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Beyond the Quantum

THE SCHRÖDINGER-PARK PARADOX ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF “STATE” IN QUANTUM STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND QUANTUM INFORMATION THEORY IS STILL OPEN: ONE MORE REASON TO GO BEYOND?

Gian Paolo Beretta

Published Sep 1, 2007• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A seldom recognized fundamental difficulty undermines the concept of individual “state” in the present formulations of quantum statistical mechanics and quantum information theory. The difficulty is an unavoidable consequence of an almost forgotten corollary proved by Schrödinger in 1936 and perused by Park in 1968. To resolve it, we must either reject as unsound the concept of state, or else undertake a serious reformulation of quantum theory and the role of statistics. We restate the difficulty and discuss alternatives towards its resolution.

DOI
10.1142/9789812771186_0029

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THE HATSOPOULOS–GYFTOPOULOS RESOLUTION OF THE SCHRÖDINGER–PARK PARADOX ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF "STATE" IN QUANTUM STATISTICAL MECHANICS

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A seldom recognized fundamental difficulty undermines the concept of individual "state" in the present formulations of quantum statistical mechanics (and in its quantum information theory interpretation as well). The difficulty is an unavoidable consequence of an almost forgotten corollary proved by Schrödinger in 1936 and perused by Park, Am. J. Phys.36, 211 (1968). To resolve it, we must either reject as unsound the concept of state, or else undertake a serious reformulation of quantum theory and the role of statistics. We restate the difficulty and discuss a possible resolution proposed in 1976 by Hatsopoulos and Gyftopoulos, Found. Phys.6, 15; 127; 439; 561 (1976).

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TOWARDS A MORE FUNDAMENTAL THEORY BEYOND QUANTUM MECHANICS, AVOIDING THE SCHRÖDINGER PARADOX

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The main distinction between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics is the lack in the latter of a full mechanical determinism: different final states can arise from the same physical state, after the measurement. No hidden variable is supposed to exist, nothing can discriminate two apparently identical states even if they give a different result. In this paper we try to put the basis for a more fundamental theory that (approximately) coincides with quantum mechanics when comparing statistics, but it is more fundamental, since it mathematically describes measurement processes giving an explicit time evolution of the wave function during the collapse. The theory is deterministic even if the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is still valid. The theory distinguishes physical states that collapse and physical states that do not collapse. The theory can be made compatible with all experiments done in the past, but new phenomena such as violations of the Born law or the superposition principle could transpire. However, even if we have probably shown that it is possible to build ad hoc a theory that can describe both the wave function collapse and the Schrödinger linear evolution, a simple and unified construction is still missing.

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Irreversibility, Statistical Mechanics and the Nature of Physical States.

Robert W. Batterman

I. Prigogine has proposed, and the writings of N. S. Krylov to some extent suggest, a novel and unorthodox solution to foundational problems in statistical mechanics. In particular, the view claims to offer new insight into two interconnected problems: underst and ing the role of probability in physics, and that of reconciling the irreversibility of physical processes with the temporal symmetry (time reversal invariance) of dynamical theories. The approach in question advocates a conception of the state of a system which incorporates features of the quantum mechanical state concept in a context, classical statistical mechanics, where quantum considerations are generally considered to be irrelevant. I examine the plausibility of this new approach by offering an analysis of the various notions of state employed in modern physics. In the first chapter, I analyze the conceptual connections between dynamical laws and the nature of a system's state. I argue that laws and states are correlative. In constructing dynamical theories one does not start with a fixed or pre-determined state concept. Neither is one given the laws of the theory from which the conception of state is derived. Rather, we get the law/state structure as a "package." In light of this general analysis, I next examine the notion of state employed in the quantum theory. Here I consider a variety of conceptions of quantum states and assess their ability to answer the "paradoxes" of quantum theory. I pay particular attention to the role of probability and related restrictions on the realization of certain states. The new approach to statistical mechanics proposes to exploit similar restrictions on states in order to resolve the irreversibility problem. But is this unorthodox approach viable? In the final four chapters, I offer a detailed critique of this approach, examining the plausibility of the radical reworking of the state concept. I argue that while some important progress can be made, certain old puzzles remain, and new and difficult ones arise--ones which raise serious doubts about the ultimate success of this particular approach. I conclude, however, by arguing that such radical proposals are not unmotivated; and that novel and unorthodox proposals concerning the foundations of statistical mechanics must be taken seriously.

