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Chinese Physics Letters

Quantum Dialogue Revisited

Man Zhong-Xiao, Zhanjun Zhang, Yong Li

Published Dec 23, 2004• 164 citations
Publisher

Abstract

An entanglement-based quantum dialogue protocol [Phys. Lett. A 328 (2004) 6] is proven to be insecure: that is, in the protocol an eavesdropper can steal the secret messages without being detected provided that he/she adopts the intercept-and-resend attack strategy. We modify the protocol, i.e. in the control mode, by introducing and randomly choosing two sets of measuring basis: the intercept-and-resend attack can be accordingly detected. Hence, within the present version two users can securely and simultaneously exchange their secret messages.

DOI
10.1088/0256-307x/22/1/007

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An entanglement-based quantum dialogue protocol [Phys. Lett. A 328 (2004) 6] is proven to be insecure: that is, in the protocol an eavesdropper can steal the secret messages without being detected provided that he/she adopts the intercept-and-resend attack strategy. We modify the protocol, i.e. in the control mode, by introducing and randomly choosing two sets of measuring basis: the intercept-and-resend attack can be accordingly detected. Hence, within the present version two users can securely and simultaneously exchange their secret messages.
We present a quantum dialogue protocol by using the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state. In this paper, we point out that the `quantum dialogue' communication scheme recently introduced by Nguyen can be eavesdropped on under an intercept-and-resend attack. We also give a revised control mode to detect this attack. Hence, within the present version two users can exchange their secret messages securely and simultaneously, and the efficiency of information transmission can be successfully increased.
The quantum secure direct communication protocol recently proposed by Cao and Song [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] (i.e., the C-S QSDC protocol) is revisited. A security leak is pointed out. Taking advantage of this leak, an eavesdropper may adopt the intercept–measure–resend strategy to attack the quantum channel such that in the C-S QSDC protocol the secret message can be completely eavesdropped. To fix the leak, the original version of the C-S QSDC protocol is revised. As a consequence, the security is improved and assured at least in the case of an ideal quantum channel.