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International Journal of Grid and Utility Computing

Toward quantum-resistant strong designated verifier signature

Xi Sun, Haibo Tian, Yumin Wang

Published Jan 1, 2014• 6 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper proposes two Strong Designated Verifier Signature (SDVS) schemes based on two post-quantum key agreement protocols. One protocol is based on a problem about an isogeny between supersingular elliptic curves. The problem is hypothetically strong against a quantum computer. Another protocol is based on the computational difficulty to solve multivariate algebraic equations of high degree. Our proposals are the first instantiations of a basic design idea about SDVS that are potentially secure against a quantum computer.

DOI
10.1504/ijguc.2014.060187

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This paper proposes two Strong Designated Verifier Signature (SDVS) schemes based on two post-quantum key agreement protocols. One protocol is based on a problem about an isogeny between supersingular elliptic curves. The problem is hypothetically strong against a quantum computer. Another protocol is based on the computational difficulty to solve multivariate algebraic equations of high degree. Our proposals are the first instantiations of a basic design idea about SDVS that are potentially secure against a quantum computer.
We propose and develop new schemes for post-quantum cryptography based on isogenies over elliptic curves. First we show that ordinary elliptic curves are have less than exponential security against quantum computers. These results were used as the motivation for De Feo, Jao and Pl\\^ut's construction of public key cryptosystems using supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. We extend their construction and show that isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves can be used as the underlying hard mathematical problem for other quantum-resistant schemes. For our second contribution, we propose is an undeniable signature scheme based on elliptic curve isogenies. We prove its security under certain reasonable number-theoretic computational assumptions for which no efficient quantum algorithms are known. This proposal represents only the second known quantum-resistant undeniable signature scheme, and the first such scheme secure under a number-theoretic complexity assumption. Finally, we also propose a security model for evaluating the security of authenticated encryption schemes in the post-quantum setting. Our model is based on a combination of the classical Bellare-Namprempre security model for authenticated encryption together with modifications from Boneh and Zhandry to handle message authentication against quantum adversaries. We give a generic construction based on Bellare-Namprempre for producing an authenticated encryption protocol from any quantum-resistant symmetric-key encryption scheme together with any digital signature scheme or MAC admitting any classical security reduction to a quantum-computationally hard problem. We apply the results and show how we can explicitly construct authenticated encryption schemes based on isogenies.
In this article, we discuss how algebraic geometry, especially the isogenies and elliptic curves, have been used to construct secure post-quantum cryptographic systems. Since quantum computing is a very big threat to conventional cryptographic techniques, it is essential to develop new strategies that would enhance protection of data in quantum age. Algebraic geometry provides such solutions as the elliptic curve cryptography and the protocols based on isogenic, which is also resistant to the attacks of quantum algorithms. The article explores the mathematical basis of these cryptographic techniques, their effectiveness, scalability and security. It is noteworthy that isogeny-based cryptography schemes such as the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) and Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) prove that isogeny-based cryptography is capable of secure key exchange and encapsulation. The results indicate that algebraic geometry is not only enhancing the cryptography systems, but also opening up a reasonable channel in which strong post-quantum systems can be created. The future of secure communication in a quantum-driven world has profound implications to the methods.
The goal of this project is to understand and analyze the supersingular isogeny Diffie Hellman (SIDH), a post-quantum key exchange protocol which security lies on the isogeny-finding problem between supersingular elliptic curves. In order to do so, we first introduce the reader to cryptography focusing on key agreement protocols and motivate the rise of post-quantum cryptography as a necessity with the existence of the model of quantum computation. We review some of the known attacks on the SIDH and finally study some algorithmic aspects to understand how the protocol can be implemented.
An Efficient Strong Designated Verifier Signature Based on R−\mathcal{R}-R− SIS Assumption
The designated verifier signature (DVS), introduced by Jakobssonet al., has the property that only the designated verifier can verify the generated signature. In order to prevent an eavesdropper to get the signature on-line before the designated verifier receives it, they also proposed strong designated verifier signature (SDVS). In this paper, according to an efficient SDVS proposed by Saeedniaet al., we present a post-quantum SDVS in the random oracle model based on lattice assumption. The unforgeability is based on the hardness of the average-case hard problemR−\mathcal {R}-R−SISq,n,m,β_{q,n,m,\beta }q,n,m,β​, which is at least as hard as worst-case SVPγ_{\gamma }γ​over ideal lattices. In addition, compared with existing lattice-based SDVS schemes, our scheme cuts by more than 50 percent repetitions and the size of signature is shorter with 256 bits security.
Motivated by the need to have secure strong designate verifier signatures (SDVS) even in the presence of quantum computers, a post-quantum lattice-based SDVS scheme is proposed based on the hardness of the short integer solution problem (SIS) and the learning with errors problem (LWE). The proposed SDVS scheme utilizes the Bonsai trees and pre-image sample-able function primitives to generate the designate verifier signature (DVS). In this construction, the un- forge-ability is based on the hardness of the SIS problem which is proven in the random oracle model and the non-transferability is based on the hardness of the LWE problem. As an application of the proposed SDVS scheme, we design a strong designate verifier ring signature scheme (SDVRS) which satisfies non-transferability. It is proven that the identity of the signer is unconditionally protected not only for any third-party but also for the designate verifier. Under the hardness of the SIS problem, the proposed SDVRS scheme is proven to be existentially un-forgeable in the random oracle model.
‎In this paper‎, ‎we introduce a zero-knowledge identification protocol designed for authentication within the supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) key exchange framework‎. ‎The protocol allows both parties to participate as either the prover or the verifier‎, ‎with the goal of proving that they know their private information‎. ‎We show the completeness and soundness of the protocol by showing that the privacy of both the prover and the verifier depends on the difficulty of solving the extended isogeny logarithm problem‎. ‎A new authentication protocol for SIDH is presented in this paper‎, ‎that is secure against attacks from eavesdroppers‎.