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Physical Review A

Pre- and postselected quantum systems, counterfactual measurements, and consistent histories

Oliver Cohen

Published Jun 1, 1995• 47 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We examine some surprising results that have been obtained for pre- and postselected quantum systems. We show that these results depend on a counterfactual interpretation of the rule of Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz [Phys. Rev. 134, B1410 (1964)] (the ABL rule) and that this interpretation is not valid in general. We then argue, with the help of the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics, that there is a special class of situations where application of the counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule can be justified. We then reexamine the aforementioned surprising results.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.51.4373

Related papers

Closing a Loophole in the Case Against the Counterfactual Usage of the ABL Rule

Ruth E. Kastner

A currently discussed interpretation of quantum theory, Time-Symmetrized Quantum Theory, makes certain claims about the properties of systems between pre- and post- selection measurements. These claims are based on a counterfactual usage of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule for calculating the probabilities of measurement outcomes between such measurements. It has been argued by several authors that the counterfactual usage of the ABL rule is, in general, incorrect. This paper examines what might appear to be a loophole in those arguments and shows that this apparent loophole cannot be used to support a counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule. It is noted that the invalidity of the counterfactual usage of the ABL rule implies that the characterization of those outcomes receiving probability 1 in a counterfactual application of the rule as `elements of reality' is, in general, unfounded.

arXiv:quant-ph/9807015•Jul 5, 1998•3 citations

Validity of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz rule

Lev Vaidman A

It is argued that the proof of Cohen [Phys. Rev. A 51, 4373 (1995)] which shows that an application of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule leads to contradiction with predictions of quantum theory is erroneous. A generalization of the ABL rule for the case of an incomplete final measurement (which is needed for the analysis of Cohen's proof) is presented.

arXiv:quant-ph/9703001•Physical Review A•Mar 1, 1998•21 citations

The Counterfactual Meaning of the ABL Rule

Louis Marchildon

The Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz rule assigns probabilities to quantum measurement results at time t on the condition that the system is prepared in a given way at t_1 < t and found in a given state at t_2 > t. The question whether the rule can also be applied counterfactually to the case where no measurement is performed at the intermediate time t has recently been the subject of controversy. I argue that the counterfactual meaning may be understood in terms of the true value of an observable at t. Such a value cannot be empirically determined for, by stipulation, the measurement that would yield it is not performed. Nevertheless, it may or may not be well-defined depending on one's proposed interpretation of quantum mechanics. Various examples are discussed illustrating what can be asserted at the intermediate time without running into contradictions.

arXiv:quant-ph/0307082•Jul 10, 2003•5 citations

The ABL Rule and the Perils of Post-Selection

Jacob A. Barandes

In 1964, Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz introduced their well-known ABL rule with the intention of providing a time-symmetric formalism for computing novel kinds of conditional probabilities in quantum theory. Later papers attached additional significance to the ABL rule, including assertions that it supported violations of the uncertainty principle. The present work challenges these claims, as well as subsequent attempts to salvage the original interpretation of the ABL rule. Taking a broader view, this paper identifies a subtle category error at the heart of the ABL rule that consists of confusing observables that belong to a single system with emergent observables that arise only for physical ensembles. Along the way, this paper points out other problems and fallacious reasoning in the research literature surrounding the ABL rule, including the misuse of post-selection, a reliance on pattern matching to classical formulas, and a posture of measurementism that takes experimental data as providing answers to interpretational questions.

quant-pharXiv:2602.07402•Feb 10, 2026•3 citations

The Nature of the Controversy over Time-Symmetric Quantum Counterfactuals

Ruth E. Kastner

It is proposed that the recent controversy over “time-symmetric quantum counterfactuals” (TSQCs), based on the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz Rule for measurements of pre- and post-selected systems, can be clarified by taking TSQCs to be counterfactuals with a specific type of compound antecedent. In that case, inconsistency proofs such as that of Sharp and Shanks (1993) are not applicable, and the main issue becomes not whether such statements are true, but whether they are nontrivial. The latter question is addressed and answered in the negative. Thus it is concluded that TSQCs, understood as counterfactuals with a compound antecedent, are true but only trivially so, and provide no new contingent information about specific quantum systems (except in special cases already identified in literature).

