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Foundations of Physics

Physics and Causation

Michaël Esfeld

Published Oct 8, 2009• 14 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s10701-009-9357-y

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This chapter focuses specifically on the notion of causation. Unless a causal interpretation can be given of quantum mechanics, there is a fundamental discontinuity between the quantum realm and everything else in the world. The quantum-theoretical dualism of waves and particles makes the same entity appear both as matter and as force. There are of course challenges to other basic ontological categories that come from quantum physics, such as to notions of continuity and identity. Both in philosophy and physics, there is a frequent assumption that causation is the provider or vehicle of determinism, via causal necessitation. The indeterminism of quantum physics leaves people with a more practical concern about causation. A feature of causation that makes predictions fallible is that causal processes are extremely sensitive to a change in context. The genuine interaction of multiple factors should therefore be seen as a symptom of causation rather than as something that needs to be analysed away by theoretical abstraction.

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The nature of emergence of complexity out of the underlying physics is a key issue in understanding the world around us (1). Genuine emergence can be claimed (2⇓–4) to depend on top-down causation, which enables higher emergent levels to direct the outcomes of causation at lower levels to fulfill higher-level causal requirements; for example, the needs of heart physiology at the systems level determine gene expression at the cellular level via gene regulatory networks (5) (Fig. 1). However, the idea of top-down causation has been denied by a number of commentators (e.g., refs. 6 and 7). The paper by Aharonov et al. (8) makes a strong contribution to this debate by giving quantum physics examples where top-down causation manifestly occurs. This physics result has strong implications for the philosophical debate about whether strong emergence is possible. Indeed, it gives specific examples where it occurs in a remarkably strong form. Fig. 1. Bottom-up and top-down causation from the quantum level up to the organism level and down again. Adapted with permission of Royal Society, from ref. 5; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. Now, the word “causation” is regarded with suspicion by many philosophers of science, so to characterize what is happening one can perhaps rather use a number of different descriptions such as “whole–part constraint” or “top-down realization.” The key point remains the same, that higher levels can influence lower-level outcomes in many ways, and hence explain how strong emergence is possible. This occurs across science in general, and in physics in particular (3, 4). The latter point … [↵][1]1Email: george.ellis{at}uct.ac.za. [1]: #xref-corresp-1-1

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This chapter focuses specifically on the notion of causation. Unless a causal interpretation can be given of quantum mechanics, there is a fundamental discontinuity between the quantum realm and everything else in the world. The quantum-theoretical dualism of waves and particles makes the same entity appear both as matter and as force. There are of course challenges to other basic ontological categories that come from quantum physics, such as to notions of continuity and identity. Both in philosophy and physics, there is a frequent assumption that causation is the provider or vehicle of determinism, via causal necessitation. The indeterminism of quantum physics leaves people with a more practical concern about causation. A feature of causation that makes predictions fallible is that causal processes are extremely sensitive to a change in context. The genuine interaction of multiple factors should therefore be seen as a symptom of causation rather than as something that needs to be analysed away by theoretical abstraction.
The nature of emergence of complexity out of the underlying physics is a key issue in understanding the world around us (1). Genuine emergence can be claimed (2⇓–4) to depend on top-down causation, which enables higher emergent levels to direct the outcomes of causation at lower levels to fulfill higher-level causal requirements; for example, the needs of heart physiology at the systems level determine gene expression at the cellular level via gene regulatory networks (5) (Fig. 1). However, the idea of top-down causation has been denied by a number of commentators (e.g., refs. 6 and 7). The paper by Aharonov et al. (8) makes a strong contribution to this debate by giving quantum physics examples where top-down causation manifestly occurs. This physics result has strong implications for the philosophical debate about whether strong emergence is possible. Indeed, it gives specific examples where it occurs in a remarkably strong form. Fig. 1. Bottom-up and top-down causation from the quantum level up to the organism level and down again. Adapted with permission of Royal Society, from ref. 5; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. Now, the word “causation” is regarded with suspicion by many philosophers of science, so to characterize what is happening one can perhaps rather use a number of different descriptions such as “whole–part constraint” or “top-down realization.” The key point remains the same, that higher levels can influence lower-level outcomes in many ways, and hence explain how strong emergence is possible. This occurs across science in general, and in physics in particular (3, 4). The latter point … [↵][1]1Email: george.ellis{at}uct.ac.za. [1]: #xref-corresp-1-1