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Zygon®

A RESPONSE TO ERVIN LASZLO: QUANTUM AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Lothar Schäfer

Published Sep 2, 2006• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract. I respond to Ervin Laszlo's suggestions and criticism regarding my essay in this issue of Zygon. Virtual atomic orbitals are used as a model to illustrate the existence of a general realm of potentiality in physical reality from which the actual world emanates. Laszlo's suggestions for “paradigm repair” are supported and accepted as essentially being in agreement with my intentions and as offering highly useful clarifications. I compare virtual states to historic ideas of forms as metaphysical principles of being that inspire thoughts regarding the actions of a Cosmic Consciousness in the processes of the universe. Metaphysical and theological interpretations of the results of scientific research are defended, provided that they are not used to interfere a priori with the technical program of scientific research.

DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9744.2005.00759.x

Related papers

A RESPONSE TO STANLEY KLEIN: A DIALOGUE ON THE RELEVANCE OF QUANTUM THEORY TO RELIGION

Lothar Schäfer

Abstract. I respond to Stanley Klein's critique of my essay “Quantum Reality, the Emergence of Complex Order from Virtual States, and the Importance of Consciousness in the Universe,” arguing in support of the necessity to derive a quantum perspective of evolution rather than adhering to an essentially classical view. In response to Klein's criticism of my concept of a cosmic morality, the origins of that concept are traced back to Zeno of Citium. I wholeheartedly embrace Klein's suggestion that the new science inspires views of the human condition that can help us make the world a better place.

Zygon®•Sep 2, 2006•4 citations

A RESPONSE TO CARL HELRICH: THE LIMITATIONS AND PROMISE OF QUANTUM THEORY

Lothar Schäfer

Abstract. I respond to Carl Helrich's criticism of my proposition that the emergence of complex order in the universe is from Virtual State Actualization (VSA). The question is discussed as to whether quantum theory is able to afford any kind of quantum ontology or whether it merely allows an epistemological view. I point out that, even though many contradictory interpretations of quantum theory are currently possible, the concept of VSA is based on molecular properties that are so simple and factual that they are beyond interpretation. Helrich's appeal for caution in proceeding from physical reality to Divine Reality is wholeheartedly supported and a detailed discussion is given.

Zygon®•Sep 1, 2006•3 citations

QUANTUM AND CONSCIOUSNESS: IN SEARCH OF A NEW PARADIGM

Ervin Laszlo

Abstract. Two fundamental issues raised by Lothar Schäfer are considered: (1) the question of a suitable paradigm within which the findings of quantum physics can be optimally interpreted and (2) the question of the assessment of the presence and importance of mind and consciousness in the universe. In regard to the former, I contend that the ideal of science is to interpret its findings in an optimally consistent and minimally speculative framework. In this context Schäfer's assertion that certain findings in quantum physics (those that relate to virtual states) indicate the presence of mind at the quantum level implies a dualistic and hence unnecessarily speculative assumption. In regard to the assessment of mind and consciousness, a consistent and parsimonious paradigm suggests that mind and consciousness are not part of a chain of events consisting of an admixture of physical and mental events but that physical events form a single, coherent set of events, and mental events another set, with the two sets related, as Teilhard (and a number of other philosophers, including White head) affirmed, as the “within” and the “without” (or the “mental pole” and the “physical pole”) of one and the same fundamental reality. This panpsychist as contrasted with Schäfer's dualist paradigm provides a single self‐consistent framework for the interpretation of quantum (and all natural) events while recognizing the presence of mind in the universe as the least speculative realist implication of our immediate experience of consciousness.

Zygon®•Sep 2, 2006•5 citations

NONEMPIRICAL REALITY: TRANSCENDING THE PHYSICAL AND SPIRITUAL IN THE ORDER OF THE ONE

Lothar Schäfer

I describe characteristic phenomena of quantum physics that suggest that reality appears to us in two domains: the open and well‐known domain of empirical, material things—the realm of actuality—and a hidden and invisible domain of nonempirical, non‐material forms—the realm of potentiality. The nonempirical forms are part of physical reality because they contain the empirical possibilities of the universe and can manifest themselves in the empirical world. Two classes of nonempirical states are discussed: the superposition states of microphysical entities, which are nonempirical because observation destroys them, and the virtual states of material systems, which are nonempirical because they are empty. The non‐empirical part to physical reality represents a predetermined and hidden order that exists before it is empirical, and the visible world is an emanation out of it. I discuss consequences for our understanding of human nature, the origin of life, and human values. Reality is an indivisible wholeness that is aware of its processes, like a Cosmic Spirit, and it reveals its awareness in the mindlike properties of elementary processes as well as in the human consciousness. Thus, one is led to G. W. F. Hegel's thesis that the Cosmic Spirit is thinking in us.