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Yet another resolution of the Gibbs paradox: an information theory approach

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Some of the quantum mechanical conceptual problems, their current status, and related theoretical developments are reviewed. The characteristics of the entangled quantum states are analyzed, and new experiments and quantum information applications involving such states are discussed. The well-known paradox of Schroedinger's cat (the impossibility of observing superpositions of macroscopically distinct states that are predicted by quantum mechanics) is discussed. It is shown that decoherence (arising when a quantum system is measured in such a way that some information about its state is recorded in its environment) prevents the distinguishing of a superposition and the corresponding mixture. This overcomes the difficulties associated with the paradoxical nature of quantum measurement provided we remain within the framework of the theory of open systems. Other conceptual difficulties, while actually lying outside physics, are now the subject of much research and have already led to new interesting interpretations of quantum mechanics. The suggestion of Wigner and others that the observer's consciousness be included in the theory of quantum measurement is discussed in this context. A hypothesis is put forward which might enable the functioning of consciousness to be described in quantum measurement terms.

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On Quantum Mechanics

Carlo Rovelli C

We reformulate the problem of the "interpretation of quantum mechanics" as the problem of DERIVING the quantum mechanical formalism from a set of simple physical postulates. We suggest that the common unease with taking quantum mechanics as a fundamental description of nature could derive from the use of an incorrect notion, as the unease with the Lorentz transformations before Einstein derived from the notion of observer independent time. Following an an analysis of the measurement process as seen by different observers, we propose a reformulation of quantum mechanics in terms of INFORMATION THEORY. We propose three different postulates out of which the formalism of the theory can be reconstructed; these are based on the notion of information about each other that systems contain. All systems are assumed to be equivalent: no observer-observed distinction, and information is interpreted as correlation. We then suggest that the incorrect notion that generates the unease with quantum mechanichs is the notion of OBSERVER INDEPENDENT state of a system.

