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International Journal of Information Security

Secure group key establishment revisited

Jens-Matthias Bohli, María Isabel González Vasco, Rainer Steinwandt

Published Feb 20, 2007• 74 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s10207-007-0018-x

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Secure Group Key Establishment Revisited.

Jens-Matthias Bohli, María Isabel González Vasco, Rainer Steinwandt

We examine the popular proof models for group key establishment of Bresson et al. [BCPQ01,BCP01] and point out missing security properties addressing malicious protocol participants. We show that established group key establishment schemes from CRYPTO 2003 and ASIACRYPT 2004 do not fully meet these new requirements. Next to giving a formal definition of these extended security properties, we prove a variant of the explored proposal from ASIACRYPT 2004 secure in this stricter sense. Our proof builds on the Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) assumption and the random oracle model.

•Jan 1, 2005•11 citations
We examine the popular proof models for group key establishment of Bresson et al. [BCPQ01,BCP01] and point out missing security properties addressing malicious protocol participants. We show that established group key establishment schemes from CRYPTO 2003 and ASIACRYPT 2004 do not fully meet these new requirements. Next to giving a formal definition of these extended security properties, we prove a variant of the explored proposal from ASIACRYPT 2004 secure in this stricter sense. Our proof builds on the Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) assumption and the random oracle model.