Zygon®•May 26, 2008•15 citations

QUANTUM THEOLOGY AND “‘WE’ AND ‘THEY’”

Arthur C. Petersen

This issue of Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science offers a podium for deep reflection on the state-of-play in “quantum theology”: theological reflection that is related to the physical theory of quantum mechanics. The thematic section has been guest edited by Mark Harris. His opening article—which in its introductory section also refers to all the other articles in the section—highlights that theological engagement with quantum physics has been dominated by the so-called “Copenhagen interpretation”; he argues for a commitment to “quantum fundamentalism,” which resolves some enduring ontological problems and takes quantum theology “beyond Copenhagen.” Shaun Henson, in dealing with Everett's “Many-Worlds Interpretation,” focuses on the status of scientific terms; he shows that the extent to which belief in Many-Worlds (which is metaphysically challenging) is believable depends on several dynamic socially oriented categories. Emily Qureshi-Hurst addresses some implications of the Many-Worlds Interpretation that are particularly relevant to theism; she argues that taking seriously the radical consequences of this interpretation means facing at least three major worries for theism pertaining to personal identity, the problem of evil, and salvation. Elise Crull offers what she calls an “interpretation-neutral yet realist” stance towards quantum mechanics; she illustrates how her interpretation-neutral take on quantum mechanics that includes the notion of “decoherence” can helpfully reframe accounts of divine action. Wilson Poon and Tom McLeish warn that one should be cautious in claiming distinctiveness for quantum theologizing (versus, for instance, theologizing classical statistical mechanics); they posit that both quantum mechanics and classical statistical mechanics point to “theology of science in which scientists participate in the divine gaze on creation as imago Dei.” And Ernest Simmons utilizes the concept of quantum decoherence, augmented by the novel theory of quantum Darwinism, to understand the transition from the quantum to the classical worlds; from his reading of quantum biology, he distills some theological metaphors for articulating divine presence at the level of life in theistic evolution. This issue also contains four articles from the 67th Annual Summer Conference of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science (IRAS), entitled “‘We’ & ‘They’: Cross-Cultural Conversations on Identity,” which was held at Star Island, NH, USA from June 26 to July 3, 2022. Anindita Balslev highlights in her article why cross-cultural conversation is important; that conversation has the potential to give a new direction to the dynamics between “the self and the other.” CJ Love argues in her article that unraveling the complex notion of “self” and “other” necessitates a layered approach that explores genetics, phenomenology, and religion; she emphasizes the need for forming a holistic picture of body, mind, event, memory, and morality. Andrew Newberg expands in his article on the role of the brain and the biological basis of the self; he argues that the self and self-consciousness is one of the most mysterious aspects of the human being, but also that to some degree we are trapped within our brain and our consciousness, which represent our own identity. And Calvin Chatlos, in his article, applies his “Framework of Spirituality” to the identity of adolescents; he makes clear that an alternative approach to adolescent development is needed that does not reinforce a fundamental experiential separateness of “me” and “other,” but that instead promotes a spiritual transformation process that is inclusive of the “other.” The Articles section contains four articles. In the first article, Gabriel Fernandez-Borsot contributes to philosophical reflection on the role of technology in society, particularly on the intersections between spirituality and technology; in his analysis, spirituality appears as an essential dimension to cultivate in technological societies, while he argues that technology might actually reveal spirituality as richer and deeper than has been apparent in traditional settings. In the second article, Yong Sup Song and Robert Geraci study the interactions between spirituality and technology in the specific context of Korea; they consider the themes of marginalization and transcendence in transhumanism and minjung theology and reflect on the exclusion of some from the benefits of technological society and on living in the context of multiple dimensions of oppression. In the third article, Kevin Ndereba addresses the nonreligious identity formation among male Kenyan Youth, which is increasingly common; he shows how youth social groups provide spaces for wrestling with the intellectual questions raised by religious faiths and argues that nonreligious communities could benefit from moving beyond the usual caricature of strong incompatibilism that is part of popular atheist literature. Finally, in the fourth article, Eugenia Torrance revisits Newton's theology by questioning whether he promulgated a “God of the gaps” argument; she thinks that he did not and uses some of his letters and drafts to suggest that any gaps in mechanical were filled by Newton with nonmechanical natural causes and argues that Newton wanted readers to marvel at humans’ inability to fully understand his scientific system. The Articles section is followed by a reflection from Josh Reeves on Peter Harrison's “After Science and Religion” project, to which Peter Harrison offers a response. The issue ends with a book review. Ron Cole-Turner reviews Victoria Lorrimar's Human Technological Enhancement and Theological Anthropology.