arXiv:hep-th/9403015•Mar 2, 1994•74 citations
A seldom recognized fundamental difficulty undermines the concept of individual “state” in the present formulations of quantum statistical mechanics and quantum information theory. The difficulty is an unavoidable consequence of an almost forgotten corollary proved by Schrödinger in 1936 and perused by Park in 1968. To resolve it, we must either reject as unsound the concept of state, or else undertake a serious reformulation of quantum theory and the role of statistics. We restate the difficulty and discuss alternatives towards its resolution.
A seldom recognized fundamental difficulty undermines the concept of individual "state" in the present formulations of quantum statistical mechanics (and in its quantum information theory interpretation as well). The difficulty is an unavoidable consequence of an almost forgotten corollary proved by Schrödinger in 1936 and perused by Park, Am. J. Phys.36, 211 (1968). To resolve it, we must either reject as unsound the concept of state, or else undertake a serious reformulation of quantum theory and the role of statistics. We restate the difficulty and discuss a possible resolution proposed in 1976 by Hatsopoulos and Gyftopoulos, Found. Phys.6, 15; 127; 439; 561 (1976).
The main distinction between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics is the lack in the latter of a full mechanical determinism: different final states can arise from the same physical state, after the measurement. No hidden variable is supposed to exist, nothing can discriminate two apparently identical states even if they give a different result. In this paper we try to put the basis for a more fundamental theory that (approximately) coincides with quantum mechanics when comparing statistics, but it is more fundamental, since it mathematically describes measurement processes giving an explicit time evolution of the wave function during the collapse. The theory is deterministic even if the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is still valid. The theory distinguishes physical states that collapse and physical states that do not collapse. The theory can be made compatible with all experiments done in the past, but new phenomena such as violations of the Born law or the superposition principle could transpire. However, even if we have probably shown that it is possible to build ad hoc a theory that can describe both the wave function collapse and the Schrödinger linear evolution, a simple and unified construction is still missing.
I. Prigogine has proposed, and the writings of N. S. Krylov to some extent suggest, a novel and unorthodox solution to foundational problems in statistical mechanics. In particular, the view claims to offer new insight into two interconnected problems: underst and ing the role of probability in physics, and that of reconciling the irreversibility of physical processes with the temporal symmetry (time reversal invariance) of dynamical theories. The approach in question advocates a conception of the state of a system which incorporates features of the quantum mechanical state concept in a context, classical statistical mechanics, where quantum considerations are generally considered to be irrelevant. I examine the plausibility of this new approach by offering an analysis of the various notions of state employed in modern physics. In the first chapter, I analyze the conceptual connections between dynamical laws and the nature of a system's state. I argue that laws and states are correlative. In constructing dynamical theories one does not start with a fixed or pre-determined state concept. Neither is one given the laws of the theory from which the conception of state is derived. Rather, we get the law/state structure as a "package." In light of this general analysis, I next examine the notion of state employed in the quantum theory. Here I consider a variety of conceptions of quantum states and assess their ability to answer the "paradoxes" of quantum theory. I pay particular attention to the role of probability and related restrictions on the realization of certain states. The new approach to statistical mechanics proposes to exploit similar restrictions on states in order to resolve the irreversibility problem. But is this unorthodox approach viable? In the final four chapters, I offer a detailed critique of this approach, examining the plausibility of the radical reworking of the state concept. I argue that while some important progress can be made, certain old puzzles remain, and new and difficult ones arise--ones which raise serious doubts about the ultimate success of this particular approach. I conclude, however, by arguing that such radical proposals are not unmotivated; and that novel and unorthodox proposals concerning the foundations of statistical mechanics must be taken seriously.
The “Gibbs Paradox” refers to several related questions concerning entropy in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics: whether it is an extensive quantity or not, how it changes when identical particles are mixed, and the proper way to count states in systems of identical particles. Several authors have recognized that the paradox is resolved once it is realized that there is no such thing as the entropy of a system, that there are many entropies, and that the choice between treating particles as being distinguishable or not depends on the resolution of the experiment. The purpose of this note is essentially pedagogical; we add to their analysis by examining the paradox from the point of view of information theory. Our argument is based on that ‘grouping’ property of entropy that Shannon recognized, by including it among his axioms, as an essential requirement on any measure of information. Not only does it provide the right connection between different entropies but, in addition, it draws our attention to the obvious fact that addressing issues of distinguishability and of counting states requires a clear idea about what precisely do we mean by a state.
Some of the quantum mechanical conceptual problems, their current status, and related theoretical developments are reviewed. The characteristics of the entangled quantum states are analyzed, and new experiments and quantum information applications involving such states are discussed. The well-known paradox of Schroedinger's cat (the impossibility of observing superpositions of macroscopically distinct states that are predicted by quantum mechanics) is discussed. It is shown that decoherence (arising when a quantum system is measured in such a way that some information about its state is recorded in its environment) prevents the distinguishing of a superposition and the corresponding mixture. This overcomes the difficulties associated with the paradoxical nature of quantum measurement provided we remain within the framework of the theory of open systems. Other conceptual difficulties, while actually lying outside physics, are now the subject of much research and have already led to new interesting interpretations of quantum mechanics. The suggestion of Wigner and others that the observer's consciousness be included in the theory of quantum measurement is discussed in this context. A hypothesis is put forward which might enable the functioning of consciousness to be described in quantum measurement terms.
We reformulate the problem of the "interpretation of quantum mechanics" as the problem of DERIVING the quantum mechanical formalism from a set of simple physical postulates. We suggest that the common unease with taking quantum mechanics as a fundamental description of nature could derive from the use of an incorrect notion, as the unease with the Lorentz transformations before Einstein derived from the notion of observer independent time. Following an an analysis of the measurement process as seen by different observers, we propose a reformulation of quantum mechanics in terms of INFORMATION THEORY. We propose three different postulates out of which the formalism of the theory can be reconstructed; these are based on the notion of information about each other that systems contain. All systems are assumed to be equivalent: no observer-observed distinction, and information is interpreted as correlation. We then suggest that the incorrect notion that generates the unease with quantum mechanichs is the notion of OBSERVER INDEPENDENT state of a system.