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Electronics Letters

Noninteractive oblivious transfer

Lein Harn, H.-Y. Lin

Published May 1, 1990• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Two new approaches to implement oblivious transfer and 1–2 oblivious transfer without interaction, based on the wellknown, Diffie–Hellman public-key distribution algorithm are proposed.
DOI
10.1049/el:19900416

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Abstract—Two non-interactive three parties k out of n oblivious transfer protocols knOT (where 0<k<n) from bilinear pairings are proposed in this paper. In these protocols, a sender can obliviously transfer n messages to a receiver without communication with him/her. The public keys that a sender used to encrypt his/her messages are made by a third party. The receiver can extract k out of n messages at his/her choices by using the corresponding secret keys. The choices of the receiver are unconditionally secure. The sender's secrecy is guaranteed if the receiver is semi-honest in the standard model since the decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (DBDH) is hard and the sender's secrecy is achieved when the receiver is a malicious party in the random oracle model since the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem assumption (BDHA) holds. When a sender is a cheating party, the receiver will detect him/her and halt the protocol. A precise proof of the security of the protocols is presented. Index Terms—oblivious transfer, malicious oblivious transfer, bilinear pairing, bilinear Diffie-Hellman problems

Journal of Software•Dec 14, 2009•3 citations
Key-exchange protocols have been overlooked as a possible means for implementing oblivious transfer (OT). In this article, we present protocols for mutual exchange of secrets, 1-out-of-2 OT and coin-flipping similar to the Diffie-Hellman protocol using the idea of obliviously exchanging encryption keys. Since the Diffie-Hellman scheme is widely used, our protocol may provide a useful alternative to the conventional methods for implementation of oblivious transfer and a useful primitive in building larger cryptographic schemes.
Abstract—Two non-interactive three parties k out of n oblivious transfer protocols knOT (where 0<k<n) from bilinear pairings are proposed in this paper. In these protocols, a sender can obliviously transfer n messages to a receiver without communication with him/her. The public keys that a sender used to encrypt his/her messages are made by a third party. The receiver can extract k out of n messages at his/her choices by using the corresponding secret keys. The choices of the receiver are unconditionally secure. The sender's secrecy is guaranteed if the receiver is semi-honest in the standard model since the decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (DBDH) is hard and the sender's secrecy is achieved when the receiver is a malicious party in the random oracle model since the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem assumption (BDHA) holds. When a sender is a cheating party, the receiver will detect him/her and halt the protocol. A precise proof of the security of the protocols is presented. Index Terms—oblivious transfer, malicious oblivious transfer, bilinear pairing, bilinear Diffie-Hellman problems