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International Journal of Quantum Information

REDUCED ENTANGLEMENT FOR QUANTUM GAMES

LI ZHANG, Tad Hogg

Published Sep 1, 2003• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum generalizations of conventional games exploit entangled states to improve performance. With many players, quantum games can require entangling many states. Such entanglement is difficult to implement, especially if the states must be communicated over some distance. To simplify possible implementations, we examine some quantum versions of social dilemma games and show their use of entanglement can be substantially reduced by randomly replacing some of the entangled states by unentangled ones. For the example of public goods games, we identify a unique Nash equilibrium invariant with respect to the amount of this replacement. We also show players obtain no advantage from adding more entanglement to states which they control. With many players, a fairly small number of entangled states can give nearly as good performance as using the full number of such states.

DOI
10.1142/s0219749903000255

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Quantum generalizations of conventional games exploit entangled states to improve performance. With many players, quantum games can require entangling many states. Such entanglement is difficult to implement, especially if the states must be communicated over some distance. To simplify possible implementations, we examine some quantum versions of social dilemma games and show their use of entanglement can be substantially reduced by randomly replacing some of the entangled states by unentangled ones. For the example of public goods games, we identify a unique Nash equilibrium invariant with respect to the amount of this replacement. We also show players obtain no advantage from adding more entanglement to states which they control. With many players, a fairly small number of entangled states can give nearly as good performance as using the full number of such states.
Quantum generalizations of conventional games broaden the range of available strategies, which can help improve outcomes for the participants. With many players, such quantum games can involve entanglement among many states which is difficult to implement, especially if the states must be communicated over some distance. This paper describes a quantum mechanism for the economically significant nnn-player public goods game that requires only two-particle entanglement and is thus much easier to implement than more general quantum mechanisms. In spite of the large temptation to free ride on the efforts of others in this game, two-particle entanglement is sufficient to give near optimal expected payoff when players use a simple mixed strategy for which no player can benefit by making different choices. This mechanism can also address some heterogeneous preferences among the players.
A well-known model in game theory, the Volunteer's Dilemma describes a group of nnn players who decide whether to volunteer for a collective benefit at a personal cost, or to abstain and risk forfeiting the benefit altogether. A quantum version of this dilemma, developed within the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein framework, allows each player to manipulate one qubit of a shared entangled state, leading to symmetric Nash equilibria with higher expected payoffs than in the classical game. Existing analyses, however, assume maximal entanglement, which is experimentally demanding for hardware-constrained quantum systems. Within the same framework, we introduce a generalized Quantum Volunteer's Dilemma with a tunable entanglement parameter γγγ and study the extent to which equilibrium behavior depends on the level of entanglement. We derive explicit conditions relating γγγ, the number of players, and the players' strategies under which symmetric Nash equilibria exist, focusing on two canonical strategy profiles: one for 2≤n≤92\leq n\leq 92≤n≤9, and one for even nnn. We find that maximal entanglement is not required to sustain symmetric equilibria. Instead, equilibrium behavior persists above a threshold value, which we compute analytically in both cases. We also demonstrate that the threshold value directly depends on system size.
A quantum version of the Minority game for an arbitrary number of agents is studied. When the number of agents is odd, quantizing the game produces no advantage to the players, however, for an even number of agents new Nash equilibria appear that have no classical analogue. The new Nash equilibria provide far preferable expected payoffs to the players compared to the equivalent classical game. The effect on the Nash equilibrium payoff of reducing the degree of entanglement, or of introducing decoherence into the model, is indicated.
A version of the Monty Hall problem is presented where the players are permitted to select quantum strategies. If the initial state involves no entanglement the Nash equilibrium in the quantum game offers the players nothing more than that obtained with a classical mixed strategy. However, if the initial state involves entanglement of the qutrits of the two players, it is advantageous for one player to have access to a quantum strategy while the other does not. Where both players have access to quantum strategies there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, however, there is a Nash equilibrium in quantum mixed strategies that gives the same average payoff as the classical game.
Decision-making by the two negotiating parties is simulated by a prisoner's dilemma game.The game is formulated in a quantum manner, where players strategies are unitary transformations of qubits built over the basis of opposite decision options.Quantum strategies are correlated through the mechanism of quantum entanglement and the result of the game is obtained by the collapse of the resulting transformed state.The range of strategies allowed for quantum players is richer than in case of a classical game and therefore the result of the game can be better optimized.On the other hand, the quantum game is save against eavesdropping and the players can be assured that this type of quantum arbitration is fair.We show that quantum prisoner's dilemma has more favorable Nash equilibria than its classical analog and they are close to the Pareto optimal solutions.Some economical examples of utilizing quantum game Nash equilibria are proposed.
In quantum games based on 2-player-N-strategies classical games, each player has a quNit (a normalized vector in an N-dimensional Hilbert space HN) upon which he applies his strategy (a matrix U∈SU(N)). The players draw their payoffs from a state . Here and J (both determined by the game’s referee) are respectively an unentangled 2-quNit (pure) state and a unitary operator such that is partially entangled. The existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the quantum game is intimately related to the degree of entanglement of . Hence, it is practical to design the entangler J= J(β) to be dependent on a single real parameter β that controls the degree of entanglement of , such that its von-Neumann entropy SN(β) is continuous and obtains any value in . Designing J(β) for N=2 is quite standard. Extension to N>2 is not obvious, and here we suggest an algorithm to achieve it. Such construction provides a special quantum gate that should be a useful tool not only in quantum games but, more generally, as a special gate in manipulating quantum information protocols.