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Philosophy of Science

Discussion: Why Bohm's Theory Solves the Measurement Problem

Tim Maudlin

Published Sep 1, 1995• 36 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abraham Stone recently has published an argument purporting to show that David Bohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics fails to solve the measurement problem. Stone's analysis is not correct, as he has failed to take account of the conditions under which the theorems he cites are proven. An explicit presentation of a Bohmian measurement illustrates the flaw in his reasoning.

DOI
10.1086/289879

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•Jan 1, 1998•2 citations
Abraham Stone recently has published an argument purporting to show that David Bohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics fails to solve the measurement problem. Stone's analysis is not correct, as he has failed to take account of the conditions under which the theorems he cites are proven. An explicit presentation of a Bohmian measurement illustrates the flaw in his reasoning.
There is a recurring line of argument in the literature to the effect that Bohm's theory fails to solve the measurement problem. I show that this argument fails in all its variants. Hence Bohm's theory, whatever its drawbacks, at least succeeds in solving the measurement problem. I briefly discuss a similar argument that has been raised against the GRW theory. 1. Introduction2. Three Theories3. The Basic Argument4. Branches and Worlds5. Theory and Interpretation6. Size Matters7. Conclusion
Bohmian mechanics also known as de Broglie-Bohm theory is the most popular alternative approach to quantum mechanics. Whereas the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics is based on the complementarity principle Bohmian mechanics assumes that both particle and wave are concrete physical objects. In 1993 Peter Holland has written an ardent account on the plausibility of the de Broglie-Bohm theory. He proved that it fully reproduces quantum mechanics if the initial particle distribution is consistent with a solution of the Schrödinger equation. Which may be the reasons that Bohmian mechanics has not yet found global acceptance? In this article it will be shown that predicted properties of atoms and molecules are in conflict with experimental findings. Moreover it will be demonstrated that repeatedly published ensembles of trajectories illustrating double slit diffraction processes do not agree with quantum mechanics. The credibility of a theory is undermined when recognizably wrong data presented frequently over years are finally not declared obsolete.
This thesis deals with the set of issues commonly known as the 'measurement problem' in quantum mechanics. The main thesis is that the problems are best understood as typically theoretical problems, in the sense that they are not problems directly concerned with the ability of the quantum theory to account for, or represent, actual measurements. This is contrary to the standard view that the quantum measurement problem is in fact about how to fit theory to experiment. I explain how I characterise a theoretical problem and argue against claims that quantum measurement theory is unrealistic or ineffective because it bears so little relation to actual measurement practice: I argue that the quantum theory's analysis of measurement need not be committed to doing for the experimenter what Henry Margenau and other critics think it should do. Its principal aim is to answer two questions. First, it tells us what properties are to be associated to quantum states; secondly, it tells us what, in the theory, a measurement must be if these properties are to emerge. I then discuss some of the specific aspects of the problem of measurement, in particular the results known as insolubility proofs of the quantum measurement problem and the characterisation of the quantum measurement interactions satisfying standard probabilistic constraints. I prove several results here, amongst them characterisations of all interactions jointly satisfying the conditions of unitarity and, first, objectification, then secondly, probability reproducibility conditions. These are the standard conditions which capture our intuitions about quantum measurement. I show how the results lead to negative consequences with respect to the interpretive questions in quantum mechanics. The discussion of these specific aspects of quantum measurements does, on the other hand, suggest a particular strategy for solving the problems. This is found in Arthur Fine's solution to the measurement problem, which is based on the idea of a selective interaction. The discussion of Fine's solution emphasises in general how simply implementing technical strategies is not sufficient to solve the measurement problem in quantum mechanics: further arguments must be given for why the strategy is appropriate, rather than just mathematically satisfactory. I claim that the arguments given by Fine are far from sufficient. The thesis concludes that, although the quantum theory of measurement is immune from Margenau's critique, and retains a theoretical autonomy, it is still plagued by numerous problems: the thesis identifies clearly what some of these problems are and considers some solutions, most of which, however, raise serious philosophical questions about the interpretation of quantum mechanics.