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Foundations of Physics

Objectivity in Perspective: Relationism in the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Dennis Dieks

Published Mar 4, 2009• 37 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Pekka Lahti is a prominent exponent of the renaissance of foundational studies in quantum mechanics that has taken place during the last few decades. Among other things, he and coworkers have drawn renewed attention to, and have analyzed with fresh mathematical rigor, the threat of inconsistency at the basis of quantum theory: ordinary measurement interactions, described within the mathematical formalism by Schrödinger-type equations of motion, seem to be unable to lead to the occurrence of definite measurement outcomes, whereas the same formalism is interpreted in terms of probabilities of precisely such definite outcomes. Of course, it is essential here to be explicit about how definite measurement results (or definite properties in general) should be represented in the formalism. To this end Lahti et al. have introduced their objectification requirement that says that a system can be taken to possess a definite property if it is certain (in the sense of probability 1) that this property will be found upon measurement. As they have gone on to demonstrate, this requirement entails that in general definite outcomes cannot arise in unitary measuring processes. In this paper we investigate whether it is possible to escape from this deadlock. As we shall argue, there is a way out in which the objectification requirement is fully maintained. The key idea is to adapt the notion of objectivity itself, by introducing relational or perspectival properties. It seems that such a “relational perspective” offers prospects of overcoming some of the long-standing problems in the interpretation of quantum mechanics.

