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Physical Review Letters

Quantum Cryptography Based on Two Mixed States

Masato Koashi, Nobuyuki Imoto

Published Sep 2, 1996• 27 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Although it is known that any two nonorthogonal pure states can constitute a secure quantum cryptosystem, the generalization of this scheme to the use of two mixed states is not trivial. It is shown here that even if a condition corresponding to the nonorthogonality in the pure-state case is satisfied, the mixed-state cryptosystem is still vulnerable to attack by an eavesdropper. A necessary and sufficient condition for the secure communication is derived. It states that the two mixed states must be connected by a rotation operator with a nonorthogonal angle.

DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.77.2137

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Although it is known that any two nonorthogonal pure states can constitute a secure quantum cryptosystem, the generalization of this scheme to the use of two mixed states is not trivial. It is shown here that even if a condition corresponding to the nonorthogonality in the pure-state case is satisfied, the mixed-state cryptosystem is still vulnerable to attack by an eavesdropper. A necessary and sufficient condition for the secure communication is derived. It states that the two mixed states must be connected by a rotation operator with a nonorthogonal angle.
All existing quantum cryptosystems use nonorthogonal states as the carriers of information. Nonorthogonal states cannot be cloned (duplicated) by an eavesdropper. As a result, any eavesdropping attempt must introduce errors in the transmission, and, therefore, can be detected by the legal users of the communication channel. Orthogonal states are not used in quantum cryptography, since they can be faithfully cloned without altering the transmitted data. We present a cryptographic scheme based on orthogonal states, which also assures the detection of any eavesdropper.
Whereas quantum cryptography ensures security by virtue of complete indistinguishability of nonorthogonal quantum states attenuation in quantum communication channels and unavailability of single-photon sources present major problems. In view of these difficulties the security of quantum cryptography can change from unconditional to conditional. Since the restrictions imposed by nonrelativistic quantum mechanics and used to formulate key distribution protocols are largely exhausted new principles are required. The fundamental relativistic causality principle in quantum cryptography can be used to propose a new approach to ensuring unconditional security of quantum cryptosystems that eliminates the aforementioned difficulties. Quantum cryptosystems of this kind should obviously be called relativistic. It is shown that relativistic quantum cryptosystems remain unconditionally secure: first attenuation in a quantum communication channel can only reduce the key generation rate but not the security of the key second the source may not generate pure single-photon states and a nonzero single-photon probability will suffice. The scheme remains secure even if the contribution of a single-photon component is arbitrarily small. This formally implies that a state may be characterized by an arbitrarily large mean photon number. The single-photon probability affects only the key generation rate but not security.
A simple proof of the unconditional security of a relativistic quantum cryptosystem based on orthogonal states is given. Limitations imposed by the special relativity theory allow the proof to be markedly simplified as compared to the case of nonrelativistic cryptosystems based on nonorthogonal states. An important point in the proposed protocol is a space-time structure of the quantum states, which is ignored in the non-relativistic protocols using only the properties of the space of states of the information carriers. As a consequence, the simplification is related to the inefficacy of using the collective measurements against an eavesdropper, the allowance for which is an especially difficult task in the nonrelativistic case.
Whereas quantum cryptography ensures security by virtue of complete indistinguishability of nonorthogonal quantum states, attenuation in quantum communication channels and the unavailability of single-photon sources present major problems. In view of these difficulties, the security of quantum cryptography can change from unconditional to conditional. Since the restrictions imposed by nonrelativistic quantum mechanics and used to formulate key distribution protocols have been largely exhausted, new principles are required. The fundamental relativistic causality principle in quantum cryptography can be used to propose a new approach to ensuring unconditional security of quantum cryptosystems that eliminates the aforementioned difficulties. Quantum cryptosystems of this kind should obviously be called relativistic. It is shown that relativistic quantum cryptosystems remain unconditionally secure: first, attenuation in a quantum communication channel can only reduce the key generation rate, but not the security of the key; second, the source may not generate pure single-photon states, and a nonzero single-photon probability will suffice. The scheme remains secure even if the contribution of a single-photon component is arbitrarily small. This formally implies that a state may be characterized by an arbitrarily large mean photon number. The single-photon probability affects only the key generation rate, but not security.
A new scheme of experimental quantum cryptography on the nonorthogonal states is described. Nonorthogonality is achieved by the time shift of states in different messages. For this scheme to be efficient, it is sufficient to balance the arms of an interferometer at the receiver and transmitter ends to an accuracy of 1–2 cm. This is a fundamental advantage of this scheme over, e.g., the most developed cryptosystem based on phase coding, where the maximum transmission distance has been achieved. In the latter system, the arms of the interferometer need to be balanced with an accuracy of fractions of a micron for a distance of several tens of kilometers.