arXiv:1401.5790•Philosophy of Science•Jan 1, 2003•17 citations

Consistent treatments of quantum mechanics

Yakir Aharonov, Sandu Popescu, Jeff Tollaksen

Aharonov, Popescu, and Tollaksen reply: We are grateful to David Mermin for stating loud and clear, in his unmistakable style, that “the authors are correct.” As for the rest of his letter, a lesson on clear writing from a great master of the subject is always welcome. We did strive for clarity in our article, but there is always space for improvement, and Freudian slips of Newspeak often creep in—that’s their very nature.However, as Mermin certainly knows, analyzing sentences in isolation without the many clues found in context doesn’t do them justice. The initial setup is indeed elementary, and we put in all the details, so it is hard to see how it could be misinterpreted. The situation becomes far more interesting and surprising, though, when weak measurements are taken into account; to ignore them, as Michael Nauenberg and Art Hobson did, is to completely miss the point. We believe that no true understanding of quantum mechanics can be obtained without taking weak measurements seriously.The letter by Robert Griffiths is mainly concerned with the merits of the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics. It is an interesting subject but one that has very little to do with our article. We presented a number of quantum effects that arise in the context of pre- and postselection, first and foremost the effects that appear when weak measurements are involved. And no, there is no error in reasoning when we claim that in a situation like that described in our article, spin measurements may, in a consistent way, indicate that spin-1⁄2 particles have value 100; that is a statement of fact about results of measurements, which incidentally have been confirmed experimentally. One is free to disagree with the meaning we attach to those facts but cannot deny the facts themselves. Of course, since our effects are purely quantum mechanical, they can be analyzed using any interpretation of quantum mechanics, including consistent histories. However, before having such a discussion, it helps if the effects are first discovered! Their existence is our main message.© 2011 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Oct 1, 2011•5 citations
We examine some surprising results that have been obtained for pre- and postselected quantum systems. We show that these results depend on a counterfactual interpretation of the rule of Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz [Phys. Rev. 134, B1410 (1964)] (the ABL rule) and that this interpretation is not valid in general. We then argue, with the help of the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics, that there is a special class of situations where application of the counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule can be justified. We then reexamine the aforementioned surprising results.
A currently discussed interpretation of quantum theory, Time-Symmetrized Quantum Theory, makes certain claims about the properties of systems between pre- and post- selection measurements. These claims are based on a counterfactual usage of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule for calculating the probabilities of measurement outcomes between such measurements. It has been argued by several authors that the counterfactual usage of the ABL rule is, in general, incorrect. This paper examines what might appear to be a loophole in those arguments and shows that this apparent loophole cannot be used to support a counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule. It is noted that the invalidity of the counterfactual usage of the ABL rule implies that the characterization of those outcomes receiving probability 1 in a counterfactual application of the rule as `elements of reality' is, in general, unfounded.
The Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz rule assigns probabilities to quantum measurement results at time t on the condition that the system is prepared in a given way at t_1 < t and found in a given state at t_2 > t. The question whether the rule can also be applied counterfactually to the case where no measurement is performed at the intermediate time t has recently been the subject of controversy. I argue that the counterfactual meaning may be understood in terms of the true value of an observable at t. Such a value cannot be empirically determined for, by stipulation, the measurement that would yield it is not performed. Nevertheless, it may or may not be well-defined depending on one's proposed interpretation of quantum mechanics. Various examples are discussed illustrating what can be asserted at the intermediate time without running into contradictions.
In 1964, Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz introduced their well-known ABL rule with the intention of providing a time-symmetric formalism for computing novel kinds of conditional probabilities in quantum theory. Later papers attached additional significance to the ABL rule, including assertions that it supported violations of the uncertainty principle. The present work challenges these claims, as well as subsequent attempts to salvage the original interpretation of the ABL rule. Taking a broader view, this paper identifies a subtle category error at the heart of the ABL rule that consists of confusing observables that belong to a single system with emergent observables that arise only for physical ensembles. Along the way, this paper points out other problems and fallacious reasoning in the research literature surrounding the ABL rule, including the misuse of post-selection, a reliance on pattern matching to classical formulas, and a posture of measurementism that takes experimental data as providing answers to interpretational questions.
It is proposed that the recent controversy over “time-symmetric quantum counterfactuals” (TSQCs), based on the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz Rule for measurements of pre- and post-selected systems, can be clarified by taking TSQCs to be counterfactuals with a specific type of compound antecedent. In that case, inconsistency proofs such as that of Sharp and Shanks (1993) are not applicable, and the main issue becomes not whether such statements are true, but whether they are nontrivial. The latter question is addressed and answered in the negative. Thus it is concluded that TSQCs, understood as counterfactuals with a compound antecedent, are true but only trivially so, and provide no new contingent information about specific quantum systems (except in special cases already identified in literature).
Aharonov, Popescu, and Tollaksen reply: We are grateful to David Mermin for stating loud and clear, in his unmistakable style, that “the authors are correct.” As for the rest of his letter, a lesson on clear writing from a great master of the subject is always welcome. We did strive for clarity in our article, but there is always space for improvement, and Freudian slips of Newspeak often creep in—that’s their very nature.However, as Mermin certainly knows, analyzing sentences in isolation without the many clues found in context doesn’t do them justice. The initial setup is indeed elementary, and we put in all the details, so it is hard to see how it could be misinterpreted. The situation becomes far more interesting and surprising, though, when weak measurements are taken into account; to ignore them, as Michael Nauenberg and Art Hobson did, is to completely miss the point. We believe that no true understanding of quantum mechanics can be obtained without taking weak measurements seriously.The letter by Robert Griffiths is mainly concerned with the merits of the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics. It is an interesting subject but one that has very little to do with our article. We presented a number of quantum effects that arise in the context of pre- and postselection, first and foremost the effects that appear when weak measurements are involved. And no, there is no error in reasoning when we claim that in a situation like that described in our article, spin measurements may, in a consistent way, indicate that spin-1⁄2 particles have value 100; that is a statement of fact about results of measurements, which incidentally have been confirmed experimentally. One is free to disagree with the meaning we attach to those facts but cannot deny the facts themselves. Of course, since our effects are purely quantum mechanical, they can be analyzed using any interpretation of quantum mechanics, including consistent histories. However, before having such a discussion, it helps if the effects are first discovered! Their existence is our main message.© 2011 American Institute of Physics.