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Philosophy of Science

An Extended Latency Interpretation of Quantum Mechanical Measurement

John L. McKnight

Published Jul 1, 1958• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

(1) the author has outlined several of the more important interpretations of measurement in quantum mechanics and discussed the problems arising from them. Particular attention was paid to the work of Bohr, Heisenberg and von Neumann and a tentative proposal was made for a possible interpretation which would mitigate some of the problems and dilemmas. This interpretation was essentially that proposed by Margenau (2) in terms of latent variables. He defines measurement to be any operation with physical apparatus which results in a number, including in this, of course, yes and no answers as well as conventional numerical answers. Further he makes the distinction between the preparation of a state and the measurement of the state (3). A preparation puts the quantum system into a particular state whereas the measurement frequently destroys the state in question. This paper presents several criteria to help in the evaluation of the alternatives presented in the first paper and carries further the suggested interpretation mentioned at the end of that paper.

DOI
10.1086/287601

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(1) the author has outlined several of the more important interpretations of measurement in quantum mechanics and discussed the problems arising from them. Particular attention was paid to the work of Bohr, Heisenberg and von Neumann and a tentative proposal was made for a possible interpretation which would mitigate some of the problems and dilemmas. This interpretation was essentially that proposed by Margenau (2) in terms of latent variables. He defines measurement to be any operation with physical apparatus which results in a number, including in this, of course, yes and no answers as well as conventional numerical answers. Further he makes the distinction between the preparation of a state and the measurement of the state (3). A preparation puts the quantum system into a particular state whereas the measurement frequently destroys the state in question. This paper presents several criteria to help in the evaluation of the alternatives presented in the first paper and carries further the suggested interpretation mentioned at the end of that paper.
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In this paper, we shall show how the theory of measurements is to be understood from the point of view of a physical interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of "hidden" variables, developed in a previous paper. We find that in principle, these "hidden" variables determine the precise results of each individual measurement process. In practice, however, in measurements that we now know how to carry out, the observing apparatus disturbs the observed system in an unpredictable and uncontrollable way, so that the uncertainty principle is obtained as a practical limitation on the possible precision of measurements. This limitation is not, however, inherent in the conceptual structure of our interpretation. We shall see, for example, that simultaneous measurements of position and momentum having unlimited precision would in principle be possible if, as suggested in the previous paper, the mathematical formulation of the quantum theory needs to be modified at very short distances in certain ways that are consistent with our interpretation but not with the usual interpretation.We give a simple explanation of the origin of quantum-mechanical correlations of distant objects in the hypothetical experiment of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, which was suggested by these authors as a criticism of the usual interpretation.Finally, we show that von Neumann's proof that quantum theory is not consistent with hidden variables does not apply to our interpretation, because the hidden variables contemplated here depend both on the state of the measuring apparatus and the observed system and therefore go beyond certain of von Neumann's assumptions.In two appendixes, we treat the problem of the electromagnetic field in our interpretation and answer certain additional objections which have arisen in the attempt to give a precise description for an individual system at the quantum level.
In the present interpretation terms such as ‘measurement,’ ‘observation,’ ‘find,’ ‘classical,’ and ‘apparatus’ do not appear in the formulation of quantum mechanics. Yet it must of course be true that quantum mechanics can be used to predict features of the results of measurements – in particular their statistics. What is required, then, is an account in quantum mechanical terms of those physical interactions capable of being used to perform measurements of quantum dynamical variables, from which it follows that the predicted probabilities for specified behavior of certain quantum systems in these interactions coincide with what, on a more conventional interpretation, are simply postulated as the quantum mechanical probabilities for various measurement results on a system with a given quantum state. It is necessary to see how this consequence may be derived, not only in order to explicate the Born rules, but also to explain the role of quantum states within the present interpretation. The first step toward the required account is to analyze the nature of an interaction capable of being used to perform a measurement of the value of a quantum dynamical variable in a quantum system. Any such interaction will be called an M-type interaction, whether or not it is in fact used to perform a measurement.
A survey is made of the hitherto proposed answers to the following crucial questions arising in the physical interpretation of the mathematical formalism of wave mechanics: (I) What is the meaning of the dynamical variables and of their eigenvalues? (II) What is the meaning of the wave function? (III) What is the nature and origin of Heisenberg's uncertainty relations? (IV) What is the nature of the systems dealt with by wave mechanics? Taking into account the interpretations that have been proposed in the last few years, a surprisingly large number of answers is found. The present situation in quantum mechanics is compared with similar crises in the past history of physics. The mere multiplicity of consistent interpretations of quantum mechanics is regarded as a warning against the dogmatic adherence to any one of them, to the exclusion of new possibilities.
The overall purpose of this paper is to clarify the physical meaning and epistemological status of the term ‘measurement’ as used in quantum theory. After a review of the essential logical structure of quantum physics. Part I presents interpretive discussions contrasting the quantal concepts observable and ensemble with their classical ancestors along the lines of Margenau's latency theory. Against this background various popular ideas concerning the nature of quantum measurement are critically surveyed. The analysis reveals that, in addition to internal mathematical difficulties, all the so-called quantum theories of measurement are grounded in unjustifiable, classical presuppositions.