The unstable characteristic of ill-conditioned system is used to guarantee wireless security in this paper. The use of ill-conditioned theory to protect wireless transmissions is proposed as a way to secure wireless networks at physical layer. Firstly, the problem of randomized transmission is converted to that of solving ill-conditioned equation to guarantee wireless transmissions with inherent low-probability-of interception (LPI). Secondly, a conditional ill-conditioned optimization function is constructed. The function of legitimate node is stable because of its matched channel. But the function of eavesdropper is randomized because that she has not the legitimate conditions, which relate to the wireless medium contains domain-specific information. In this context, we propose a security scheme for wireless security in time-variant channels. In this scheme, the variable part of channels is converted to additional conditions, which can be solved by optimizing parameters. In contrast to conventional physical-layer security techniques, the scheme exploits the redundancy of ill-conditioned problem's solutions instead of array redundancy for deliberate signal randomization, which effectively randomizes the eavesdropper's received signals but not the authorized receiver's signals. Extensive simulations and analysis results show that our proposed scheme is useful for securing wireless transmissions.
The unstable characteristic of ill-conditioned system is used to guarantee wireless security in this paper. The use of ill-conditioned theory to protect wireless transmissions is proposed as a way to secure wireless networks at physical layer. Firstly, the problem of randomized transmission is converted to that of solving ill-conditioned equation to guarantee wireless transmissions with inherent low-probability-of interception (LPI). Secondly, a conditional ill-conditioned optimization function is constructed. The function of legitimate node is stable because of its matched channel. But the function of eavesdropper is randomized because that she has not the legitimate conditions, which relate to the wireless medium contains domain-specific information. In this context, we propose a security scheme for wireless security in time-variant channels. In this scheme, the variable part of channels is converted to additional conditions, which can be solved by optimizing parameters. In contrast to conventional physical-layer security techniques, the scheme exploits the redundancy of ill-conditioned problem's solutions instead of array redundancy for deliberate signal randomization, which effectively randomizes the eavesdropper's received signals but not the authorized receiver's signals. Extensive simulations and analysis results show that our proposed scheme is useful for securing wireless transmissions.
The Ill-posed security theoretical framework for guaranteeing wireless physical-layer security is proposed in the paper, by introducing the concept of ill-posed.Firstly,the ill-posed security transforms non-unique and instability of solutions into information redundancy,which transforms the original problem into two randomized problems with redundancy combining the theory of perturbation. The framework includes the first kind ill-posed secure theory based on non-unique solutions and the second kind ill-posed secure theory based on instable solutions of an ill-posed problem.The first one utilizes the non-uniqueness of ill-posed problem to introduce redundancy for the transmitted precoding parameters,which is used to randomize transmitted signals for guaranteeing physical-layer security.The second one utilizes the instability of ill-posed problem to introduce redundancy for the transmitted precoding parameters,which can be used to guarantee physical-layer security at a little cost of legitimate users' performance.Secondly,the security of the proposed framework is measured by using secrecy capacity with imperfect channel statement information.At last,some typical examples are researched under the theoretical framework of ill-posed security.The results reveal that the existing signal processing based physical-layer security methods are all the special cases of the framework.
Wireless communications are naturally exposed to important security risks due to their broadcast nature. In contrast with wired communications, no physical medium is isolating the transmission surroundings to a specific path. Traditional methods to reach the goals of communications security rely on algorithms at protocol stack level, which are based on mathematically derived cryptographic protocols. With the tremendous proliferation of wireless devices, and the increase in computational power available for decryption, traditional cryptographic measures may be compromised. To protect communications at the lowest level, physical layer (PHY) security methods have been proposed recently. These techniques aim to ensure secure communications by exploiting the unique characteristics of the physical medium between communicating nodes, effectively reducing the decryption capabilities of an eavesdropper to intercept transmissions. This thesis explains within a general framework the most important PHY layer security schemes. First we explore approaches which utilize the knowledge of the unique channel between communicating nodes to distort a transmitted signal with various kinds of randomizations, in such a way that the intended receivers are unaffected by the distortion, but any other observer will be exposed to it. These techniques, however, introduce several trade-offs between transmission resources and the effectiveness in achieving secrecy. Of particular interest for this investigation is a class of methods which can be referred to as "security enhancing techniques", in which minimal priors about the potential eavesdroppers locations and capabilities are assumed. In this thesis, a wave-based approach to the communication secrecy problem is introduced. An interesting perspective is provided by studying the relation between electromagnetic theory and information theory, the so-called electromagnetic information theory. This allows to properly identify the unavoidable limitations imposed by the laws of electromagnetics to our ability to communicate securely. The proposed model can be extended to the analysis of different signal distortion methodologies and different channel conditions. The resulting approach is highly relevant to the study of PHY layer security methods since it is physically fundamental as well as architecture independent, which leads to a consolidating point of view of the secrecy problem. In addition, the thesis presents computer simulation results which shed insight on the security possibilities and limitations of three different security scenarios, which are termed MISO (multiple-input, single-output) (with single eavesdropper), MISOME (multiple-input, single-output, multiple eavesdropper), and MIMOME (multiple-input, multiple-output, multiple-eavesdropper).
