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International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS)

Efficient Universally Composable Password-Based Key Exchange

Hongyong Jia, Sihan Qing, Li-Ze Gu, Yixian Yang

Published Dec 1, 2008• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

In this article, we propose an improvement on the universally composable password-based key exchange protocol. We replace one-time signature with message authentication codes which reduce the bandwidth consumption. For typical security parameters our improvement saves as much as 12 Kbytes of bandwidth in a protocol execution. Our protocol can be efficiently instantiated using either the DDH or the N-residuosity Assumption. A complete security proof of the proposed protocol is given in the universally composable framework under common reference string model.

DOI
10.1109/cis.2008.148

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In this article, we propose an improvement on the universally composable password-based key exchange protocol. We replace one-time signature with message authentication codes which reduce the bandwidth consumption. For typical security parameters our improvement saves as much as 12 Kbytes of bandwidth in a protocol execution. Our protocol can be efficiently instantiated using either the DDH or the N-residuosity Assumption. A complete security proof of the proposed protocol is given in the universally composable framework under common reference string model.
This paper initiates a study of two-party identication and key-exchange protocols in which users authenticate themselves by prov- ing possession of credentials satisfying arbitrary policies, instead of using the more traditional mechanism of a public-key infrastructure. Deni- tions in the universal composability framework are given, and practical protocols satisfying these denitions, for policies of practical interest, are presented. All protocols are analyzed in the common reference string model, assuming adaptive corruptions with erasures, and no random or- acles. The new security notion includes password-authenticated key ex- change as a special case, and new, practical protocols for this problem are presented as well, including the rst such protocol that provides re- silience against server compromise (without random oracles).
Message authentication and key exchange are two of the most basic tasks of cryptography. Solutions based on public-key infrastructure (PKI) are prevalent. Still, the state of the art in composable security analysis of PKI-based authentication and key exchange is somewhat unsatisfactory. Specifically, existing treatments either (a) make the unrealistic assumption that the PKI is accessible only within the confines of the protocol itself, thus failing to capture real-world PKI-based authentication, or (b) impose oftenunnecessary requirements—such as strong on-line non-transferability—on candidate protocols, thus ruling out natural candidates. We give a modular and universally composable analytical framework for PKI-based message authentication and key exchange protocols. This framework guarantees security even when the PKI is pre-existing and globally available, without being unnecessarily restrictive. Specifically, we model PKI as a global set-up functionality within the Global UC security model [Canetti et al., TCC 2007] and relax the ideal authentication and key exchange functionalities accordingly. We then demonstrate the security of basic signature-based authentication and key exchange protocols. Our modeling makes minimal security assumptions on the PKI in use; in particular, “knowledge of the secret key” is not needed.
Universal composability (or UC security) provides very strong security guarantees for protocols that run in complex real-world environments. In particular, security is guaranteed to hold when the protocol is run concurrently many times with other secure and possibly insecure protocols. Commitment schemes are a basic building block in many cryptographic constructions, and as such universally composable commitments are of great importance in constructing UC-secure protocols. In this paper, we construct highly efficient UC-secure commitments from the standard DDH assumption, in the common reference string model. Our commitment stage is non-interactive, has a common reference string with O(1) group elements, and has complexity of O(1) exponentiations for committing to a group element (to be more exact, the effective cost is that of 23 1 exponentiations overall, for both the commit and decommit stages). We present 3 a construction that is secure in the presence of static adversaries, and a construction that is secure in the presence of adaptive adversaries with erasures, where the latter construction has an effective additional cost of just 5 1 3 exponentiations. 1
A new oblivious transfer protocol was proposed within the framework of universally composable security(UC-DT).The protocol based on the verifiably smooth projective hashing(VSPH) is against adaptive adversaries in a common reference string(CRS) model.The UC-OT protocol improves computational efficiency with non-committing encryptions(NCE)which is based on decisional compounding residuosity,achieves UC-OT,and it saves O(n)-1 rounds in communication efficiency than bit-OT protocols.Compared with Canetti’s scheme in non-erase model,the message reduced once.Compared with Fischlin’s scheme,the message transfers were reduced twice,and the scheme does not rely on the auxiliary party,therefore it is more practical.
Non-committing encryption achieved only semantic security,in contrast,applications often require security against chosen ciphertext attacks.A main ingredient in the previous adaptive universally composable(UC)oblivious transfer protocols are non-committing encryptions.the previous proposals are not UC secure against adaptive adversaries in the so-called non-erase model.A new UC secure oblivious transfer protocols were proposed and schemes utilize two primitives of the verifiably smooth projective hashing and deniable encryption as constructed by.the double trapdoor decryption mechanism based on trapdoor commitment.Our construction is based on the decisional composite residuosity in common reference string (CRS) model.We constructed a two-message(1-round) string oblivious transfer protocol,which improves computational efficient that supports message spaces of size exponential and save O(n)-1 rounds communications efficient than bit-OT protocols.
A Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol allows two parties to agree upon a cryptographic key, when the only information shared in advance is a low-entropy password. The standard security notion for PAKE (Canetti et al., Eurocrypt 2005) is in the Universally Composable (UC) framework. We show that unlike most UC security notions, UC PAKE does not imply correctness. While Canetti et al. has briefly noticed this issue, we present the first comprehensive study of correctness in UC PAKE: We show that TrivialPAKE, a no-message protocol that does not satisfy correctness, is a UC PAKE; We propose nine approaches to guaranteeing correctness in the UC security notion of PAKE, and show that seven of them are equivalent, whereas the other two are unachievable; We prove that a direct solution, namely changing the UC PAKE functionality to incorporate correctness, is impossible; Finally, we show how to naturally incorporate correctness by changing the model—we view PAKE as a three-party protocol, with the man-in-the-middle adversary as the third party. In this way, we hope to shed some light on the very nature of UC-security in the man-in-the-middle setting.