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American Journal of Physics

Are Electrons Real?

W. V. Houston

Published Apr 1, 1966• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Recent years have shown a revival of interest in the conceptual problem raised by the incorporation of quantum mechanics into physics. The problem is an old one, but the use of both waves and particles as visualizations of electrons has presented it in a new and acute form. Several observations based on the methods of quantum mechanics can be made. (1) The time development of an isolated system is completely determinate, as in classical mechanics. (2) A precisely defined quantum mechanical state is an eigenstate of some operator described in classical terms. The production of such a state requires a suitable large scale apparatus. (3) If the state is not precisely defined as an eigenstate, quantum statistical mechanics must be used. (4) The idea of measurement is of doubtful applicability in the analysis of idealized experiments, since the process of measurement destroys the identity of the object (an electron) whose properties are measured. Quantum mechanics may be viewed strictly as a method of describing, in classical terms, the behavior of large scale apparatus, although the use of visualizations with a properly conditioned intuition is probably essential to progress in the analysis of new phenomena.

DOI
10.1119/1.1972969

Related papers

Classical Quantum Mechanics

Randell L Mills

Despite its successes, quantum mechanics (QM) has remained mysterious to all who have encountered it. Starting with Bohr and progressing into the present, the departure from intuitive, physical reality has widened. The connection between QM and reality is more than just a “philosophical” issue. It reveals that QM is not a correct or complete theory of the physical world and that inescapable internal inconsistencies and incongruities arise when attempts are made to treat it as physical as opposed to a purely mathematical “tool.” Some of these issues are discussed in a review by F. Laloe [Am. J. Phys. 69, 655 (2001)]. In an attempt to provide some physical insight into atomic problems and starting with the same essential physics as Bohr of e moving in the Coulombic field of the proton and the wave equation as modified by Schrodinger, a classical approach is explored that yields a remarkably accurate model and provides insight into physics on the atomic level. The proverbial view, deeply seated in the wave-particle duality notion, that there is no large-scale physical counterpart to the nature of the electron may not be correct. Physical laws and intuition may be restored when dealing with the wave equation and quantummechanical problems. Specifically, a theory of classical quantum mechanics (CQM) is derived from first principles that successfully applies physical laws on all scales. Rather than using the postulated Schrodinger boundary condition “Ψ → 0 as r → ∞,” which leads to a purely mathematical model of the electron, the constraint is based on experimental observation. Using Maxwell’s equations, the classical wave equation is solved with the constraint that the bound (n = 1)state electron cannot radiate energy. By further application of Maxwell’s equations to electromagnetic and gravitational fields at particle production, the Schwarzschild metric is derived from the classical wave equation, which modifies general relativity to include conservation of spacetime in addition to momentum and matter/energy. The result gives a natural relationship among Maxwell’s equations, special relativity, and general relativity. CQM holds over a scale of spacetime of 85 orders of magnitude — it correctly predicts the nature of the universe from the scale of the quarks to that of the cosmos. A review is given by G. Landvogt [Internat. J. Hydrogen Energy 28, 1155 (2003)].

Physics Essays•Dec 1, 2003•27 citations

The Formal Theory of Quantum Mechanics

In classical mechanics, the state of a physical object is determined by quantities such as mass, momentum, and angular momentum. According to Newton’s laws, for a given initial state, the evolution of the system is deterministic—that is, the state of the object (i.e., its parameters) can be precisely predicted at any future time. In quantum mechanics, however, based on the theory of matter waves, the state of a system is described by a probability wave function. Given an initial state, the time evolution of the system is governed by the Schrödinger equation, which determines the probability distribution of the particle’s position (or other observables) in space over time. The probabilistic nature of the quantum state implies that prior to measurement, the system may exist in a superposition of possible states, each associated with a certain probability amplitude. In physics, measurement refers to the experimental determination of mechanical quantities such as position, momentum, energy, and angular momentum. In classical mechanics, the act of measurement does not influence the physical state of the object; the system remains unaffected by the observation. In contrast, quantum measurement fundamentally alters the state: once a definite value of an observable is measured, the wave function collapses to the corresponding eigenstate. This signifies that the probabilistic description of the system with respect to that observable becomes a definite state—the system’s wave function is projected accordingly. Thus, the state of a quantum system is inherently measurement-dependent, and by measuring a mechanical quantity, one effectively determines the corresponding probability distribution, or wave function, associated with that observable. Therefore, the relationship between observables (mechanical quantities) and state wave functions, as well as the mathematical structure connecting them, constitutes one of the central concerns of quantum theory. As previously discussed, the Schrödinger equation involves expressions for energy and momentum that act on wave functions in the form of operators. Accordingly, we now proceed to explore the formalism of quantum mechanics based on the concept of operators.