DOI
10.1007/s10701-009-9293-x

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•May 29, 2026•0 citations
Pekka Lahti is a prominent exponent of the renaissance of foundational studies in quantum mechanics that has taken place during the last few decades. Among other things, he and coworkers have drawn renewed attention to, and have analyzed with fresh mathematical rigor, the threat of inconsistency at the basis of quantum theory: ordinary measurement interactions, described within the mathematical formalism by Schrödinger-type equations of motion, seem to be unable to lead to the occurrence of definite measurement outcomes, whereas the same formalism is interpreted in terms of probabilities of precisely such definite outcomes. Of course, it is essential here to be explicit about how definite measurement results (or definite properties in general) should be represented in the formalism. To this end Lahti et al. have introduced their objectification requirement that says that a system can be taken to possess a definite property if it is certain (in the sense of probability 1) that this property will be found upon measurement. As they have gone on to demonstrate, this requirement entails that in general definite outcomes cannot arise in unitary measuring processes. In this paper we investigate whether it is possible to escape from this deadlock. As we shall argue, there is a way out in which the objectification requirement is fully maintained. The key idea is to adapt the notion of objectivity itself, by introducing relational or perspectival properties. It seems that such a “relational perspective” offers prospects of overcoming some of the long-standing problems in the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The main theme of this book is the idea that quantum mechanics is valid not only for microscopic objects but also for the macroscopic apparatus used for quantum mechanical measurements. The author demonstrates the intimate relations that exist between quantum mechanics and its interpretation which are induced by the quantum mechanical measurement process. Consequently, the book is concerned both with the philosophical, metatheoretical problems of interpretations and with the more formal problems of quantum object theory. The consequences of this approach turn out to be partly very promising and partly rather disappointing. On the one hand, it is possible to give a rigorous justification of some important parts of interpretation, such as probability, by means of object theory. On the other hand, the problem of the objectification of measurement results leads to inconsistencies which cannot be resolved in an obvious way. This open problem has far-reaching consequences for the possibility of recognising an objective reality in physics.
Experimental evidene of the last decades has made the status of "collapses of the wave function" even more shaky than it already was on conceptual grounds: interference effects turn out to be detectable even when collapses are typically expected to occur. Non-collapse interpretations should consequently be taken seriously. In this paper we argue that such interpretations suggest a perspectivalism according to which quantum objects are not characterized by monadic properties, but by relations to other systems. Accordingly, physical systems may possess different properties with respect to different "reference systems". We discuss some of the relevant arguments, and argue that perspectivalism both evades recent arguments that single-world interpretations are inconsistent and eliminates the need for a privileged rest frame in the relativistic case.
Abstract The theories of pre-quantum physics are standardly seen as representing physical systems and their properties. Quantum mechanics in its standard form is a more problematic case: here, interpretational problems have led to doubts about the tenability of realist views. Thus, QBists and Quantum Pragmatists maintain that quantum mechanics should not be thought of as representing physical systems, but rather as an agent-centered tool for updating beliefs about such systems. It is part and parcel of such views that different agents may have different beliefs and may assign different quantum states. What results is a collection of agent-centered perspectives rather than a unique representation of the physical world. In this paper we argue that the problems identified by QBism and Quantum Pragmatism do not necessitate abandoning the ideal of representing the physical world. We can avail ourselves of the same puzzle-solving strategies as employed by QBists and pragmatists by adopting a perspectival quantum realism. According to this perspectivalism (close to the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics) objects may possess different, but equally objective properties with respect to different physically defined perspectives. We discuss two options for such a perspectivalism, a local and a nonlocal one, and apply them to Wigner’s friend and EPR scenarios. Finally, we connect quantum perspectivalism to the recently proposed philosophical position of fragmentalism.
This paper discusses perspectivism and relationalism in the two versions of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM): that initiated by Rovelli ( Int. J. Theor. Phys. , 35 (8), 1637–1678 1996) and the other, by Adlam and Rovelli ( Philos. Phys. , 1 (1) 2023). To this end, we offer a substantial discussion of this interpretation. We investigate the issue of the disagreement of results between different observers; distinguish four senses of agreement: strong, weak, very weak, and perspectival; and argue that the old version guarantees only the very weak and perspectival agreement, whereas the new version guarantees the weak agreement as well. The problem that individuals in RQM need to be propertyless when they do not interact is also investigated. Concerning the issue of probabilities in RQM, we argue that to express probabilities involving events relative to different systems, a new kind of probability spaces needs to be devised. The final problem that we identify concerns underspecified dynamics; we argue that some additional postulates are indispensable to make RQM’s dynamics fully specified. The last two points lead to the conclusion that, contrary to declarations of RQM proponents, this interpretation requires some modifications of quantum formalism and not merely conceptual changes. Finally, concerning the problem of testimony, while the new version of RQM was devised to solve it, we argue that in the old version, this problem can be alleviated to the extent that perspectivism permits.
The received view in foundations and philosophy of physics holds that if we reject supplementing quantum theory (QT) with certain hidden variables and consider that unitary QT is correct and universal, we should adopt a relationalist interpretation of QT. Relationalist interpretations relativize measurement outcomes to, for example, worlds, systems, agents, or reference frames. It includes the Many-Worlds Interpretation, Relational Quantum Mechanics, and QBism. These interpretations have potential costs connected with their relationalism that make them unattractive. Thus, if there exists a non-relational non-hidden variable universal intepretations of QT, it should be taken seriously. I will present an interpretation of this kind called Environmental Determinacy-based or EnD Quantum Theory (EnDQT), which goes beyond relationalism and the received view. EnDQT circumvents relationalism by constructing an account of indeterminate and determinate values and underlying quantum properties that is not relational while maintaining unitary non-hidden variable universal QT. In situations where a relationalist assumes that measurement outcomes are relativized, such as in the extended Wigner's friend scenarios, according to EnDQT there aren't determinate outcomes but systems with non-relational indeterminate values. In this approach, determinate values arose at some point in time through certain systems and persist due to them via certain interactions represented by certain networks. When there is isolation from the rest of the systems that belong to these networks, such as inside the friend's lab in the extended Wigner's friend scenarios, indeterminate values non-relationally arise inside. I will discuss other independent good reasons for adopting EnDQT, including providing a local causal explanation of Bell correlations and novel empirical posits represented by these networks.
This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of Wigner’s Friend paradox (1961), a foundational thought experiment in quantum mechanics that highlights the tension between the internal perspective of a measuring observer (who experiences a definite outcome) and the external perspective of a super-observer who treats the entire laboratory as a quantum system in superposition. It traces the historical lineage from Schrödinger’s cat and von Neumann’s measurement theory, provides a formal mathematical description of the state evolution and logical structure of the paradox, examines implications for major interpretations of quantum mechanics (Copenhagen, Everettian many-worlds, QBism, relational quantum mechanics, and objective collapse theories), and discusses modern extensions such as the Frauchiger–Renner paradox. The work explores profound philosophical and epistemological consequences for the nature of observation, objectivity, intersubjectivity, and the role of consciousness in quantum theory (2026).