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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

The Price of Insisting that Quantum Mechanics is Complete

P. D. Magnus

Published Jun 1, 2004• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The Bare Theory was offered by David Albert as a way of standing by the completeness of quantum mechanics in the face of the measurement problem. This paper surveys objections to the Bare Theory that recur in the literature: what will here be called the oddity objection, the coherence objection, and the context-of-the-universe objection. Critics usually take the Bare Theory to have unacceptably bizarre consequences, but to be free from internal contradiction. Bizarre consequences need not be decisive against the Bare Theory, but a further objection—dubbed here the calibration objection—has been underestimated. This paper argues that the Bare Theory is not only odd but also inconsistent. We can imagine a successor to the Bare Theory—the Stripped Theory—which avoids the objections and fulfills the original promise of the Bare Theory, but at the cost of amplifying the bizarre consequences. The Stripped Theory is either a stunning development in our understanding of the world or a reductio disproving the completeness of quantum mechanics. 1. The Bare Theory 2. The usual objections 3. The calibration objection 4. Beyond the Bare Theory

DOI
10.1093/bjps/55.2.257

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The Bare Theory was offered by David Albert as a way of standing by the completeness of quantum mechanics in the face of the measurement problem. This paper surveys objections to the Bare Theory that recur in the literature: what will here be called the oddity objection, the coherence objection, and the context-of-the-universe objection. Critics usually take the Bare Theory to have unacceptably bizarre consequences, but to be free from internal contradiction. Bizarre consequences need not be decisive against the Bare Theory, but a further objection—dubbed here the calibration objection—has been underestimated. This paper argues that the Bare Theory is not only odd but also inconsistent. We can imagine a successor to the Bare Theory—the Stripped Theory—which avoids the objections and fulfills the original promise of the Bare Theory, but at the cost of amplifying the bizarre consequences. The Stripped Theory is either a stunning development in our understanding of the world or a reductio disproving the completeness of quantum mechanics. 1. The Bare Theory 2. The usual objections 3. The calibration objection 4. Beyond the Bare Theory
Abstract It is often claimed that quantum mechanics entails that there is indeterminacy in the world, in the sense that physical systems can lack a precise value for a property. Indeed, a radical form of indeterminacy, in which systems have almost none of the properties we normally attribute to them, can be shown to follow from a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics—the bare theory. However, the bare theory is shown to be incoherent. Still, a more limited form of indeterminacy can be located in spontaneous collapse, hidden variables, and many-worlds theories. This indeterminacy is unlike that which arises classically, having nothing to do with ordinary forms of vagueness or the composition of large objects out of smaller parts. Indeterminacy in quantum mechanics can perhaps be avoided, but there seems little reason to do so.
Quantum mechanics allows a remarkably accurate description of nature and powerful predictive capabilities. The analyses of quantum systems and their interpretation lead to many surprises, for example, the ability to detect the characteristics of an object without ever touching it in any way, via "interaction-free measurement," or the teleportation of an atomic state over large distances. The results can become downright bizarre. Quantum mechanics is a subtle subject that usually involves complicated mathematics -- calculus, partial differential equations, etc., for complete understanding. Most texts for general audiences avoid all mathematics. The result is that the reader misses almost all deep understanding of the subject, much of which can be probed with just high-school level algebra and trigonometry. Thus, readers with that level of mathematics can learn so much more about this fundamental science. The book starts with a discussion of the basic physics of waves (an appendix reviews some necessary classical physics concepts) and then introduces the fundamentals of quantum mechanics, including the wave function, superposition, entanglement, Bell's theorem, etc., and applications to Bose--Einstein condensation, quantum computing, and much more. The interpretation of the mathematics of quantum mechanics into a world view has been the subject of much controversy. The result is a variety of conflicting interpretations, from the famous Copenhagen view of Bohr to the multiple universes of Everett. We discuss these interpretations in the chapter "What is a wave function?" and include some very recent advances, for example, quantum Bayesianism, and measurements of the reality of the wave function.
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics has been a cause of much puzzlement over the years. The very idea of having two different versions of reality for the same system has been a cause for much debate. Often quantum mechanics textbooks follow the ‘shut up and calculate’ paradigm. This denies the opportunity for the common student to understand the consequence of one of the most elegant and beautiful aspects of science. The state of the art textbooks give a purely algebraic, perfunctory and monotonous approach where the real consequence of the system is not fully appreciated. A good reason for this is the considerable deviation of the quantum mechanical process from the commonsensical idea of truth, reality and reason. We tend to look at the world in a materialistic, deterministic, causal and objectivistic way. We tend not to accept a world of contradictions. A quantum measurement is essentially an amalgamation of contradictions, mystery and duality. It encompasses an implicit dependence on subjectivity and contradicts with causality as we know it. We look at the world as in the present. But a quantum mechanical