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Quantum Attack-Resistent Certificateless Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme

Huixian Li, Xubao Chen, Liaojun Pang, Weisong Shi

Published Jun 5, 2013• 6 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The existing certificateless signcryption schemes were designed mainly based on the traditional public key cryptography, in which the security relies on the hard problems, such as factor decomposition and discrete logarithm. However, these problems will be easily solved by the quantum computing. So the existing certificateless signcryption schemes are vulnerable to the quantum attack. Multivariate public key cryptography (MPKC), which can resist the quantum attack, is one of the alternative solutions to guarantee the security of communications in the post-quantum age. Motivated by these concerns, we proposed a new construction of the certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme (CLMSC) based on MPKC. The new scheme inherits the security of MPKC, which can withstand the quantum attack. Multivariate quadratic polynomial operations, which have lower computation complexity than bilinear pairing operations, are employed in signcrypting a message for a certain number of receivers in our scheme. Security analysis shows that our scheme is a secure MPKC-based scheme. We proved its security under the hardness of the Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) problem and its unforgeability under the Isomorphism of Polynomials (IP) assumption in the random oracle model. The analysis results show that our scheme also has the security properties of non-repudiation, perfect forward secrecy, perfect backward secrecy and public verifiability. Compared with the existing schemes in terms of computation complexity and ciphertext length, our scheme is more efficient, which makes it suitable for terminals with low computation capacity like smart cards.

