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Lecture notes in electrical engineering

Automatic Security Analysis for Group Key Exchange Protocol: A Case Study in Burmester-Desmedt Protocol

Ren Chunyang, Wang Hongyuan, Zhang Zijian, Liao Lejian

Published Jan 1, 2012• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-26007-0_3

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With the rapid development of cloud computing and mobile networks, more and more application scenarios require a secret group key for secure communication. Group Key Exchange (GKE) protocol provides a secret group key for three or more members. Burmester and Desmedt presented an influential GKE protocol, which has a broadcast version and a cyclic version. In this paper, we investigate the security weaknesses of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol. We report that both the broadcast version and the cyclic version of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol suffer member tampering attacks if the two members that belong to both group A and group B are corrupted. That is, two corrupted members can add some unknowing members of group A to group B and trick the legal members of group B to believe that these unknowing members share the secret group key with them after a protocol run. Furthermore, to defeat the member tampering attack, we propose digital signature-based improvements on the broadcast version and the cyclic version of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol. We hope our research results will encourage the development of more robust and effective GKE protocols that stand rigorous security analysis.

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Scalable authenticated tree based group key exchange for ad-hoc groups

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Abstract. Task-specific groups are often formed in an ad-hoc manner within big structures, like companies. Take the following typical scenario: A high rank manager decides that a task force group for some project needs to be built. This order is passed down the hierarchy where it finally reaches a manager who calls some employees to form a group. The members should communicate in a secure way and for efficiency reasons symmetric systems are the common choice. To establish joint secret keys for groups, group key exchange (GKE) protocols were developed. If the users are part of e.g. a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which is usually the case within a company or a small network, it is possible to achieve authenticated GKE by modifying the protocol and particularly by including signatures. In this paper we recall a GKE due to Burmester and Desmedt which needs only O(log n) communication and computation complexity per user, rather than O(n) as in the more well-known Burmester-Desmedt protocol, and runs in a constant number of rounds. To achieve authenticated GKE one can apply compilers, however, the existing ones would need O(n) computation and communication thereby mitigating the advantages of the faster protocol. Our contribution is to extend an existing compiler so that it preserves the computation and communication complexity of the non-authenticated protocol. This is particularly important for tree based protocols.

•Jan 1, 2006•0 citations
With the rapid development of cloud computing and mobile networks, more and more application scenarios require a secret group key for secure communication. Group Key Exchange (GKE) protocol provides a secret group key for three or more members. Burmester and Desmedt presented an influential GKE protocol, which has a broadcast version and a cyclic version. In this paper, we investigate the security weaknesses of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol. We report that both the broadcast version and the cyclic version of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol suffer member tampering attacks if the two members that belong to both group A and group B are corrupted. That is, two corrupted members can add some unknowing members of group A to group B and trick the legal members of group B to believe that these unknowing members share the secret group key with them after a protocol run. Furthermore, to defeat the member tampering attack, we propose digital signature-based improvements on the broadcast version and the cyclic version of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol. We hope our research results will encourage the development of more robust and effective GKE protocols that stand rigorous security analysis.
The advent of large-scale quantum computers implies that our existing public-key cryptography infrastructure has become insecure. That means that the privacy of many mobile applications involving dynamic peer groups, such as multicast messaging or pay-per-view, could be compromised. In this work we propose a generalization of the well known group key exchange protocol proposed by Burmester and Desmedt to the non-abelian case by the use of finite group actions and we prove that the presented protocol is secure in Katz and Yung's model.
Abstract. Task-specific groups are often formed in an ad-hoc manner within big structures, like companies. Take the following typical scenario: A high rank manager decides that a task force group for some project needs to be built. This order is passed down the hierarchy where it finally reaches a manager who calls some employees to form a group. The members should communicate in a secure way and for efficiency reasons symmetric systems are the common choice. To establish joint secret keys for groups, group key exchange (GKE) protocols were developed. If the users are part of e.g. a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which is usually the case within a company or a small network, it is possible to achieve authenticated GKE by modifying the protocol and particularly by including signatures. In this paper we recall a GKE due to Burmester and Desmedt which needs only O(log n) communication and computation complexity per user, rather than O(n) as in the more well-known Burmester-Desmedt protocol, and runs in a constant number of rounds. To achieve authenticated GKE one can apply compilers, however, the existing ones would need O(n) computation and communication thereby mitigating the advantages of the faster protocol. Our contribution is to extend an existing compiler so that it preserves the computation and communication complexity of the non-authenticated protocol. This is particularly important for tree based protocols.