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The Physical Nature of Wave/Particle Duality

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1.1 Waves and particles in quantum mechanics In spite of the fact that the extraordinary progress of experimental techniques make us able to manipulate at will systems made of any small and well defined number of atoms, electrons and photons making therefore possible the actual performance of the gedankenexperimente that Einstein and Bohr had imagined to support their opposite views on the physical properties of the wavelike/particlelike objects (quantons) of the quantum world it does not seem that, after more than eighty years, a unanimous consensus has been reached in the physicist's community on how to understand their strange properties. Unfortunately, we cannot know whether Feynman would still insist in maintaining his famous sentence It is fair to say that nobody understands quantum mechanics. We can only discuss if, almost thirty years after his death, some progress towards this goal has been made. I believe that this is the case. I will show in fact that, by following the suggestions of Feynman himself, some clarification of the old puzzles can be achieved. This chapter therefore by no means is intended to provide an impartial review of the present status of the question but is focused on the exposure of the results of more than twenty years of research of my group in Rome, which in my opinion provide a possible way of connecting together at the same time the random nature of the events at the atomic level of reality and the completeness of their probabilistic representation by the principles of Quantum Mechanics.

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Time-symmetric quantum mechanics questioned and defended

Yakir Aharonov, Sandu Popescu, Jeff Tollaksen

Aharonov, Popescu, and Tollaksen reply: We thank the letter writers for their interest and for the opportunity to better clarify our ideas.Michael Nauenberg and Art Hobson make essentially the same point—namely, that our ideas are completely wrong. To put their criticism in the right context, we point out that the outcome of our research program is twofold. First, we have discovered an entirely new class of quantum effects; second, we present a new way of thinking about quantum mechanics.The fact that quantum mechanics predicts the effects we discovered is just that, a fact. The effects are computed using standard quantum mechanics, without additions or modifications. As such, their prediction by quantum mechanics is beyond doubt (unless one suspects algebraic mistakes). Furthermore, many of our effects have been verified experimentally; in particular, different versions of our amplification method have been used as novel technological tools. Both Nauenberg and Hobson completely ignore our effects. But one should not ignore them. They are novel and they are strange. Even more, they don’t appear in isolation, but they form a well-structured pattern. Surely there is a lesson here that quantum mechanics wants to teach us; one ignores it at one’s peril.On the other hand, our way of looking at quantum mechanics is certainly unconventional; it introduces new concepts, and it approaches old concepts in a new way. That is essentially what the two letter writers point out, Hobson most emphatically when he writes that our article “is riddled with errors.” We are criticized for thinking in a different way and for asking new questions. But our way of thinking leads to the same predictions as the conventional way, so as far as experiments are concerned they are completely equivalent. As Richard Feynman says in his book The Character of Physical Law (Modern Library, 1994), suppose we have “two theories” that “have all the consequences . . . exactly the same. . . . How are we going to decide which one is right? There is no way by science, because they both agree with the experiment to the same extent.” So the criticism is baseless.At the same time, if our approach is completely equivalent to the standard one, why bother? Again Feynman gives the best answer: “For psychological reasons . . . , these two things may be far from equivalent, because one gives a man different ideas from the other. . . . There will be something, for instance, in theory A that talks about something, . . . but to find out what the corresponding thing is . . . in [theory] B may be very complicated—it may not be a very simple idea at all.” As a consequence, a new way of thinking allows one to ask new questions that, although they could be asked in the old theory as well, would have been very difficult to even envisage. That is precisely what we did. First, we raised the issue of the physics in pre- and postselected ensembles. And to reply to Hobson, no, there is nothing “erroneous” in the process of postselection. Postselection is a question about results of experiments, and every question about the results of actual measurements is legitimate. Subsequently, we discovered the concept of weak measurements, which in turn led us to discover the various effects we presented. Since the power of any new approach is given by its ability to predict new effects, one should conclude that ours is strong indeed.Furthermore, as many physicists agree, an intuitive understanding of quantum