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International Journal of Quantum Information

QUANTUM INFORMATION — WHAT PRICE REALISM?

Amit Hagar

Published Dec 17, 2004• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Recent suggestions to supply quantum mechanics (QM) with realistic foundations by reformulating it in light of quantum information theory (QIT) are examined and are found wanting by pointing to a basic conceptual problem that QIT itself ignores, namely, the measurement problem. Since one cannot ignore the measurement problem and at the same time pretend to be a realist, as they stand, the suggestions to reformulate QM in light of QIT are nothing but instrumentalism in disguise.

DOI
10.1142/s0219749905000694

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Recent suggestions to supply quantum mechanics (QM) with realistic foundations by reformulating it in light of quantum information theory (QIT) are examined and are found wanting by pointing to a basic conceptual problem that QIT itself ignores, namely, the measurement problem. Since one cannot ignore the measurement problem and at the same time pretend to be a realist, as they stand, the suggestions to reformulate QM in light of QIT are nothing but instrumentalism in disguise.
Quantum Information Theory (QIT) has emerged as one of the most influential fields in modern science, combining the principles of quantum mechanics with classical information theory. It forms the theoretical foundation of advanced technologies such as quantum computing, quantum communication, and quantum cryptography. Despite remarkable progress in these areas, the measurement problem remains a fundamental conceptual and practical challenge. Measurement in quantum mechanics plays a dual role: it enables information extraction while simultaneously disturbing the quantum system. This paper presents a detailed study of the measurement problem within the framework of quantum information theory. It examines the role of measurement in quantum state evolution, the effects of entanglement and decoherence, and the impact on information processing tasks. The paper also discusses existing theoretical approaches and highlights the importance of resolving measurement-related issues for the future development of quantum technologies.
During many years since the birth of quantum mechanics, instrumentalist interpretations prevailed: the meaning of the theory was expressed in terms of measurements results. However, in the last decades, several attempts to interpret it from a realist viewpoint have been proposed. Among them, modal interpretations supply a realist non-collapse account, according to which the system always has definite properties and the quantum state represents possibilities, not actualities. But the traditional modal interpretations faced some conceptual problems when addressing imperfect measurements. The modal-Hamiltonian interpretation, on the contrary, proved to be able to supply an adequate account of the measurement problem, both in its ideal and its non-ideal versions. Moreover, in the non-ideal case, it gives a precise criterion to distinguish between reliable and non-reliable measurements. Nevertheless, that criterion depends on the particular state of the measured system, and this might be considered as a shortcoming of the proposal. In fact, one could ask for a criterion of reliability that does not depend on the features of what is measured but only on the properties of the measurement device. The aim of this article is precisely to supply such a criterion: we will adopt an informational perspective for this purpose.During many years since the birth of quantum mechanics, instrumentalistinterpretations prevailed: the meaning of the theory was expressed in terms of measurementsresults. However, in the last decades, several attempts to interpret it from a realist viewpointhave been proposed. Among them, modal interpretations supply a realist non-collapseaccount, according to which the system always has definite properties and the quantum staterepresents possibilities, not actualities. But the traditional modal interpretations faced someconceptual problems when addressing imperfect measurements. The modal-Hamiltonianinterpretation, on the contrary, proved to be able to supply an adequate account of themeasurement problem, both in its ideal and its non-ideal versions. Moreover, in the non-idealcase, it gives a precise criterion to distinguish between reliable and non-reliable measurements.Nevertheless, that criterion depends on the particular state of the measured system, and thismight be considered as a shortcoming of the proposal. In fact, one could ask for a criterionof reliability that does not depend on the features of what is measured but only on theproperties of the measurement device. The aim of this article is precisely to supply such acriterion: we will adopt an informational perspective for this purpose.
We reformulate the problem of the "interpretation of quantum mechanics" as the problem of DERIVING the quantum mechanical formalism from a set of simple physical postulates. We suggest that the common unease with taking quantum mechanics as a fundamental description of nature could derive from the use of an incorrect notion, as the unease with the Lorentz transformations before Einstein derived from the notion of observer independent time. Following an an analysis of the measurement process as seen by different observers, we propose a reformulation of quantum mechanics in terms of INFORMATION THEORY. We propose three different postulates out of which the formalism of the theory can be reconstructed; these are based on the notion of information about each other that systems contain. All systems are assumed to be equivalent: no observer-observed distinction, and information is interpreted as correlation. We then suggest that the incorrect notion that generates the unease with quantum mechanichs is the notion of OBSERVER INDEPENDENT state of a system.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?