measurement is a prediction of the future influenced by the observer or the measurer. This offers a philosophical and pedagogical conundrum. It poses a challenge on not just how our perception of the world might change in addition to providing a big challenge on how to make it compatible with the other successful theories of physics. The most common text book interpretation of quantum mechanics has been the Copenhagen Interpretation suggests the ‘collapse of the wave function’ as a mechanism of transition between duality. But a more bizarre yet elegant theory, extending quantum formalism to the classical domain, called the Many Worlds Interpretation has been catching up very quickly; it stands for the split of the universe when we make a quantum mechanical measurement. Consequently, reality as we is redefined as a universal wave function which is a superposition of several outcomes, which is incompatible with many of the successful concepts of physics and has several problems like the correct idea about probability or basis. We adapt the idea of the universal wave function, but instead suggest a continuum interpretation of quantum mechanics where the universal wave function represents the entire singular universe and the concept of atoms or electrons as conceptually a continuous part of it rather than a distinct separate entity. Such an interpretation could be compatible with other continuum theories like the Superfluid vacuum theory or the Higgs Field.
David Wallace's The Emergent Multiverse is the most recent complete presentation of a version of Everett's theory of quantum mechanics that has attracted much scientific activity in the past decade. I present a brief sketch ofWallace's solution to the measurement problem, arguing that the many-worlds interpretation is not as far-fetched as it is often conceived to be. Taking the wavefunction as the fundamental ontology, it claims to solve the measurement problem by recognizing certain (quasi-classical) patterns of the wavefunction in 3N-dimensional configuration space that functionally behave like the (classical) configuration-space pattern of a N-particle system described by classical mechanics. In this sense, structures within the universal wavefunction are identified with classical `worlds' at the coarse-grained level. I highlight two elements of this work: the role of emergence and the functionalist framework that Wallace imports through what he calls `Dennett's criterion'. This criterion appeals to the virtue of usefulness (in the form of predictability and explanatory power) as a criterion for the reality of `patterns'. It is shown that, due to decoherence, quasi-classical worlds emerge weakly, similar to that of the emergence of thermodynamic temperature from statistical physics, in the sense that they are autonomous and unexpected with respect to the lower-level domain (as opposed to strong emergence of some insuper et supra high-level ontology). However, the use of Dennett's criterion obscures this result, laying bare some philosophical issues, which we address over three axes of distinctions: (i) the objective/subjective-axis, (ii) the quantitative/qualitative-axis within the framework of intertheoretic reduction and (iii) the ontological/epistemological-axis. First, Daniel Dennett's `real patterns' are compared to Wallace approach to patterns. Then, I point out (i) an analogy with Bas van Fraassen's idea of causal patterns that become salient due to pragmatic explanation, namely that in the context of a pragmatic goal the quasi-classical pattern is made salient over other objectively existing, non-classical, patterns. I conclude that in the absence of human goals there is no reason to regard the quasi-classical pattern as `more real' than other patterns. In analogy to Dennett's `intentional stance', Wallace is committed to a `classical stance', equivalent to breaking Hilbert space democracy of bases. Although Wallace's version is a weaker one, his (ii) relations between theories bare resemblance to the reductionist program, and I argue that, next to quantitative deduction, additional conceptual `bridge principles' à la Ernest Nagel are needed. The appeal to usefulness as a criterion for reality (iii), I claim, is not necessary to solve the measurement problem itself, but has the further (unwarranted) goal of establishing `real' worlds. I spell out a solution to the measurement problem, the many-minds theory, which solves the problem along the same lines as The Emergent Multiverse, with the exception that the - although the quantum world itself is real - the classical worlds with definite properties are beliefs in the superposed brains of observers.
Abstract The bare theory is a no-collapse version of quantum mechanics which predicts certain puzzling results for the introspective beliefs of human observers of superpositions. The bare theory can be interpreted to claim that an observer can form false beliefs about the outcome of an experiment which produces a superpositional result. It is argued that, when careful consideration is given to the observer’s belief states and their evolution, the observer does not end up with the beliefs claimed. This result leads to questions about whether there can be any allure for no-collapse theories as austere as the bare theory.
We argue that a clear view of quantum mechanics is obtained by considering that the unicity of the macroscopic world is a fundamental postulate of physics, rather than an issue that must be mathematically justified or demonstrated. This postulate allows for a framework in which quantum mechanics can be constructed in a complete mathematically consistent way. This is made possible by using general operator algebras to extend the mathematical description of the physical world toward macroscopic systems. Such an approach goes beyond the usual type-I operator algebras used in standard textbook quantum mechanics. This avoids a major pitfall, which is the temptation to make the usual type-I formalism 'universal'. This may also provide a meta-framework for both classical and quantum physics, shedding new light on ancient conceptual antagonisms and clarifying the status of quantum objects. Beyond exploring remote corners of quantum physics, we expect these ideas to be helpful to better understand and develop quantum technologies.