DOI
10.1371/journal.pone.0049141

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The existing certificateless signcryption schemes were designed mainly based on the traditional public key cryptography, in which the security relies on the hard problems, such as factor decomposition and discrete logarithm. However, these problems will be easily solved by the quantum computing. So the existing certificateless signcryption schemes are vulnerable to the quantum attack. Multivariate public key cryptography (MPKC), which can resist the quantum attack, is one of the alternative solutions to guarantee the security of communications in the post-quantum age. Motivated by these concerns, we proposed a new construction of the certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme (CLMSC) based on MPKC. The new scheme inherits the security of MPKC, which can withstand the quantum attack. Multivariate quadratic polynomial operations, which have lower computation complexity than bilinear pairing operations, are employed in signcrypting a message for a certain number of receivers in our scheme. Security analysis shows that our scheme is a secure MPKC-based scheme. We proved its security under the hardness of the Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) problem and its unforgeability under the Isomorphism of Polynomials (IP) assumption in the random oracle model. The analysis results show that our scheme also has the security properties of non-repudiation, perfect forward secrecy, perfect backward secrecy and public verifiability. Compared with the existing schemes in terms of computation complexity and ciphertext length, our scheme is more efficient, which makes it suitable for terminals with low computation capacity like smart cards.
The threshold proxy signcryption can implement signature and encryption simultaneously in one logical step, and can be used to realize the decentralized protection of the group signature key, so it is an efficient technology for network security. Currently, most of the existing threshold proxy signcryption schemes are designed based on the traditional public key cryptosystems, and their security mainly depends on the difficulty of the large integer decomposition and the discrete logarithm. However, the traditional public key cryptosystems cannot resist the quantum computer attack, which makes the existing threshold proxy signcryption schemes based on traditional public key cryptosystems insecure against quantum attacks. Motivated by these concerns, we proposed a threshold proxy signcryption scheme based on Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystem (MPKC) which is one of the quantum attack-resistent public key algorithms. Under the premise of satisfying the threshold signcryption requirements of the threshold proxy, our scheme can not only realize the flexible participation of the proxy signcrypters but also resist the quantum computing attack. Finally, based on the assumption of Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) problem and Isomorphism Polynomial (IP) problem, the proof of the confidentiality and the unforgeability of the proposed scheme under the random oracle model is given.
Signcryption is a public-key cryptographic primitive which combines the functions of public-key encryption and digital signature into a single logical step at low computational and communication costs. While multi-receiver signcryption is suited for a situation where a sender wants to send a signcrypted message to multiple receivers in a confidential and authenticated way. Due to this attractive property, recently, multi-receiver signcryption plays an important role in some practical applications such as virtual conference as well as authenticated mail transferring. In this paper, we present an efficient multi-receiver identity-based signcryption (MIBSC) scheme from lattice assumption which is believed to resist quantum computer attacks. The proposed scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model, which has the indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks under the hardness of learning with errors (LWE), and existentially unforgeability against chosen message attacks under the small integer solution assumption (SIS). Moreover, we also compare our MIBSC scheme with existing schemes from performance efficiency and security, the result shows that our proposed scheme is more efficient and more secure. In particular, our scheme can be properly applied in the post-quantum communication environments.
Much of the assumed safety and security of classical cryptographic building blocks depends on the hardness of number-theoretical problems. However, Shor's algorithm proves that conventional cryptographic systems are no longer secure under quantum systems. As a response to this challenge, researchers started to develop a new cryptographic method known as post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which is based on hard computational problem that can resist the quantum threats. The multivariate public-key cryptography (MPKC) is one such candidate. The theoretical security of MPKC comes from the intractability of the MQ problem, which is believed to be NP-hard. Herein, we analyze the security of MQDSS signature scheme proposed by Chen et al. We investigate the proof of security of MQDSS, assuming that the malicious party can access to the quantum resources. We demonstrate that in its current state, MQDSS has quite a few insecurities in the quantum setting. In response to the proposed threats, we pitch possible modifications to MQDSS. We emphasize that our proposed security threats do not restrict themselves to MQDSS, and can be extended to other MPKC and PQC based cryptographic primitives.
How to construct a multi message multi receiver signcryption scheme for reusing random numbers on a ring is an urgent task to be solved. Based on the LHY20 standard signature scheme and the LHY21 partial random number reuse security theory, For the first time, a multi message multi receiver signature scheme without trapdoors on the ring is constructed. It is proved that the confidentiality and authentication of the scheme under the random oracle model can be reduced to Indistinguishability against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (IND-CCA2) and Strongly Existential Unforgeability against Chosen Message Attacks (SUF-CMA), respectively. In terms of authentication, it is stronger than the multi message multi receiver signature scheme on the LHY21 standard lattice in terms of Existential Unforgeability against Chosen Message Attacks (EUF-CMA). Efficiency analysis shows that compared with the standard signcryption scheme ℰRLWESC, which runs LHY21 independently multiple times, the multi receiver signcryption scheme proposed in this paper reduces ciphertext by nearly 25%. Compared with the multi receiver signcryption scheme on the LHY21 standard lattice, the size of the public and private key in this scheme is reduced from square level to linear level. For a system with n users, it reduces n−1n×100%\tfrac{n - 1}{n} \times 100 \%nn−1​×100% and n−3n×100%\tfrac{n - 3}{n} \times 100 \%nn−3​×100%, respectively. The proposed scheme exhibits excellent scalability. For example, when the user scale n>100, the public key size and private key size are reduced by more than 99% and 97%, respectively. This work provides an efficient and scalable post-quantum secure solution for multi-receiver communication scenarios, promotes the practical application of ring-based lattice cryptography in secure multicast systems
Certificateless signcryption can simultaneously provide certificateless signature and encryption. In recent years, many certificateless signcryption schemes have been proposed. However, these schemes are based on traditional mathematical theory and not have the ability of resisting the quantum computing attacks. Up to now, lattice-based certificateless signature or encryption schemes have been proposed; however, these schemes only have one function and cannot fulfill two functions of certificateless signature and encryption at the same time. In consideration of this reason, in this article, a certificateless signcryption scheme from lattice (L-CLSS) is constructed. L-CLSS has three advantages. First, in the random oracle model, it is provably indistinguishable against adaptive ciphertext-chosen attacks under the intractability of the learning with errors (LWE) problem and unforgeable against adaptive message-chosen attacks under the hardness of small integer solution (SIS) problem. Second, comparison with the cryptographic algorithms under the difficulty of large integer decomposition, L-CLSS can resist the quantum computing attacks. Third, L-CLSS has higher computation efficiency and a lower communication cost than the existing schemes.
Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption (IBBE\textsf{IBBE}IBBE) is a novel concept that can efficiently and securely transmit confidential content to a group of authorized users without the traditional Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI\textsf{PKI}PKI). After carefully exploring these areas, we have observed that none of the existing works have adopted the quantum-attack resistant cryptographic machinery Multivariate Public-Key Cryptography (MPKC\textsf{MPKC}MPKC) with provable security. We are the first to design a quantum-safe IBBE\textsf{IBBE}IBBE that solely relies on the MPKC\textsf{MPKC}MPKC framework. Our proposed protocol has achieved $ \mathcal{O}(n) $-size communication bandwidth and $ {n^3}\cdot\mathcal{O}\big(\max\big\{N, {\delta}^4\big\}\big) $-size overhead storage without any security breach. Here, $ n $ is the number of variables for each multivariate polynomial, $ N $ represents the total number of system users, and $ \delta $ denotes a positive fixed-length. More positively, our design has achieved the adaptive INDistinguishable Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA\textsf{IND-CCA}IND-CCA) security in the Random Oracle Model (ROM\textsf{ROM}ROM) under the hardness of standard Multivariate Quadratic (MQ\textsf{MQ}MQ) problem. We emphasize that our system can also be immune against collusion attacks where several users come together to create an illicit decryption box.