Secure wireless communication has always been a hot research topic due to the vulnerabilities associated with wireless channel. Physical layer aspects to secure wireless communication, based on the information-theoretic security and signal processing methods have gained much recognition over the last decade. Specifically, artificial noise (AN) methods are assumed to be good means for providing security against potential eavesdroppers in multi-input multi-output (MIMO) systems and/or relay systems. However, there are still a large number of nodes which do not have multi-antennas or support sophisticated protocols in wireless networks. In this paper, a novel AN-aided method is proposed to secure wireless communications between the legitimate users (not equipped with multiple antennas) in the presence of an eavesdropper. In this proposed method frequency selective property of wireless channel is exploited. The basic principle is same in which transmitter generate random AN signal utilizing some of the transmission power to confuse eavesdropper. However artificial noise is generated in such a way that it appears to be zero at the sampling time, only for the legitimate receiver while degrading eavesdropper's channel. Artificial noise is specified using the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate users' link. However, the secrecy of proposed scheme doesn't depend on the secrecy of CSI. Extensive simulation suggests that the proposed scheme can effectively utilized for securing wireless transmissions.
Security capacity improvement is always the implementation goal of physical layer security, which can be achieved by deliberate randomization based on differentia and uniqueness of wireless channels through signal processing method. An information-guided randomization secure transmission scheme is proposed combined with a spatial modulation system in which information can be carried by receiving antennas index but actually by channel differentia. Randomization is generated along with channel modulation procedure realized by corresponding preprocessing to transmitting signals. We provide three approaches for designing preprocessing weights under different constraint conditions. The former two can only be used when the number of receiving antennas is less than transmitting and have a tradeoff with varying degrees between receiving performance and security. The third one then relaxes the limits via generalized spatial modulation and can be used for arbitrary antennas configuration but with a receiving performance compromise. Lastly, results of performance analysis and numerical evaluation show that the proposed secure scheme is effective to prohibit the eavesdropper from intercepting information.
Wireless physical layer key generation is a remarkable technology for physical layer security. The security of key generation is not guaranteed in existing wireless physical layer key generation schemes if the eavesdropper is less than half a wavelength away from the legitimate node, which called non-secure zones problem. To address this problem, this paper proposes a Wireless physical layer key generation scheme based on unscheduled forwarding signal (WKG-UFS). Specifically, the legitimate communication nodes send random signals to each other within a coherent time. Then, the received signals are forwarded back within the coherent time after a random time interval. The legitimate nodes estimate the equivalent channel based on the final received signal and generate the secure key. Since eavesdropper does not know the original signals sent by the legitimate communication nodes, the channel feature cannot be effectively estimated. The results of theoretical analysis and experimental simulation show that the proposed scheme can effectively reduce the threat of eavesdropping on secure communication. Besides, since the time intervals for receiving and forwarding signals are variable, it can also effectively resist active attacks which by manipulating the channel.
Due to the broadcast nature, wireless links are open to malicious intrusions from outsiders, which makes the security issues a critical concern in the wireless communicationsover them. Physical-layer security techniques, which are based on the Shannon’s unconditional secrecy model, are effective in addressing the security issue while meeting the required performance level. According to the Wyner’s wiretap channel model, to achieve unconditionally security communication, the first step is to build up a wiretap channel with better channel quality between the legitimate communication peers than that of the eavesdropper; and the second step is to employ a robust security code to ensure that the legitimate users experience negligible errors while the eavesdropper is subject to 0.5 error probability. \nMotivated by this idea, in this thesis, we build wiretap channels for the single antenna systems without resorting to the spatial degree in commonly observed the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems. Firstly, to build effective wiretap channels, we design a novel scheme, called multi-round two-way communications (MRTWC). By taking feedback mechanisms into the design of Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes, our scheme adds randomness to the feedback signals from the destination to keep the eavesdropper ignorant while adding redundancy with the LDPC codes so that the legitimate receiver can correctly receive and decode the signals. Then, the channel BERs are specifically quantified according to the crossover probability in the case of Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC), or the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) in the case of AWGN and Rayleigh channels. Thus, the novel scheme can be utilized to address the security and reliability. Meanwhile, we develop a cross-layer approach to building the wiretap channel, which is suitable for high dynamic scenarios. By taking advantage of multiple parameters freedom in the discrete fractional Fourier transform (DFRFT) for single antenna systems, the proposed scheme introduces a distortion parameter instead of a general signal parameter for wireless networks based on DFRFT. The transmitter randomly flip-flops the uses of the distortion parameter and the general signal parameter to confuse the eavesdropper. An upper-layer cipher sequence will be employed to control the flip-flops. This cryptographic sequence in the higher layer is combined with the physical layer security scheme with random parameter fipping in DFRFT to guarantee security advantages over the main communication channel. \nAs the efforts on the second step, this thesis introduces a novel approach to generate security codes, which can be used for encoding with low complexity by taking advantage of a matrix general inverse algorithm. The novel constructions of the security codes are based on binary and non-binary resilient functions. With the proposed security codes, we prove that our novel security codes can ensure 0.5 error probability seen by the wiretapper while close to zero by the intended receiver if the error probability of the wiretapper’s channel is over a derived threshold. Therefore, the unconditionally secure communication of legitimate partners can be guaranteed. It has been proved mathematically that the non-binary security codes could achieve closer to the security capacity bound than any other reported short-length security codes under BSC. \nFinally, we develop the framework of associating the wiretap channel building approach with the security codes. The advantages between legitimate partners are extended via developing the security codes on top of our cross-layer DFRFT and feedback MRTWC security communication model. In this way, the proposed system could ensure almost zero information obtained by the eavesdroppers while still keeping rather lower error transmissions for legitimate users. Extensive experiments are carried out to verify the proposed security schemes and demonstrate the feasibility and implement ability. An USRP testbed is also constructed, under which the physical layer security mechanisms are implemented and tested. Our study shows that our proposed security schemes can be implemented in practical communications settings.