mechanics is still missing. That is why quantum physicists are surprised over and over again by the discovery of strange and unexpected fundamental effects. We hope that our new way of thinking is a step toward the long-sought intuition. Even more important, the new way of thinking may give us new ideas about what to change, if experiments ever turn out to contradict quantum mechanics and therefore require its modification. In particular, since we tinker with the idea of time— one of the most important concepts in physics—starting the change from there may be a very potent method.Shaul Mukamel refers to our experiment in which the component along some given axis of a spin-1⁄2 particle is found, by a weak measurement, to have the value √2‾/2 which is √2‾ times larger than the largest eigenvalue. He suggests an alternative explanation based on a classical vector model of spin. According to his explanation, values up to √3‾/2 should be possible. However, we presented the experiment showing √2‾/2 only because it was mathematically simple; by choosing a different postselection, we could have obtained, as results of weak measurements, values as large as we wanted. Hence the above simple classical-vector view doesn’t work.Robert Griffiths points out that there are two other time-symmetric formulations of quantum mechanics besides ours—“consistent histories” and “decoherent histories.” In particular, Griffiths is right when he emphasizes a major difference in spirit between our theory and consistent histories. The main goal of consistent histories is to find an explanation for the (apparent?) collapse of the wavefunction during a quantum measurement; although that solution is hotly disputed, as are all other solutions to the collapse problem, it is certainly a very ingenious one. However, an answer to the collapse problem is not our primary interest (though we are starting to see glimmers of an alternative answer to it using our approach).The letter by Griffiths, however, runs the risk of being misread as implying that solving the collapse problem will by itself clarify most or all of the counterintuitive aspects of quantum mechanics. That conclusion would be wrong. Quantum mechanics is strange and unusual and defies intuition in many ways; solving the collapse problem is by no means its only interesting fundamental issue. Nor can the solution of that one problem lead to a complete understanding of quantum phenomena. That particles tunnel in the first place is surprising by itself; even more so is the fact that, as we showed, perfectly good measuring devices, working with arbitrarily high precision, indicate consistently that the tunneling particles have negative kinetic energy. Equally surprising is that we can arrange a situation in which perfectly good measurements, made with as high a precision as we want, indicate that spin-1⁄2 particles have arbitrarily large spin. And these are only two examples. As far as we are aware, none of the many proposed solutions to the collapse problem make these effects seem less surprising, let alone predict them.© 2011 American Institute of Physics.

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In classical physics, the ‘state’ of a particle, at any particular time, is taken to involve a definite position in space and a definite motion; and the state of a system of particles is taken to involve a definite position in space and a definite motion for each of the particles. The situation in relation to quantum mechanics is completely different. As in classical physics, calculations can be made concerning the position and motion of a particle. However, this representation is not by means of symbols for scalar or vector quantities: it is by a more complex mathematical object. This quantum state does not indicate or represent position or motion in any direct way: what it does in substance is to enable calculation of the probability of the particle in question being found to have a position or momentum if an appropriate measurement is made.

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Loss of quantum-mechanical coherence in a measurement process

Hiromichi Nakazato, Saverio Pascazio

A quantum-mechanical measurement process is analyzed in terms of a model Hamiltonian describing the interaction between a quantum system (a ``particle'') and a macroscopic apparatus (a ``detector''), which is assumed to be made up of N two-level elementary constituents (``molecules''). The description of the molecule locations introduces an effective fluctuating coupling constant, and this provokes a loss of quantum-mechanical coherence in the limit of large N. It is argued that coherence is lost statistically, as a result of the interaction: The collapse of the wave function is indeed obtained when the same experiment is performed many times, as a result of the microscopic differences among macroscopically identical initial states of the detector. In this way, insight is obtained into the mechanism engendering the loss of coherence suffered by a quantum-mechanical system when interacting with a macroscopic apparatus, and the concept of ``wave-function collapse'' is replaced by that of a statistically defined dephasing process. No classical behavior of the detection system is postulated and the presence of no external observer is required.

