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Foundations of Physics Letters

‘Counterfactual’ interpretation of the quantum measurement process

Giuseppe Nisticò

Published Aug 1, 1997• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bf02764107

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A currently discussed interpretation of quantum theory, Time-Symmetrized Quantum Theory, makes certain claims about the properties of systems between pre- and post- selection measurements. These claims are based on a counterfactual usage of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule for calculating the probabilities of measurement outcomes between such measurements. It has been argued by several authors that the counterfactual usage of the ABL rule is, in general, incorrect. This paper examines what might appear to be a loophole in those arguments and shows that this apparent loophole cannot be used to support a counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule. It is noted that the invalidity of the counterfactual usage of the ABL rule implies that the characterization of those outcomes receiving probability 1 in a counterfactual application of the rule as `elements of reality' is, in general, unfounded.