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IEEE Transactions on Information Theory

General Error Decodable Secret Sharing Scheme and Its Application

Kaoru Kurosawa

Published Sep 1, 2011• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Consider a model of secret sharing schemes with cheaters. We say that a secret sharing scheme is error decodable if we can still recover the secretscorrectly from a noisy share vector (share1', ..., sharen'). In this paper, we first prove that a perfect secret sharing scheme is error decodable if and only if the adversary structure Γ satisfies a certain condition calledQ3. Next, for such Γ , we show a scheme such that the decoding algorithm runs in polynomial-time in |S| and the size of a linear secret sharing scheme which realizes Γ. We finally show an application to 1-round perfectly secure message transmission schemes (PSMT).

DOI
10.1109/tit.2011.2161927

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Consider a model of secret sharing schemes with cheaters. We say that a secret sharing scheme is error decodable if we can still recover the secretscorrectly from a noisy share vector (share1', ..., sharen'). In this paper, we first prove that a perfect secret sharing scheme is error decodable if and only if the adversary structure Γ satisfies a certain condition calledQ3. Next, for such Γ , we show a scheme such that the decoding algorithm runs in polynomial-time in |S| and the size of a linear secret sharing scheme which realizes Γ. We finally show an application to 1-round perfectly secure message transmission schemes (PSMT).
Consider a model of secret sharing schemes with cheaters. We say that a secret sharing scheme is error decodable if we can still recover the secret s correctly from a noisy share vector (share1', ..., sharen'). In this paper, we first prove that a perfect secret sharing scheme is error decodable if and only if the adversary structure Γ satisfies a certain condition called Q3. Next, for such Γ , we show a scheme such that the decoding algorithm runs in polynomial-time in |S | and the size of a linear secret sharing scheme which realizes Γ. We finally show an application to 1-round perfectly secure message transmission schemes (PSMT).
In the model of Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Schemes (PSMTs), there are n channels between a sender and a receiver, and they share no key. An infinitely powerful adversary A can corrupt (observe and forge) the messages sent through some subset of n channels. For non-threshold adversaries called Q 2, Kumar et al. showed a many round PSMT (Ashwin Kumar et al. On perfectly secure communication over arbitrary networks. PODC 2002, pp. 193---202, 2002). In this paper, we show round efficient PSMTs against Q 2-adevrsaries. We first give a 3-round PSMT which runs in polynomial time in the size of the underlying linear secret sharing scheme. We next present a 2-round PSMT which is inefficient in general. (However, it is efficient for some special case.)
The characterization of access structure is one of the main open problems in secret sharing schemes. We are particularly interested in determining which Q 3 access structures can be realized and the requirement should be achieved even in the presence of an adversary who is able to corrupt some players in an ideal secret sharing scheme. The problems are studied in our paper. Above all, we present a concrete scheme that can meet all above requirements. In our scheme, it is not only a dynamic multi-secret and multi-use sharing protocol, but participants from access structure can recover the secret using their shares, while the same number of participants from adversary structure can't recover the secret using their shares, which is different from general access structure schemes. Moreover, in the whole dynamic process, the coefficients of polynomial and private secret shares always stay the same. Therefore, it enjoys high practical value.
Abstract. In the model of perfectly secure message transmission schemes (PSMTs), there are n channels between a sender and a receiver. An infinitely powerful adversary A may corrupt (observe and forge) the messages sent through t out of n channels. The sender wishes to send a secret s to the receiver perfectly privately and perfectly reliably without sharing any key with the receiver. In this paper, we show the first 2-round PSMT for n = 2t + 1 such that not only the transmission rate is O(n) but also the computational costs of the sender and the receiver are both polynomial in n. This means that we solve the open problem raised by Agarwal, Cramer and de Haan at CRYPTO 2006. The main novelty of our approach is to introduce a notion of pseudobasis to the coding theory. It will be an independent interest for coding theory, too.
Abstract. An n -player -secure robust secret sharing scheme is a ( t , n )-threshold secret sharing scheme with the additional property that the secret can be recovered, with probability at least , from the set of all shares even if up to t players provide incorrect shares. The existing constructions of robust secret sharing schemes for the range have the share size larger than the secret size. An important goal in this area is to minimize the share size. In the paper, we propose a new unconditionally-secure robust secret sharing scheme for the case with share size equal to the secret size. This is the minimum possible size as dictated by the perfect secrecy of the scheme. We further extend our scheme to realize a class of multilevel access structures that satisfy a special condition. The property that the share size is equal to secret size is preserved in the extended scheme. The proposed scheme is the first known robust secret sharing scheme realizing multilevel access structure.
Secret sharing schemes which are secure under the presence of malicious participants who forge their shares have been investigated by many researchers so far. In this paper we consider a secret sharing scheme with a key at an encoder and a decoder and analyze its security against the substitution attack by malicious participants. We first give conditions that the secret sharing scheme with a key must satisfy. Next, we construct a simple secret sharing scheme with a key that generates n shares and detects forged shares with high probability. We can prove that, if at most n - 1 malicious participants collude and try to deceive the other participants by forged shares optimally, the success probability of such an attack is upper-bounded by |S|-1/|X|-1, where |S| and |X| denote the sizes of the secret and the n shares, respectively. In addition, we investigate basic properties of the scheme especially for the case of n = 2.