Physical Review A•Apr 1, 1992•14 citations
Recent years have shown a revival of interest in the conceptual problem raised by the incorporation of quantum mechanics into physics. The problem is an old one, but the use of both waves and particles as visualizations of electrons has presented it in a new and acute form. Several observations based on the methods of quantum mechanics can be made. (1) The time development of an isolated system is completely determinate, as in classical mechanics. (2) A precisely defined quantum mechanical state is an eigenstate of some operator described in classical terms. The production of such a state requires a suitable large scale apparatus. (3) If the state is not precisely defined as an eigenstate, quantum statistical mechanics must be used. (4) The idea of measurement is of doubtful applicability in the analysis of idealized experiments, since the process of measurement destroys the identity of the object (an electron) whose properties are measured. Quantum mechanics may be viewed strictly as a method of describing, in classical terms, the behavior of large scale apparatus, although the use of visualizations with a properly conditioned intuition is probably essential to progress in the analysis of new phenomena.
Despite its successes, quantum mechanics (QM) has remained mysterious to all who have encountered it. Starting with Bohr and progressing into the present, the departure from intuitive, physical reality has widened. The connection between QM and reality is more than just a “philosophical” issue. It reveals that QM is not a correct or complete theory of the physical world and that inescapable internal inconsistencies and incongruities arise when attempts are made to treat it as physical as opposed to a purely mathematical “tool.” Some of these issues are discussed in a review by F. Laloe [Am. J. Phys. 69, 655 (2001)]. In an attempt to provide some physical insight into atomic problems and starting with the same essential physics as Bohr of e moving in the Coulombic field of the proton and the wave equation as modified by Schrodinger, a classical approach is explored that yields a remarkably accurate model and provides insight into physics on the atomic level. The proverbial view, deeply seated in the wave-particle duality notion, that there is no large-scale physical counterpart to the nature of the electron may not be correct. Physical laws and intuition may be restored when dealing with the wave equation and quantummechanical problems. Specifically, a theory of classical quantum mechanics (CQM) is derived from first principles that successfully applies physical laws on all scales. Rather than using the postulated Schrodinger boundary condition “Ψ → 0 as r → ∞,” which leads to a purely mathematical model of the electron, the constraint is based on experimental observation. Using Maxwell’s equations, the classical wave equation is solved with the constraint that the bound (n = 1)state electron cannot radiate energy. By further application of Maxwell’s equations to electromagnetic and gravitational fields at particle production, the Schwarzschild metric is derived from the classical wave equation, which modifies general relativity to include conservation of spacetime in addition to momentum and matter/energy. The result gives a natural relationship among Maxwell’s equations, special relativity, and general relativity. CQM holds over a scale of spacetime of 85 orders of magnitude — it correctly predicts the nature of the universe from the scale of the quarks to that of the cosmos. A review is given by G. Landvogt [Internat. J. Hydrogen Energy 28, 1155 (2003)].
In classical mechanics, the state of a physical object is determined by quantities such as mass, momentum, and angular momentum. According to Newton’s laws, for a given initial state, the evolution of the system is deterministic—that is, the state of the object (i.e., its parameters) can be precisely predicted at any future time. In quantum mechanics, however, based on the theory of matter waves, the state of a system is described by a probability wave function. Given an initial state, the time evolution of the system is governed by the Schrödinger equation, which determines the probability distribution of the particle’s position (or other observables) in space over time. The probabilistic nature of the quantum state implies that prior to measurement, the system may exist in a superposition of possible states, each associated with a certain probability amplitude. In physics, measurement refers to the experimental determination of mechanical quantities such as position, momentum, energy, and angular momentum. In classical mechanics, the act of measurement does not influence the physical state of the object; the system remains unaffected by the observation. In contrast, quantum measurement fundamentally alters the state: once a definite value of an observable is measured, the wave function collapses to the corresponding eigenstate. This signifies that the probabilistic description of the system with respect to that observable becomes a definite state—the system’s wave function is projected accordingly. Thus, the state of a quantum system is inherently measurement-dependent, and by measuring a mechanical quantity, one effectively determines the corresponding probability distribution, or wave function, associated with that observable. Therefore, the relationship between observables (mechanical quantities) and state wave functions, as well as the mathematical structure connecting them, constitutes one of the central concerns of quantum theory. As previously discussed, the Schrödinger equation involves expressions for energy and momentum that act on wave functions in the form of operators. Accordingly, we now proceed to explore the formalism of quantum mechanics based on the concept of operators.
