Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Lecture notes in computer science

Multiparty Computations Ensuring Privacy of Each Party’s Input and Correctness of the Result

David Chaum, Ivan Damgård, Jeroen van de Graaf

Published Jan 1, 1988• 219 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/3-540-48184-2_7

Related papers

Trading Robustness for Correctness and Privacy in Certain Multiparty Computations, beyond an Honest Majority

Anne Broadbent, Stacey Jeffery, Samuel Ranellucci +1 more

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2012•1 citation

A Comparative Study of Available Protocols during Privacy Preservation in Secure Multiparty Computation

Zulfa Shaikh, Poonam Garg, Andrew Chi-Chih Yao +1 more

In this paper, comparative study of different available Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) protocols have been addressed. In SMC, a set of parties wishes to jointly compute some function on their inputs. This computation must preserve certain security properties, like privacy and correctness. The general approach for such kind of computation is to make use of trusted third party to do the computation and then announce the result publicly. The major problem with this approach is that it is difficult to find a third party which is trusted by all the parties providing the inputs. This implies that the data of parties must be secured. Security is meant to achieve correctness of the result of computation and keeping the party’s input private even if some of the parties are corrupted.

•Jan 1, 2011•1 citation

Secure Multiparty Computation

Keith B. Frikken

Chapman & Hall/CRC applied algorithms and data structures series•Nov 20, 2009•38 citations

Performance Analysis of Secure Multiparty Computation Protocol

Samiksha Shukla, Durgesh Kumar Mishra

In this paper we address the issue related to privacy, security, complexity and Implementation, various adversaries exist which hamper the secure multiparty computation. In the secure multiparty computation, a set of parties wishes to jointly compute some function of their inputs. Such a computation must preserve certain security properties, like privacy and correctness, even if some of the participating parties or an external adversary colludes to attack the honest parties.

Mapana Journal of Sciences•May 31, 2009•0 citations

Secure Multiparty Computation

Xun Yi, Xuechao Yang, Xiaoning Liu +5 more

Springer eBooks•Jan 1, 2025•10 citations

REALIZING SECURE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION ON INCOMPLETE NETWORKS

Shailesh Vaya

Secure multiparty computation of a multivariate function is a central problem in cryptography. It is well known that secure multiparty computation can be realized by a set of n parties iff the connectivity of the underlying (authenticated) communication network is more than twice the number of corrupted parties. This impossibility result makes secure multiparty computation far less applicable in practice, as most deployed networks have a degree much lower than O(n) and one would ideally like to be able to tolerate Θ(n) corrupted parties. In this work we consider a recently proposed model for (Unconditional) secure multiparty computation for networks of low degrees for which authenticated channels are available only between very few pairs of parties. Not all honest parties may be expected to achieve traditional security guarantees of multiparty computation for this model because of theoretical limitations posed by lack of infrastructure. Honest parties which are not given canonical guarantees of Correctness and Privacy are called ”sacrificed” and the resulting notion is called almost everywhere secure computation. In this conceptual note, we investigate the previous results about this model by Garay and Ostrovsky'2008. We explain why these results hold only for weak honest-but-curious type passive corruptions. We emphasize why the results for almost everywhere secure computation are theoretically interesting and practically relevant only when active malicious corruptions are allowed. We argue the limitation of hybrid argument for realizing privacy property when Byzantine corruptions are allowed. From this we deduce that simulation based reduction approach is necessary to realize even input indistinguishability type definition of privacy for the stand alone setting. We present a conceptual exposition of the simulator based approach for defining privacy of a.e.s.c. Finally, we present a brief overview of technicalities involved in realizing a.e.s.c. when malicious corruptions are allowed.

International Conference on Security and Cryptography•Jan 1, 2010•3 citations
In this paper, comparative study of different available Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) protocols have been addressed. In SMC, a set of parties wishes to jointly compute some function on their inputs. This computation must preserve certain security properties, like privacy and correctness. The general approach for such kind of computation is to make use of trusted third party to do the computation and then announce the result publicly. The major problem with this approach is that it is difficult to find a third party which is trusted by all the parties providing the inputs. This implies that the data of parties must be secured. Security is meant to achieve correctness of the result of computation and keeping the party’s input private even if some of the parties are corrupted.
Secure multiparty computation of a multivariate function is a central problem in cryptography. It is well known that secure multiparty computation can be realized by a set of n parties iff the connectivity of the underlying (authenticated) communication network is more than twice the number of corrupted parties. This impossibility result makes secure multiparty computation far less applicable in practice, as most deployed networks have a degree much lower than O(n) and one would ideally like to be able to tolerate Θ(n) corrupted parties. In this work we consider a recently proposed model for (Unconditional) secure multiparty computation for networks of low degrees for which authenticated channels are available only between very few pairs of parties. Not all honest parties may be expected to achieve traditional security guarantees of multiparty computation for this model because of theoretical limitations posed by lack of infrastructure. Honest parties which are not given canonical guarantees of Correctness and Privacy are called ”sacrificed” and the resulting notion is called almost everywhere secure computation. In this conceptual note, we investigate the previous results about this model by Garay and Ostrovsky'2008. We explain why these results hold only for weak honest-but-curious type passive corruptions. We emphasize why the results for almost everywhere secure computation are theoretically interesting and practically relevant only when active malicious corruptions are allowed. We argue the limitation of hybrid argument for realizing privacy property when Byzantine corruptions are allowed. From this we deduce that simulation based reduction approach is necessary to realize even input indistinguishability type definition of privacy for the stand alone setting. We present a conceptual exposition of the simulator based approach for defining privacy of a.e.s.c. Finally, we present a brief overview of technicalities involved in realizing a.e.s.c. when malicious corruptions are allowed.