Zygon®•Mar 2, 2023•1 citation

Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics

Jonathan Simon

This book is a treat, a collection of essays about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics that is guaranteed to move the needle: serious, original, and relatively accessible. The essays develop cutting-edge views by thought-leading authors on questions that matter for the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mind, and while to follow along you need to know what supervenience is and what an eigenstate is, the majority of essays should be accessible to advanced undergraduates (i.e., those who have taken a rigorous introductory course in quantum mechanics as well as a course or two in the philosophy of mind).Why care about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics? If you are coming from physics, your point of entry is probably the measurement problem. When you let quantum systems evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, they enter into superpositions of mutually incompatible states. How can this be reconciled with the testimony of our senses that such systems are always in one state or the other when we measure them (with a probability distribution given by the Born rule)? This is the measurement problem, and it concerns consciousness because it draws from the testimony of our senses.If you are coming from the philosophy of mind, your primary concern is probably the mind-body problem: the task of accounting for how consciousness arises out of or fits into physical reality. If consciousness is reducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to establish that reduction? If consciousness is irreducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to explain why consciousness exists, or to find some work for it to do in the world? You may also be concerned with the structure and function of consciousness: for example, you may hold that minds can do things that classical digital computers cannot, and take it that we must look to the quantum realm to discover how.If you are not already entrenched, you might just wonder what kind of world we live in. The mechanistic philosophy of centuries past seemed to disenchant the world, rendering it a place of barren corpuscles banging into one another, leaving no room for mind or meaning, except perhaps as patterns in the collisions, or useless epiphenomena. But quantum mechanics and its relativistic generalizations force a rethinking of the mechanistic picture from the ground up. Once the dust has settled—if it ever does—we may find reasons to relegate consciousness once again to the shadows. But we may also find reasons to give it pride of place. If you are after scientific reasons to reenchant the world, this is a good place to look.The entries in this volume address these questions and others besides. The volume is organized into three parts. The first part contains four essays about the idea that consciousness causes (or constrains) quantum collapse. The second part contains eight essays discussing other ways that consciousness might contribute to theories of quantum mechanics. The third part contains five essays about how quantum mechanics might contribute to an ultimate theory of consciousness. I’ll follow the book’s order.In chapter 1, David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen develop a new consciousness-triggered collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics. On their approach, consciousness has a strict physical correlate (perhaps given by quantum integrated information theory), it is approximately superposition-resistant, and collapse dynamics are continuous (à la Philip Pearle). They respond to the standard objections that a consciousness-collapse link makes the collapse mechanism imprecise and requires dualism, as well as to worries about Quantum Zeno, among others. Crucially, their approach allows that superpositions of consciousness are possible: their motivation is to give the view a run for its money and to find work for consciousness to do in the universe, not to rid the world of all traces of superposed consciousness. One question: In taking consciousness itself to be superposition-resistant (rather than the environmental systems it asks questions about, as Henry Stapp suggests), we appear to favor internalism over externalism. What would an externalist variant look like? Another question: How exactly would experimental results—for example, that simple enough systems with maximal Φ remain in coherent superposition—constrain our theoretical options? If to accommodate this we have to impose an experimentally determined threshold for the minimal absolute Φ for consciousness, will that mean that on the physicalist version of the view, the property we privilege for superposition-resistance is just an arbitrary collection of atoms?In chapter 2, Elias Okon and Miguel Angel Sebastian defend a consciousness-collapse theory that they call the Subjective-Objective collapse model. Like Chalmers and McQueen, Okon and Sebastian invoke a Pearle-style continuous collapse dynamics and think of consciousness as only weakly superposition-resistant. A key contribution is the treatment of a worry about multiple realizability (i.e., the way that some property of biological neurons and some other property of artificial neurons might both realize the state of being in pain). The problem is that it is not straightforward to define Hermitian operators whose eigenstates are disjunctions of the eigenstates of other Hermitian operators: you must ensure orthogonality (“being red or being a circle” is not orthogonal to “being red or being square”). In answer, the authors point out that we don’t need each multiply realizable phenomenal state to be an eigenstate of our collapse operator; it suffices that each way of realizing each phenomenal state is an eigenstate. One question is whether this problematizes the dancing qualia argument. A second worry is that we still must find a suitable basis for Hilbert space. But theories of consciousness may constrain both position and momentum: for example, both distances between neurons and how energy is transferred. We can talk about wave packets, but these will not get us eigenstates of a Hermitian operator.In chapter 3, J. Acacio de Barros and Carlos Montemayor suggest that if a mentality-triggered collapse theory is what you want, you should opt for intentionality rather than phenomenality. This is because, first, we have evidence from psychophysics that there is unconscious perception. Second, the first-personal data that motivate collapse theory concern intentionality: we remember only recording definite values; our decisions about what to measure affect the outcomes we see. First question: Can the reasons we have for thinking that there is unconscious intentionality extend into a case for unconscious primitive intentionality? Another question is how the proposal here would differ from Stapp’s treatment of what questions a mind asks of the universe. A third is how we contend with Quantum Zeno, the effect that forces both Chalmers-McQueen and Okon-Angel Sebastian to say that consciousness is only weakly superposition-resistant. Those authors note the possibility that the relevant superposed states of consciousness might overflow access consciousness (in Ned Block’s sense). We may have an easier time ensuring that access conscious states only rarely enter into superposition, if we set them back from our front line of superposition-resistant states.In chapter 4, Adrian Kent explores objective collapse theories—mass-dependent continuous spontaneous localization models. Consciousness may not be in the spotlight on these theories, but they should at least ensure that collapse happens faster than the time it takes for a stimulus (e.g., a system of several photons) to make it from a retinal impact to consciousness. Angelo Bassi, Dirk-André Deckert, and Luca Ferialdi (2010) argue that for a range of theories this constraint is respected, with collapse for a system of several photos happening at around 100 ms. Kent problematizes their argument, showing that their estimation may be off by an order of magnitude or more. Kent’s point is compelling: more work is needed to refine the estimate and to conceptually clarify the import of the constraints from perception.Part 2 consists of eight essays on various ways that consciousness might figure in or constrain quantum theories. In chapter 5, Phillip Goff argues that 3N-dimensional wave function monism cannot accommodate ground truths about consciousness, pressing on worries that the view imposes too few structural constraints to allow for the unambiguous recovery of ordinary 3D reality. While I agree that wave function monistic accounts of ordinary reality (e.g., Albert’s functionalism