1.1 Waves and particles in quantum mechanics In spite of the fact that the extraordinary progress of experimental techniques make us able to manipulate at will systems made of any small and well defined number of atoms, electrons and photons making therefore possible the actual performance of the gedankenexperimente that Einstein and Bohr had imagined to support their opposite views on the physical properties of the wavelike/particlelike objects (quantons) of the quantum world it does not seem that, after more than eighty years, a unanimous consensus has been reached in the physicist's community on how to understand their strange properties. Unfortunately, we cannot know whether Feynman would still insist in maintaining his famous sentence It is fair to say that nobody understands quantum mechanics. We can only discuss if, almost thirty years after his death, some progress towards this goal has been made. I believe that this is the case. I will show in fact that, by following the suggestions of Feynman himself, some clarification of the old puzzles can be achieved. This chapter therefore by no means is intended to provide an impartial review of the present status of the question but is focused on the exposure of the results of more than twenty years of research of my group in Rome, which in my opinion provide a possible way of connecting together at the same time the random nature of the events at the atomic level of reality and the completeness of their probabilistic representation by the principles of Quantum Mechanics.
Aharonov, Popescu, and Tollaksen reply: We thank the letter writers for their interest and for the opportunity to better clarify our ideas.Michael Nauenberg and Art Hobson make essentially the same point—namely, that our ideas are completely wrong. To put their criticism in the right context, we point out that the outcome of our research program is twofold. First, we have discovered an entirely new class of quantum effects; second, we present a new way of thinking about quantum mechanics.The fact that quantum mechanics predicts the effects we discovered is just that, a fact. The effects are computed using standard quantum mechanics, without additions or modifications. As such, their prediction by quantum mechanics is beyond doubt (unless one suspects algebraic mistakes). Furthermore, many of our effects have been verified experimentally; in particular, different versions of our amplification method have been used as novel technological tools. Both Nauenberg and Hobson completely ignore our effects. But one should not ignore them. They are novel and they are strange. Even more, they don’t appear in isolation, but they form a well-structured pattern. Surely there is a lesson here that quantum mechanics wants to teach us; one ignores it at one’s peril.On the other hand, our way of looking at quantum mechanics is certainly unconventional; it introduces new concepts, and it approaches old concepts in a new way. That is essentially what the two letter writers point out, Hobson most emphatically when he writes that our article “is riddled with errors.” We are criticized for thinking in a different way and for asking new questions. But our way of thinking leads to the same predictions as the conventional way, so as far as experiments are concerned they are completely equivalent. As Richard Feynman says in his book The Character of Physical Law (Modern Library, 1994), suppose we have “two theories” that “have all the consequences . . . exactly the same. . . . How are we going to decide which one is right? There is no way by science, because they both agree with the experiment to the same extent.” So the criticism is baseless.At the same time, if our approach is completely equivalent to the standard one, why bother? Again Feynman gives the best answer: “For psychological reasons . . . , these two things may be far from equivalent, because one gives a man different ideas from the other. . . . There will be something, for instance, in theory A that talks about something, . . . but to find out what the corresponding thing is . . . in [theory] B may be very complicated—it may not be a very simple idea at all.” As a consequence, a new way of thinking allows one to ask new questions that, although they could be asked in the old theory as well, would have been very difficult to even envisage. That is precisely what we did. First, we raised the issue of the physics in pre- and postselected ensembles. And to reply to Hobson, no, there is nothing “erroneous” in the process of postselection. Postselection is a question about results of experiments, and every question about the results of actual measurements is legitimate. Subsequently, we discovered the concept of weak measurements, which in turn led us to discover the various effects we