Aharonov and Susskind denied the concept of the superselection rules, and suggested the experimental feasibility of measuring interference between states with different charges. Their reasoning is shown to be incorrect.
We consider a particle in a coherent superposition of states with different electric charges moving in the vicinity of a magnetic flux. Formally, it should acquire a (gauge-dependent) Aharonov–Bohm (AB) relative phase between the charge states, even for an incomplete loop. If measurable, such a geometric, rather than topological, AB phase would seem to break gauge invariance. Wick, Wightman and Wigner argued that since (global) charge-dependent phase transformations are physically unobservable, charge state superpositions are unphysical (‘charge superselection rule’). This would resolve the apparent paradox in a trivial way. However, Aharonov and Susskind disputed this superselection rule: they distinguished between such global charge-dependent transformations and transformations of the relative inter-charge phases of two particles, and showed that the latter could in principle be observable! Finally, the paradox again disappears once we consider the ‘calibration’ of the phase measured by the Aharonov–Susskind phase detectors, as well as the phase of the particle at its initial point. It turns out that such a detector can only distinguish between the relative phases of two paths if their (oriented) difference forms a loop around the flux.
A superselection rule advanced in the course of a quantum-mechanical treatment of some phenomenon is an assertion to the effect that the superposition principle of quantum mechanics is to be restricted in the application at hand. Superselection accounts of measurement all have in common a decision to represent the indicator states of detectors by eigenspaces of superselection operators named in a superselection rule, on the grounds that the states in question are states of a so-called classical quantity and therefore not subject to quantum interference effects. By this strategy superselectionists of measurement expect to dispense with use of projection postulates in treatments of measurement. I shall argue that superselection accounts of measurement are self-contradictory, and that treatments of infinite systems, if they can avoid the contradiction, are not true superselection accounts.