or Ney’s priority monism) yield an explanatory gap (even given the 3D-ish structure of GRW jumps), I was puzzled here. All type-B physicalists confront an explanatory gap where consciousness is concerned. Isn’t this a point in support of wave function monism, since it amounts to a companions-in-guilt argument against opposition from other type-B materialists?In chapter 6, Peter Lewis raises some sensible worries about the use of phenomenal consciousness as an unanalyzed primitive or special case in quantum theory. He objects to the suggestion made by some Bohmians that we can be directly aware of the particles in our brains. Another target is John von Neumann, who appeals to intuitions about psychophysical connections to justify a collapse hypothesis. These are nice points: I would be curious to know whether Lewis thinks they apply to the justifications for mentalistic collapse theories from part 1.In chapter 7, Jenann Ismael first argues that the hard problem of consciousness is of no concern to physics per se: “If consciousness enters the problem space of physics, it does so by making a difference to the behavior of physical objects.” She then offers some clarifying remarks about how we might reconcile Van Gelder-style dynamicist conceptions of mentality with (virtual) machine functionalism. I find much to agree with here, though I do wonder how strictly to take Ismael’s claims about the irrelevance of the hard problem. If there is a tie between two theories of physics over predictive accuracy, elegance, and naturalness, but one yields a more satisfying analysis of consciousness than the other, are we not even allowed to treat that as a tie-breaker?In chapter 8, Shan Gao defends a mentalistic characterization of the measurement problem in reply to Andrea Oldofredi (2019). The question is whether the key premise of the measurement problem should be that measurements take on definite values or only that we (definitely) experience them as taking on definite values. Of course, our reasons for thinking that they do arise from our seeing or remembering that they do, but we can distinguish between the claim and our evidence for it. Gao argues that the underlying mentalistic claims are more inextricable from the dilemma than that. Many dilemmas involve premises for which the evidence is perceptual, though they make no mention of perception. Here, however, solutions to the problem require special attention to the nature of that evidence.In chapter 9, Paul Skokowski illustrates one reason that we must pay special attention to the nature of that evidence. Jeffrey A. Barrett’s (1999) bare theory is a minimalistic reading of Everett on which measurement outcomes are only definite if they obtain on all branches. One question is whether this means that observers have blatantly false disjunctive beliefs: let someone measure an electron’s spin and then ask, Do you believe that you got a definite measurement outcome, either “UP” or “DOWN”? The observer will say yes, because on each branch they saw one and not the other. However, by the lights of the theory, this disjunctive belief is false. Skokowski’s insight is that while the observer definitely says yes, it does not follow (by the lights of the bare theory) that the observer has a (definite) false belief, since the neural realizer for the disjunctive belief will be different on each branch and therefore not correspond to a common eigenstate (compare the worry from chapter 2 about multiple realizability). But isn’t this just to move from the frying pan to the fire, as it seems now that our observer has no (definite) beliefs at all?In chapter 10, Michael Silberstein and W. M. Stuckey advocate for a psi-epistemicist perspective that vindicates many phenomenological intuitions, including the one that experimental outcomes are definite (and intersubjectively consistent). The approach requires that we rethink naïve realism about the wave function and that we rethink mind-body duality, in favor of a neutral monist ontology governed by constraints. This is an exciting approach, though I’m not fully clear on how to differentiate neutral monism from its idealist, dual aspect, or panpsychist cousins.In chapter 11, Michael Bitbol suggests a phenomenology-first approach to interpreting quantum mechanics. Bitbol favors a QBist participatory realism, tempered by phenomenology, that could perhaps also be described as neutral monist. He notes that the phenomenology of embodiment (à la Merleau-Ponty) acquaints us with how something can be both active and passive, both minded and incarnate, and he traces the error of believing in a separate, physical world (an error participatory realism corrects) to the tendency of self-separation: the tendency to try to project ourselves beyond ourselves, discussed in Heidegger, Sartre, and Michel Henry. These phenomenological insights are enlightening, though I am still not quite clear on how the underlying (neutral?) ontology works. Who, precisely, are the observers? Do electrons have feelings, or are they just fictions we use to cope with ours?In chapter 12, Lucien Hardy describes an experiment in which humans might be used to determine the settings in a Bell experiment. Hardy suggests that the outcome may be a violation of quantum theory consistent with the Bell inequality. He argues that this result would support (superdeterministic) mind-body dualism and also could serve as a new more objective Turing test. This is a fascinating proposal: it remains only to do the experiment.This brings us to part 3: accounts that move from quantum mechanics to consciousness, rather than conversely. In chapters 13 and 14, Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff give a comprehensive account of the current state of their ORCH-OR theory of quantum collapse and consciousness. Among other things we find here a nice presentation of Goodstein’s theorem as an example of a theorem that is noncomputable but easy enough for humans to understand, and a nice discussion of how retroactivity might equip us with something to say to Benjamin Libet about the role of consciousness in action selection. I’ll note, though, that I asked ChatGPT to explain Goodstein to me and it did a fairly good job, suggesting something like understanding. On Libet, I’m not sure what exactly we need retrocausality for: Why not just content ourselves that awareness of the action plan leaves time for a veto, as Libet and others have suggested?In chapter 15, Basil J. Hiley and Paavo Pylkkänen explore another route to a comprehensive theory of consciousness, drawing from the materials of a theory of quantum reality. Here, that theory is the Bohmian implicate order picture, with special attention to the notion of active information that arises there. This is another approach with neutral monist overtones, but here the wave function of a system behaves something like a customized hylomorphic form for the system while at the same time imbuing it with intentionality. There are interesting claims here about the continuity between life and mind, the unity of consciousness, and protopanpsychism, as well as some speculation of how the theory might align with the various scientific theories of consciousness inspired by psychophysics, like higher-order or global workspace theories.In chapter 16, William Seager offers a helpful discussion of the kinds of intelligibility at issue in these debates, distinguishing between mundane, mathematical, and metaphysical intelligibility, weaving together insights from Leibniz and others to argue that a Bohmian approach offers the best bet for a metaphysically intelligible world view. I sympathize with the positive aspects of his argument, though I think that other papers in this volume showcase the metaphysical intelligibility of rival approaches.Finally, in chapter 17, Lee Smolin describes a completion of quantum mechanics, also echoing Leibniz, which could support a theory of quantum gravity and which offers a new conception of consciousness: the causal theory of views, alongside the principle of precedence. This yields a novel sort of protopanpsychism in which the world is a collection of (background-independent) causal views, where views are conscious when they have a few extra features, including being unprecedented and being maximal. This is an exciting approach. One question is how we reconcile the claim that experiential states are maximal with the (mental) problem of the many, the problem that there are ties between composites (that differ over a stray ion or two) over which has best claim to be me.In closing, this is a fantastic volume. I commend Shan Gao for his editorial work: he would make a wonderful DJ. There are subtle symmetries in the way that each entry segues to the next, and the collection has a remarkable coherence.

