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Self-Locating Uncertainty, Subjective Probability and the Everett Interpretation

Fraser, Keith

Published Jan 1, 2014• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper analyses an attempt to reintroduce the probabilistic predictions of quantum mechanics into the Everett interpretation. An overview of the measurement problem and the Everett interpretation are first given, with particular attention paid to the issue of probability within a deterministic theory. An argument is put forth that observers in an Everettian multiverse generically experience a period of post-measurement uncertainty in regards to their location. It is further argued that this uncertainty allows pre-measurement to observers to act as if they are uncertain about future outcomes. This is then the justification for attaching probabilities to the squared moduli of the wave function. It is also noted that there is an assumption of typicality present in discussions of probability within Everett and some arguments to justify this assumption are considered.

DOI
10.7916/d81j98ch

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This paper analyses an attempt to reintroduce the probabilistic predictions of quantum mechanics into the Everett interpretation. An overview of the measurement problem and the Everett interpretation are first given, with particular attention paid to the issue of probability within a deterministic theory. An argument is put forth that observers in an Everettian multiverse generically experience a period of post-measurement uncertainty in regards to their location. It is further argued that this uncertainty allows pre-measurement to observers to act as if they are uncertain about future outcomes. This is then the justification for attaching probabilities to the squared moduli of the wave function. It is also noted that there is an assumption of typicality present in discussions of probability within Everett and some arguments to justify this assumption are considered.
In the current debate on the concept of probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics Saunders and Wallace argue for a notion of pre-measurement uncertainty whilst Greaves and Myrvold attempt to do without uncertainty altogether. Both these approaches are controversial and I suggest a middle way. I develop in detail an argument which Wallace has hinted at and Greaves has seen as beside the point in order to show that Vaidman’s concept of post-measurement uncertainty has more relevance to pre-measurement decision making than has hitherto been generally recognised. Further, Vaidman uncertainty leads naturally to another form of post-measurement uncertainty which clarifies the process of experimental confirmation of quantum mechanics in the Everett picture. I also stress the importance of Sider’s theory of transtemporal identity in making Everett’s multiverse intelligible.
There are currently several versions of Everett's relative state interpretation of quantum mechanics, responding to a number of perceived problems for the original proposal. One of those problems is whether Everett's idea is in accord with the standard 'probabilistic' interpretation implicit in the Born rule. I argue in defence of what appears to be Everett's original view on this. The contribution I aim to make is a more complete discussion of the central issues of the identity of objects and observers over time and how the concept of expectation can be applied when all 'possible' outcomes of a measurement process are regarded as actually occurring.
I consider exactly what is involved in a solution to the probability problem of the Everett interpretation, in the light of recent work on applying considerations from decision theory to that problem. I suggest an overall framework for understanding probability in a physical theory, and conclude that this framework, when applied to the Everett interpretation, yields the result that that interpretation satisfactorily solves the measurement problem. 1. Introduction 2. What is probability? 2.1Objective probability and the Principal Principle 2.2Three ways of satisfying the functional definition 2.3Cautious functionalism 2.4Is the functional definition complete? 3. The Everett interpretation and subjective uncertainty 3.1Interpreting quantum mechanics 3.2The need for subjective uncertainty 3.3Saunders' argument for subjective uncertainty 3.4Objections to Saunders' argument 3.5Subjective uncertainty again: arguments from interpretative charity 3.6Quantum weights and the functional definition of probability 4. Rejecting subjective uncertainty 4.1The fission program 4.2Against the fission program 5. Justifying the axioms of decision theory 5.1The primitive status of the decision-theoretic axioms 5.2Holistic scepticism 5.3The role of an explanation of decision theory 6. Conclusion
Objective probability in quantum mechanics is often thought to involve a stochastic process whereby an actual future is selected from a range of possibilities. Everett's seminal idea is that all possible definite futures on the pointer basis exist as components of a macroscopic linear superposition. I demonstrate that these two conceptions of what is involved in quantum processes are linked by two alternative interpretation of the mind-body relation. This leads to a fission, rather than divergence, interpretation of Everettian theory and to a novel explanation of why a principle of indifference does not apply to self-location uncertainty for a post-measurement, pre-observation subject, just as Sebens and Carroll claim. Their Epistemic Separability Principle is shown to arise out of this explanation and the derivation of the Born rule for Everettian theory is thereby put on a firmer footing.
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics faces a well‑known challenge: how can probabilities emerge in a deterministic theory where all measurement outcomes occur? A prominent response appeals to self‑locating uncertainty (SLU): after branching, copies of an observer are uncertain about which branch they inhabit during the post-measurement, pre-observation period, and this uncertainty is then quantified to yield the Born rule. This paper examines whether the notion of SLU can be coherently instantiated in the Everettian framework. It argues that the two conditions required for SLU—having a branch‑relative identity (Recording Condition) and being uncertain about that identity (Uncertainty Condition)—are difficult to satisfy simultaneously in any physical system. Any attempt to realize SLU appears to force a decomposition of the observer into a memory module that records the outcome (and thus has branch‑relative identity) and a decision module that is uncertain (and thus lacks branch‑relative identity). Neither module individually possesses SLU, and it is not obvious that they can be combined into a unified epistemic agent that does. The analysis complements and deepens existing critiques and suggests that SLU‑based derivations of the Born rule may rest on a problematic foundation.
The deterministic nature of EQM (the Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics) seems to be inconsistent with the use of probability in EQM, giving rise to what is known as the “incoherence problem”. In this paper, I explore approaches to solve the incoherence problem of EQM via pre-measurement uncertainty. Previous discussions on the validity of pre-measurement uncertainty have leaned heavily on intricate aspects of the theory of semantics and reference, the embrace of either four-dimensionalism or three-dimensionalism of personhood, or the ontology of EQM. In this paper, I argue that, regardless of the adoption of three-dimensionalism or four-dimensionalism of personhood, the overlapping view or the divergence view of the ontology of EQM, the pre-measurement uncertainty approach to the incoherence problem of EQM can only achive success while contradicting fundamental principles of physicalism. I also use the divergence view of EQM as an example to illustrate my analyses.