perfect (i.e. information-theoretic) security can now be achieved for distribution of a cryptographic key. QKD systems and similar protocols use classical error-correcting codes for both error correction (for the honest parties to correct errors) and privacy amplification (to make an eavesdropper fully ignorant). From a coding perspective, a good model for such a setting is the wire tap channel system introduced by Wyner in 1975. In this paper, we study fundamental limits and coding methods for wire tap channel systems. We provide a novel proof for the secrecy capacity theorem for wire tap channels and show how capacity achieving codes can be used to achieve the secrecy capacity for any wiretap channel. We also consider binary erasure channel and binary symmetric channel special cases for the wiretap channel system and propose specific practical codes. In some cases our designs achieve the secrecy capacity and in others the codes provide complete security at rates below secrecy capacity in some specific cases.