The Philosophical Review•Jul 1, 2024•0 citations
Abstract. I respond to Ervin Laszlo's suggestions and criticism regarding my essay in this issue of Zygon. Virtual atomic orbitals are used as a model to illustrate the existence of a general realm of potentiality in physical reality from which the actual world emanates. Laszlo's suggestions for “paradigm repair” are supported and accepted as essentially being in agreement with my intentions and as offering highly useful clarifications. I compare virtual states to historic ideas of forms as metaphysical principles of being that inspire thoughts regarding the actions of a Cosmic Consciousness in the processes of the universe. Metaphysical and theological interpretations of the results of scientific research are defended, provided that they are not used to interfere a priori with the technical program of scientific research.
Abstract. I respond to Stanley Klein's critique of my essay “Quantum Reality, the Emergence of Complex Order from Virtual States, and the Importance of Consciousness in the Universe,” arguing in support of the necessity to derive a quantum perspective of evolution rather than adhering to an essentially classical view. In response to Klein's criticism of my concept of a cosmic morality, the origins of that concept are traced back to Zeno of Citium. I wholeheartedly embrace Klein's suggestion that the new science inspires views of the human condition that can help us make the world a better place.
Abstract. I respond to Carl Helrich's criticism of my proposition that the emergence of complex order in the universe is from Virtual State Actualization (VSA). The question is discussed as to whether quantum theory is able to afford any kind of quantum ontology or whether it merely allows an epistemological view. I point out that, even though many contradictory interpretations of quantum theory are currently possible, the concept of VSA is based on molecular properties that are so simple and factual that they are beyond interpretation. Helrich's appeal for caution in proceeding from physical reality to Divine Reality is wholeheartedly supported and a detailed discussion is given.
Abstract. Two fundamental issues raised by Lothar Schäfer are considered: (1) the question of a suitable paradigm within which the findings of quantum physics can be optimally interpreted and (2) the question of the assessment of the presence and importance of mind and consciousness in the universe. In regard to the former, I contend that the ideal of science is to interpret its findings in an optimally consistent and minimally speculative framework. In this context Schäfer's assertion that certain findings in quantum physics (those that relate to virtual states) indicate the presence of mind at the quantum level implies a dualistic and hence unnecessarily speculative assumption. In regard to the assessment of mind and consciousness, a consistent and parsimonious paradigm suggests that mind and consciousness are not part of a chain of events consisting of an admixture of physical and mental events but that physical events form a single, coherent set of events, and mental events another set, with the two sets related, as Teilhard (and a number of other philosophers, including White head) affirmed, as the “within” and the “without” (or the “mental pole” and the “physical pole”) of one and the same fundamental reality. This panpsychist as contrasted with Schäfer's dualist paradigm provides a single self‐consistent framework for the interpretation of quantum (and all natural) events while recognizing the presence of mind in the universe as the least speculative realist implication of our immediate experience of consciousness.
I describe characteristic phenomena of quantum physics that suggest that reality appears to us in two domains: the open and well‐known domain of empirical, material things—the realm of actuality—and a hidden and invisible domain of nonempirical, non‐material forms—the realm of potentiality. The nonempirical forms are part of physical reality because they contain the empirical possibilities of the universe and can manifest themselves in the empirical world. Two classes of nonempirical states are discussed: the superposition states of microphysical entities, which are nonempirical because observation destroys them, and the virtual states of material systems, which are nonempirical because they are empty. The non‐empirical part to physical reality represents a predetermined and hidden order that exists before it is empirical, and the visible world is an emanation out of it. I discuss consequences for our understanding of human nature, the origin of life, and human values. Reality is an indivisible wholeness that is aware of its processes, like a Cosmic Spirit, and it reveals its awareness in the mindlike properties of elementary processes as well as in the human consciousness. Thus, one is led to G. W. F. Hegel's thesis that the Cosmic Spirit is thinking in us.
This issue of Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science offers a podium for deep reflection on the state-of-play in “quantum theology”: theological reflection that is related to the physical theory of quantum mechanics. The thematic section has been guest edited by Mark Harris. His opening article—which in its introductory section also refers to all the other articles in the section—highlights that theological engagement with quantum physics has been dominated by the so-called “Copenhagen interpretation”; he argues for a commitment to “quantum fundamentalism,” which resolves some enduring ontological problems and takes quantum theology “beyond Copenhagen.” Shaun Henson, in dealing with Everett's “Many-Worlds Interpretation,” focuses on the status of scientific terms; he shows that the extent to which belief in Many-Worlds (which is metaphysically challenging) is believable depends on several dynamic socially oriented categories. Emily Qureshi-Hurst addresses some implications of the Many-Worlds Interpretation that are particularly relevant to theism; she argues that taking seriously the radical consequences of this interpretation means facing at least three major worries for theism pertaining to personal identity, the problem of evil, and salvation. Elise Crull offers what she calls an “interpretation-neutral yet realist” stance towards quantum mechanics; she illustrates how her interpretation-neutral take on quantum mechanics that includes the notion of “decoherence” can helpfully reframe accounts of divine action. Wilson Poon and Tom McLeish warn that one should be cautious in claiming distinctiveness for quantum theologizing (versus, for instance, theologizing classical statistical mechanics); they posit that both quantum mechanics and classical statistical mechanics point to “theology of science in which scientists participate in the divine gaze on creation as imago Dei.” And Ernest Simmons utilizes the concept of quantum decoherence, augmented by the novel theory of quantum Darwinism, to understand the transition from the