presented. Since the power of any new approach is given by its ability to predict new effects, one should conclude that ours is strong indeed.Furthermore, as many physicists agree, an intuitive understanding of quantum mechanics is still missing. That is why quantum physicists are surprised over and over again by the discovery of strange and unexpected fundamental effects. We hope that our new way of thinking is a step toward the long-sought intuition. Even more important, the new way of thinking may give us new ideas about what to change, if experiments ever turn out to contradict quantum mechanics and therefore require its modification. In particular, since we tinker with the idea of time— one of the most important concepts in physics—starting the change from there may be a very potent method.Shaul Mukamel refers to our experiment in which the component along some given axis of a spin-1⁄2 particle is found, by a weak measurement, to have the value √2‾/2 which is √2‾ times larger than the largest eigenvalue. He suggests an alternative explanation based on a classical vector model of spin. According to his explanation, values up to √3‾/2 should be possible. However, we presented the experiment showing √2‾/2 only because it was mathematically simple; by choosing a different postselection, we could have obtained, as results of weak measurements, values as large as we wanted. Hence the above simple classical-vector view doesn’t work.Robert Griffiths points out that there are two other time-symmetric formulations of quantum mechanics besides ours—“consistent histories” and “decoherent histories.” In particular, Griffiths is right when he emphasizes a major difference in spirit between our theory and consistent histories. The main goal of consistent histories is to find an explanation for the (apparent?) collapse of the wavefunction during a quantum measurement; although that solution is hotly disputed, as are all other solutions to the collapse problem, it is certainly a very ingenious one. However, an answer to the collapse problem is not our primary interest (though we are starting to see glimmers of an alternative answer to it using our approach).The letter by Griffiths, however, runs the risk of being misread as implying that solving the collapse problem will by itself clarify most or all of the counterintuitive aspects of quantum mechanics. That conclusion would be wrong. Quantum mechanics is strange and unusual and defies intuition in many ways; solving the collapse problem is by no means its only interesting fundamental issue. Nor can the solution of that one problem lead to a complete understanding of quantum phenomena. That particles tunnel in the first place is surprising by itself; even more so is the fact that, as we showed, perfectly good measuring devices, working with arbitrarily high precision, indicate consistently that the tunneling particles have negative kinetic energy. Equally surprising is that we can arrange a situation in which perfectly good measurements, made with as high a precision as we want, indicate that spin-1⁄2 particles have arbitrarily large spin. And these are only two examples. As far as we are aware, none of the many proposed solutions to the collapse problem make these effects seem less surprising, let alone predict them.© 2011 American Institute of Physics.
In classical physics, the ‘state’ of a particle, at any particular time, is taken to involve a definite position in space and a definite motion; and the state of a system of particles is taken to involve a definite position in space and a definite motion for each of the particles. The situation in relation to quantum mechanics is completely different. As in classical physics, calculations can be made concerning the position and motion of a particle. However, this representation is not by means of symbols for scalar or vector quantities: it is by a more complex mathematical object. This quantum state does not indicate or represent position or motion in any direct way: what it does in substance is to enable calculation of the probability of the particle in question being found to have a position or momentum if an appropriate measurement is made.
A quantum-mechanical measurement process is analyzed in terms of a model Hamiltonian describing the interaction between a quantum system (a ``particle'') and a macroscopic apparatus (a ``detector''), which is assumed to be made up of N two-level elementary constituents (``molecules''). The description of the molecule locations introduces an effective fluctuating coupling constant, and this provokes a loss of quantum-mechanical coherence in the limit of large N. It is argued that coherence is lost statistically, as a result of the interaction: The collapse of the wave function is indeed obtained when the same experiment is performed many times, as a result of the microscopic differences among macroscopically identical initial states of the detector. In this way, insight is obtained into the mechanism engendering the loss of coherence suffered by a quantum-mechanical system when interacting with a macroscopic apparatus, and the concept of ``wave-function collapse'' is replaced by that of a statistically defined dephasing process. No classical behavior of the detection system is postulated and the presence of no external observer is required.