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Progress of Theoretical Physics

Comments on an Article of Takabayasi conserning the Formulation of Quantum Mechanics with Classical Pictures

David Böhm

Published Mar 1, 1953• 76 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Certain of Takabayasi's criticism of a causal re-interpretation of the quantum theory are answered in detail. It is indecated how this interpretation can be extended to the Dirac equation, and the problem of the identity of equivalent particles is discussed, for the case of particles that satisfy the Pauli principle. Possible extensions of theory are indicated. Finally, criticisms at the philosophical level are discussed, especially the question of what it means to call a theory "metaphysical" and the reasons why the concept of causality is indispensable in scientific theories.

DOI
10.1143/ptp/9.3.273

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arXiv:quant-ph/0305183•May 30, 2003•2 citations
Certain of Takabayasi's criticism of a causal re-interpretation of the quantum theory are answered in detail. It is indecated how this interpretation can be extended to the Dirac equation, and the problem of the identity of equivalent particles is discussed, for the case of particles that satisfy the Pauli principle. Possible extensions of theory are indicated. Finally, criticisms at the philosophical level are discussed, especially the question of what it means to call a theory "metaphysical" and the reasons why the concept of causality is indispensable in scientific theories.
The disagreement with regard to the validity of the principle of causality, existing to-day among scientists, has its roots in the diversity of definitions of the principle itself rather than in a problematic scientific situation. As far as the formulation of quantum theory is complete its bearing upon philosophical questions can be fixed with precision provided the questions are phrased intelligibly. But a question is intelligible from a scientific point of view only if it satisfies two conditions: (1) the meaning of its terms must be fixed; (2) it must be in accord with the conventions of the science to which the question is put.
Beginning in 1900 with 1-iax Planck's hypothesis of quanta, physics has been embarked on a course which has raised serious questions about the true nature of physical reality, about the foundational assumptions and structures of science, and about the relationships between physical reality and physical theory. In particular, attempts to give a physical interpretation to quantum theory seem to result in "pictures" of nature which are paradoxical. A subatomic entity is described by the theory as exhibiting the properties and behavior of both particle-like phenomena and wave­like phenomena. Since it seems unreasonable that a single entity could be both a point-like mass and a wave spread out through a region of space, quantum theory would seem to be less than satisfactory or less than complete at the interpretational level. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the underlying causes of this paradox. The dissertation proceeds by reviewing the development of quantum theory and the emergence of the paradox. Next, the prob­lem of physical interpretation is examined and several of the more significant existing interpretations are discussed and analyzed. Finally, the foundations of science and the general structure of scientific theory are examined in a search for the origins of the paradox. As a result of these investigations and analyses, it is con­cluded that the paradoxical nature of the physical interpretation of quantum theory is the consequence of certain paradigms and preconceptualizations about physical reality which have been incorporated into the theory at the foundational level. These fundamental assU14p­tions produce, within quantum theory, a forced marriage of the plenum and atomic views of physical reality. They also produce an ambiguity with respect to the nature of causality which is charaeteristic of the theory. These problems are reflected in the mathematical formalisms and physical concepts of the theory as well as in its meta­physical foundations. Lastly, methods of resoling the paradox are discussed. It is argued that a successful solution is possible, but that it would involve the creation of a new metaphor-an extension of the present language--which would lead science to a deeper, subquantum level in terms of which the present paradox would vanish.
ABSTRACT The paper aims to bridge the history of quantum theory with its philosophical implications. The focus is not only on the scientific underpinnings of quantum mechanics (these theories emerged as ‘ad hoc’ responses to experimental anomalies) but also on the philosophical ramifications of its probabilistic nature and indeterminacy, which differ from classical realism. The paper examines Dirac's, Bell's, and modern views, focusing on how quantum mechanics (QM) challenges traditional notions of causality, objectivity, and truth while embracing epistemological and metaphysical perspectives. Debates over collapse theories and hidden variables are discussed, as well as Putnam's philosophical outlook, which includes his trenchant involvement with realism, logic, and the measurement problem. Finally, the paper proposes that QM represents a philosophical revolution that renews our understanding of reality, knowledge, and scientific explanation, rather than simply serving as a physical theory for assessing the prospects of quantum philosophy by connecting it to broader aspects such as relativity, causality, and scientific realism.
By re-expressing the generalized Schrodinger equation in its coordinate representation in terms of amplitude and phase of the state vector, a quantum-mechanical change of a system can be made to correspond to an ensemble of classical motions of the system to which is added some internal potential. This ensemble may be taken as the statistical. This enables an alternative formulation of quantum mechanics with which is associated that classical picture. Such a formulation leads, however, if developed straightforwardly according to the picture, to a theoretical scheme quite different from that of ordinary quantum mechanics concerning the problems other than the equation of motion. Furthermore, this formulation is not applicable to Fermions when spin, or exclusion principle is taken into account. Bohm's recent renewed form of the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics referring to this formulation is criticized in several points. On this formulation we can construct a singular ensemble which is shown to correspond to the transformation kernel of the wave function to infinitesimally later instant, and thus a connection between this formulation and that of Feynman's is taken out. Hydrodynamical picture formally equivalent to the statistical picture in one-body problems is also considered, and from such analogy certain formal generalization of Schrodinger equation is suggested.
The most important problems in the philosophy of quantum mechanics are the problem of measurement and the problem of the 'acausal' EPR correlations. It is commonly thought that these problems call for a new interpretation of the quantum theory. I argue that it is possible to construe both problems rather differently, as resulting from a mistaken understanding of scientific theory-application. It then becomes possible to tackle both problems independently of questions of interpretation, by attending carefully to what constitutes a successful application of a scientific theory, and of the quantum theory in particular. In the first part of the Thesis, I argue against a standard conception of scientific theory-application. This standard conception, which is often presupposed in the philosophical discussions of quantum mechanics, takes the applications of a scientific theory to constitute its domain of empirical adequacy. I argue that, on the contrary, a scientific theory can be applied to phenomena that it does not subsume. I present a case study in the history of superconductivity to illustrate and to motivate this claim. In the second part, I argue that the problem of measurement can be construed as the impossibility of applying the quantum theory to measurement interactions. I then argue that Arthur Fine's proposed solution to the measurement problem implicitly abandons the standard conception of application. Finally I look at quantum correlation phenomena. Bas Van Fraassen has claimed that the EPR correlations fit no causal model. The correctness of this claim depends on what probabilistic constraints a causal model is taken to have to satisfy. I argue, following Nancy Cartwright, that Van Fraassen's constraints on common-cause models are too strong; and I describe a direct-cause model that, I urge, constitutes a successful application of the quantum theory to the EPR correlations.
The causal interpretation of quantum mechanics, as originally stated by deBroglie and Bohm, had several attractive features. Among these is the possibility that it could address some of the most fundamental questions on quantum phenomena. However, subsequent theoretical conjectures, which have now been included in the orthodox view of the deBroglie Bohm theory, are unphysical and have done much to undermine the original theory's appeal. We, therefore, return to the original theory as our starting point and address one of its perplexing areas: the quantum potential. By avoiding the unphysical conjectures we are led to an understanding of the quantum potential which is distinctly different from that of the orthodox deBroglie Bohm view.