quantum to the classical worlds; from his reading of quantum biology, he distills some theological metaphors for articulating divine presence at the level of life in theistic evolution. This issue also contains four articles from the 67th Annual Summer Conference of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science (IRAS), entitled “‘We’ & ‘They’: Cross-Cultural Conversations on Identity,” which was held at Star Island, NH, USA from June 26 to July 3, 2022. Anindita Balslev highlights in her article why cross-cultural conversation is important; that conversation has the potential to give a new direction to the dynamics between “the self and the other.” CJ Love argues in her article that unraveling the complex notion of “self” and “other” necessitates a layered approach that explores genetics, phenomenology, and religion; she emphasizes the need for forming a holistic picture of body, mind, event, memory, and morality. Andrew Newberg expands in his article on the role of the brain and the biological basis of the self; he argues that the self and self-consciousness is one of the most mysterious aspects of the human being, but also that to some degree we are trapped within our brain and our consciousness, which represent our own identity. And Calvin Chatlos, in his article, applies his “Framework of Spirituality” to the identity of adolescents; he makes clear that an alternative approach to adolescent development is needed that does not reinforce a fundamental experiential separateness of “me” and “other,” but that instead promotes a spiritual transformation process that is inclusive of the “other.” The Articles section contains four articles. In the first article, Gabriel Fernandez-Borsot contributes to philosophical reflection on the role of technology in society, particularly on the intersections between spirituality and technology; in his analysis, spirituality appears as an essential dimension to cultivate in technological societies, while he argues that technology might actually reveal spirituality as richer and deeper than has been apparent in traditional settings. In the second article, Yong Sup Song and Robert Geraci study the interactions between spirituality and technology in the specific context of Korea; they consider the themes of marginalization and transcendence in transhumanism and minjung theology and reflect on the exclusion of some from the benefits of technological society and on living in the context of multiple dimensions of oppression. In the third article, Kevin Ndereba addresses the nonreligious identity formation among male Kenyan Youth, which is increasingly common; he shows how youth social groups provide spaces for wrestling with the intellectual questions raised by religious faiths and argues that nonreligious communities could benefit from moving beyond the usual caricature of strong incompatibilism that is part of popular atheist literature. Finally, in the fourth article, Eugenia Torrance revisits Newton's theology by questioning whether he promulgated a “God of the gaps” argument; she thinks that he did not and uses some of his letters and drafts to suggest that any gaps in mechanical were filled by Newton with nonmechanical natural causes and argues that Newton wanted readers to marvel at humans’ inability to fully understand his scientific system. The Articles section is followed by a reflection from Josh Reeves on Peter Harrison's “After Science and Religion” project, to which Peter Harrison offers a response. The issue ends with a book review. Ron Cole-Turner reviews Victoria Lorrimar's Human Technological Enhancement and Theological Anthropology.
This book is a treat, a collection of essays about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics that is guaranteed to move the needle: serious, original, and relatively accessible. The essays develop cutting-edge views by thought-leading authors on questions that matter for the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mind, and while to follow along you need to know what supervenience is and what an eigenstate is, the majority of essays should be accessible to advanced undergraduates (i.e., those who have taken a rigorous introductory course in quantum mechanics as well as a course or two in the philosophy of mind).Why care about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics? If you are coming from physics, your point of entry is probably the measurement problem. When you let quantum systems evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, they enter into superpositions of mutually incompatible states. How can this be reconciled with the testimony of our senses that such systems are always in one state or the other when we measure them (with a probability distribution given by the Born rule)? This is the measurement problem, and it concerns consciousness because it draws from the testimony of our senses.If you are coming from the philosophy of mind, your primary concern is probably the mind-body problem: the task of accounting for how consciousness arises out of or fits into physical reality. If consciousness is reducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to establish that reduction? If consciousness is irreducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to explain why consciousness exists, or to find some work for it to do in the world? You may also be concerned with the structure and function of consciousness: for example, you may hold that minds can do things that classical digital computers cannot, and take it that we must look to the quantum realm to discover how.If you are not already entrenched, you might just wonder what kind of world we live in. The mechanistic philosophy of centuries past seemed to disenchant the world, rendering it a place of barren corpuscles banging into one another, leaving no room for mind or meaning, except perhaps as patterns in the collisions, or useless epiphenomena. But quantum mechanics and its relativistic generalizations force a rethinking of the mechanistic picture from the ground up. Once the dust has settled—if it ever does—we may find reasons to relegate consciousness once again to the shadows. But we may also find reasons to give it pride of place. If you are after scientific reasons to reenchant the world, this is a good place to look.The entries in this volume address these questions and others besides. The volume is organized into three parts. The first part contains four essays about the idea that consciousness causes (or constrains) quantum collapse. The second part contains eight essays discussing other ways that consciousness might contribute to theories of quantum mechanics. The third part contains five essays about how quantum mechanics might contribute to an ultimate theory of consciousness. I’ll follow the book’s order.In chapter 1, David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen develop a new consciousness-triggered collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics. On their approach, consciousness has a strict physical correlate (perhaps given by quantum integrated information theory), it is approximately superposition-resistant, and collapse dynamics are continuous (à la Philip Pearle). They respond to the standard objections that a consciousness-collapse link makes the collapse mechanism imprecise and requires dualism, as well as to worries about Quantum Zeno, among others. Crucially, their approach allows that superpositions of consciousness are possible: their motivation is to give the view a run for its money and to find work for consciousness to do in the universe, not to rid the world of all traces of superposed consciousness. One question: In taking consciousness itself to be superposition-resistant (rather than the environmental systems it asks questions about, as Henry Stapp suggests), we appear to favor internalism over externalism. What would an externalist variant look like? Another question: How exactly would experimental results—for example, that simple enough systems with maximal Φ remain in coherent superposition—constrain our theoretical options? If to accommodate this we have to impose an experimentally determined threshold for the minimal absolute Φ for consciousness, will that mean that on the physicalist version of the view, the property we privilege for superposition-resistance is just an arbitrary collection of atoms?In chapter 2, Elias Okon and Miguel Angel Sebastian defend a consciousness-collapse theory that they call the Subjective-Objective collapse model. Like Chalmers and McQueen, Okon and Sebastian invoke a Pearle-style continuous collapse dynamics and think of consciousness as only weakly superposition-resistant. A key contribution is the treatment of a worry about multiple realizability (i.e., the way that some property of biological neurons and some other property of artificial neurons might both realize the state of being in pain). The problem is that it is not straightforward to define Hermitian operators whose eigenstates are disjunctions of the eigenstates of other Hermitian operators: you must ensure orthogonality (“being red or being a circle” is not orthogonal to “being red or being square”). In answer, the authors point out that we don’t need each multiply realizable phenomenal state to be an eigenstate of our collapse operator; it suffices that each way of realizing each phenomenal state is an eigenstate. One question is whether this problematizes the dancing qualia argument. A second worry is that we still must find a suitable basis for Hilbert space. But theories of consciousness may constrain both position and momentum: for example, both distances between neurons and how energy is transferred. We can talk about wave packets, but these will not get us eigenstates of a Hermitian operator.In chapter 3, J. Acacio de Barros and Carlos Montemayor suggest that if a mentality-triggered collapse theory is what you want, you should opt for intentionality rather than phenomenality. This is because, first, we have evidence from psychophysics that there is unconscious perception. Second, the first-personal data that motivate collapse theory concern intentionality: we remember only recording definite values; our decisions about what to measure affect the outcomes we see. First question: Can the reasons we have for thinking that there is unconscious intentionality extend into a case for unconscious primitive intentionality? Another question is how the proposal here would differ from Stapp’s treatment of what questions a mind asks of the universe. A third is how we contend with Quantum Zeno, the effect that forces both Chalmers-McQueen and Okon-Angel Sebastian to say that consciousness is only weakly superposition-resistant. Those authors note the possibility that the relevant superposed states of consciousness might overflow access consciousness (in Ned Block’s sense). We may have an easier time ensuring that access conscious states only rarely enter into superposition, if we set them back from our front line of superposition-resistant states.In chapter 4, Adrian Kent explores objective collapse theories—mass-dependent continuous spontaneous localization models. Consciousness may not be in the spotlight on these theories, but they should at least ensure that collapse happens faster than the time it takes for a stimulus (e.g., a system of several photons) to make it from a retinal impact to consciousness. Angelo Bassi, Dirk-André Deckert, and Luca Ferialdi (2010) argue that for a range of theories this constraint is respected, with collapse for a system of several photos happening at around 100 ms. Kent problematizes their argument, showing that their estimation may be off by an order of magnitude or more. Kent’s point is compelling: more work is needed to refine the estimate and to conceptually clarify the import of the constraints from perception.Part 2 consists of eight essays on various ways that consciousness might figure in or constrain quantum theories. In chapter 5, Phillip Goff argues that 3N-dimensional wave function monism cannot accommodate ground truths about consciousness, pressing on worries that the view imposes too few structural constraints to allow for the unambiguous recovery of ordinary 3D reality. While I agree that wave function monistic accounts of ordinary reality (e.g., Albert’s functionalism or Ney’s priority monism) yield an explanatory gap (even given the 3D-ish structure of GRW jumps), I was puzzled here. All type-B physicalists confront an explanatory gap where consciousness is concerned. Isn’t this a point in support of wave function monism, since it amounts to a companions-in-guilt argument against opposition from other type-B materialists?In chapter 6, Peter Lewis raises some sensible worries about the use of phenomenal consciousness as an unanalyzed primitive or special case in quantum theory. He objects to the suggestion made by some Bohmians that we can be directly aware of the particles in our brains. Another target is John von Neumann, who appeals to intuitions about psychophysical connections to justify a collapse hypothesis. These are nice points: I would be curious to know whether Lewis thinks they apply to the justifications for mentalistic collapse theories from part 1.In chapter 7, Jenann Ismael first argues that the hard problem of consciousness is of no concern to physics per se: “If consciousness enters the problem space of physics, it does so by making a difference to the behavior of physical objects.” She then offers some clarifying remarks about how we might reconcile Van Gelder-style dynamicist conceptions of mentality with (virtual) machine functionalism. I find much to agree with here, though I do wonder how strictly to take Ismael’s claims about the irrelevance of the hard problem. If there is a tie between two theories of physics over predictive accuracy, elegance, and naturalness, but one yields a more satisfying analysis of consciousness than the other, are we not even allowed to treat that as a tie-breaker?In chapter 8, Shan Gao defends a mentalistic characterization of the measurement