We discuss Chalmers ’ “hard problem ” in respect of a mind/brain identity theory. We examine a handful of mathematical parallels between the visual field and its concomitant quantum field, and argue for an identity between the two fields.
Although it is not endorsed by every theoretical physicist, I hold that - paraphrasing Abner Shimony - a theory of everything must 'close the circle'. That is, it must provide an account of the existence of consciousness in nature. Phenomenal consciousness, this intimate 'feel of me being me', is difficult to grasp in physical terms. David Chalmers famously distinguished the 'easy' cognitive problems of the mind from the true 'hard problem': physical theories describe worlds that could have been zombie-worlds as well, i.e. worlds occupied by creatures who act the way we do, but who do not share with us that special aspect we call phenomenal consciousness. That is to say, the facts of physics do not entail it.\nIn this thesis I explore how we should understand the problem from the perspectives of a discipline that seems to be concerned by its very nature with 'a view from the outside'. The burden of the hard problem of consciousness for physics seems to be concerned with putting a shift from the third- to the first person's perspective somewhere into physics. A deeper analysis of two concrete proposals for a physical theory of the mind reveals that specific interpretations of quantum mechanics take this first person's perspective as fundamental from the outset. It turns out that views on the ontology of quantum theory sometimes perfectly align with perspectives on the ontology of consciousness. I conclude that the essence of the hard problem for physics must not be concerned with an explanation of the existence of consciousness, but that it rather should be about the identification of metaphysically reasonable grounds to decide where to put it into nature.
The hard problem in consciousness is the problem of understanding how physical processes in the brain could give rise to subjective conscious experience. In this paper, I suggest that in order to understand the relationship between consciousness and the physical world, we need to probe deeply into the nature of physical reality. This leads us to quantum physics and to a second explanatory gap: that between quantum and classical reality. I will seek a philosophical framework that can address these two gaps simultaneously. Our analysis of quantum mechanics will naturally lead us to the notion of a hidden reality and to the postulate that consciousness is an integral component of this reality. The framework proposed in the paper provides the philosophical underpinnings for a theory of consciousness while satisfactorily resolving the interpretation problem in quantum mechanics without the need to alter its mathematical structure. I also discuss some implications for a scientific theory of consciousness.
Abstract There has been an upsurge of interest lately in developing Wigner’s hypothesis that conscious observation causes collapse by exploring dynamical collapse models in which some purportedly quantifiable aspect(s) of consciousness resist superposition. Kremnizer–Ranchin, Chalmers–McQueen and Okon–Sebastián have explored the idea that collapse may be associated with a numerical measure of consciousness. More recently, Chalmers–McQueen have argued that any single measure is inadequate because it will allow superpositions of distinct states of equal consciousness measure to persist. They suggest a satisfactory model needs to associate collapse with a set of measures quantifying aspects of consciousness, such as the “Q-shapes” defined by Tononi et al. in their “integrated information theory” (IIT) of consciousness. I argue here that Chalmers–McQueen’s argument against associating a single measure with collapse requires a precise symmetry between brain states associated with different experiences and thus does not apply to the only case where we have strong intuitions, namely human (or other terrestrial biological) observers. In defence of Chalmers–McQueen’s stance, it might be argued that idealized artificial information processing networks could display such symmetries. However, I argue that the most natural form of any theory (such as IIT) that postulates a map from network states to mind states is one that assigns identical mind states to isomorphic network states (as IIT does). This suggests that, if such a map exists, no familiar components of mind states, such as viewing different colours, or experiencing pleasure or pain, are likely to be related by symmetries.
Orthodox Copenhagen quantum theory renounces the quest to understand the reality in which we are imbedded, and settles for practical rules that describe connections between our observations. However, an examination of certain nonlocal features of quantum theory suggests that the perceived need for this renunciation was due to the uncritical importation from classical physics of a crippling metaphysical prejudice, and that rejection of that prejudice opens the way to a dynamical theory of the interaction between mind and brain that has significant explanatory power.