problem in reply to Andrea Oldofredi (2019). The question is whether the key premise of the measurement problem should be that measurements take on definite values or only that we (definitely) experience them as taking on definite values. Of course, our reasons for thinking that they do arise from our seeing or remembering that they do, but we can distinguish between the claim and our evidence for it. Gao argues that the underlying mentalistic claims are more inextricable from the dilemma than that. Many dilemmas involve premises for which the evidence is perceptual, though they make no mention of perception. Here, however, solutions to the problem require special attention to the nature of that evidence.In chapter 9, Paul Skokowski illustrates one reason that we must pay special attention to the nature of that evidence. Jeffrey A. Barrett’s (1999) bare theory is a minimalistic reading of Everett on which measurement outcomes are only definite if they obtain on all branches. One question is whether this means that observers have blatantly false disjunctive beliefs: let someone measure an electron’s spin and then ask, Do you believe that you got a definite measurement outcome, either “UP” or “DOWN”? The observer will say yes, because on each branch they saw one and not the other. However, by the lights of the theory, this disjunctive belief is false. Skokowski’s insight is that while the observer definitely says yes, it does not follow (by the lights of the bare theory) that the observer has a (definite) false belief, since the neural realizer for the disjunctive belief will be different on each branch and therefore not correspond to a common eigenstate (compare the worry from chapter 2 about multiple realizability). But isn’t this just to move from the frying pan to the fire, as it seems now that our observer has no (definite) beliefs at all?In chapter 10, Michael Silberstein and W. M. Stuckey advocate for a psi-epistemicist perspective that vindicates many phenomenological intuitions, including the one that experimental outcomes are definite (and intersubjectively consistent). The approach requires that we rethink naïve realism about the wave function and that we rethink mind-body duality, in favor of a neutral monist ontology governed by constraints. This is an exciting approach, though I’m not fully clear on how to differentiate neutral monism from its idealist, dual aspect, or panpsychist cousins.In chapter 11, Michael Bitbol suggests a phenomenology-first approach to interpreting quantum mechanics. Bitbol favors a QBist participatory realism, tempered by phenomenology, that could perhaps also be described as neutral monist. He notes that the phenomenology of embodiment (à la Merleau-Ponty) acquaints us with how something can be both active and passive, both minded and incarnate, and he traces the error of believing in a separate, physical world (an error participatory realism corrects) to the tendency of self-separation: the tendency to try to project ourselves beyond ourselves, discussed in Heidegger, Sartre, and Michel Henry. These phenomenological insights are enlightening, though I am still not quite clear on how the underlying (neutral?) ontology works. Who, precisely, are the observers? Do electrons have feelings, or are they just fictions we use to cope with ours?In chapter 12, Lucien Hardy describes an experiment in which humans might be used to determine the settings in a Bell experiment. Hardy suggests that the outcome may be a violation of quantum theory consistent with the Bell inequality. He argues that this result would support (superdeterministic) mind-body dualism and also could serve as a new more objective Turing test. This is a fascinating proposal: it remains only to do the experiment.This brings us to part 3: accounts that move from quantum mechanics to consciousness, rather than conversely. In chapters 13 and 14, Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff give a comprehensive account of the current state of their ORCH-OR theory of quantum collapse and consciousness. Among other things we find here a nice presentation of Goodstein’s theorem as an example of a theorem that is noncomputable but easy enough for humans to understand, and a nice discussion of how retroactivity might equip us with something to say to Benjamin Libet about the role of consciousness in action selection. I’ll note, though, that I asked ChatGPT to explain Goodstein to me and it did a fairly good job, suggesting something like understanding. On Libet, I’m not sure what exactly we need retrocausality for: Why not just content ourselves that awareness of the action plan leaves time for a veto, as Libet and others have suggested?In chapter 15, Basil J. Hiley and Paavo Pylkkänen explore another route to a comprehensive theory of consciousness, drawing from the materials of a theory of quantum reality. Here, that theory is the Bohmian implicate order picture, with special attention to the notion of active information that arises there. This is another approach with neutral monist overtones, but here the wave function of a system behaves something like a customized hylomorphic form for the system while at the same time imbuing it with intentionality. There are interesting claims here about the continuity between life and mind, the unity of consciousness, and protopanpsychism, as well as some speculation of how the theory might align with the various scientific theories of consciousness inspired by psychophysics, like higher-order or global workspace theories.In chapter 16, William Seager offers a helpful discussion of the kinds of intelligibility at issue in these debates, distinguishing between mundane, mathematical, and metaphysical intelligibility, weaving together insights from Leibniz and others to argue that a Bohmian approach offers the best bet for a metaphysically intelligible world view. I sympathize with the positive aspects of his argument, though I think that other papers in this volume showcase the metaphysical intelligibility of rival approaches.Finally, in chapter 17, Lee Smolin describes a completion of quantum mechanics, also echoing Leibniz, which could support a theory of quantum gravity and which offers a new conception of consciousness: the causal theory of views, alongside the principle of precedence. This yields a novel sort of protopanpsychism in which the world is a collection of (background-independent) causal views, where views are conscious when they have a few extra features, including being unprecedented and being maximal. This is an exciting approach. One question is how we reconcile the claim that experiential states are maximal with the (mental) problem of the many, the problem that there are ties between composites (that differ over a stray ion or two) over which has best claim to be me.In closing, this is a fantastic volume. I commend Shan Gao for his editorial work: he would make a wonderful DJ. There are subtle symmetries in the way that each entry segues to the next, and the collection has a remarkable coherence.