Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

International Conference on Quantum Information

The Security of SARG04 Protocol with An Untrusted Source

Hong Mei Guo, Xiang Peng, Bingjie Xu

Published Jan 1, 2011• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We investigate the security of SARG04 protocol with untrusted source. The secure key rate is derived given that several key parameters of the untrusted source are known. Further, a passive scheme is proposed to monitor the untrusted-source parameters.
DOI
10.1364/icqi.2011.qmi19

Related papers

Source monitor in quantum key distribution

Xiang Peng, Hong Mei Guo

The core value of a quantum-key-distribution (QKD) system is the unconditional security. In the standard security analysis, the characteristics of QKD source are assumed to be known and fixed. In a real QKD experiment, this assumption may be deviated. Especially, in commercial Plug&Play QKD system, the source is untrusted. Source monitor can close this security loophole. This paper analyzes passive source-monitor scheme, and shows that this scheme can be well implemented in practice.

URSI General Assembly and Scientific Symposium•Aug 1, 2011•0 citations

Quantum key distribution with an unknown and untrusted source

Yi Bing Zhao, Bing Qi, Hoi‐Kwong Lo

The security of a standard bidirectional ``plug-and-play'' quantum key distribution (QKD) system has been an open question for a long time. This is mainly because its source is equivalently controlled by an eavesdropper, which means the source is unknown and untrusted. Qualitative discussion on this subject has been made previously. In this paper, we solve this question directly by presenting the quantitative security analysis on a general class of QKD protocols whose sources are unknown and untrusted. The securities of standard Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, $\text{weak}+\text{vacuum}$ decoy state protocol, and one-decoy state protocol, with unknown and untrusted sources are rigorously proved. We derive rigorous lower bounds to the secure key generation rates of the above three protocols. Our numerical simulation results show that QKD with an untrusted source gives a key generation rate that is close to that with a trusted source.

arXiv:0802.2725•Physical Review A•May 20, 2008•121 citations

Security analysis of an untrusted source for quantum key distribution: passive approach

Yi Zhao, Bing Qi, Hoi-Kwong Lo +1 more

We present a passive approach to the security analysis of quantum key distribution (QKD) with an untrusted source. A complete proof of its unconditional security is also presented. This scheme has significant advantages in real-life implementations as it does not require fast optical switching or a quantum random number generator. The essential idea is to use a beam splitter to split each input pulse. We show that we can characterize the source using a cross-estimate technique without active routing of each pulse. We have derived analytical expressions for the passive estimation scheme. Moreover, using simulations, we have considered four real-life imperfections: additional loss introduced by the 'plug&play' structure, inefficiency of the intensity monitor noise of the intensity monitor, and statistical fluctuation introduced by finite data size. Our simulation results show that the passive estimate of an untrusted source remains useful in practice, despite these four imperfections. Also, we have performed preliminary experiments, confirming the utility of our proposal in real-life applications. Our proposal makes it possible to implement the 'plug&play' QKD with the security guaranteed, while keeping the implementation practical.

arXiv:0905.4225•New Journal of Physics•Feb 16, 2010•44 citations

Solving the Untrusted Source Problem in Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution

Yucheng Qiao, Gan Wang, Zengyu Li +3 more

We propose a light source monitoring scheme to solve the untrusted sourceproblem in measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution, and show it performs almost the same as the initial protocol with a trusted source.

Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics•Jan 1, 2019•0 citations

Solving the Untrusted Source Problem in Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution

Yucheng Qiao, Gan Wang, Zhengyu Li +3 more

We propose a light source monitoring scheme to solve the untrusted source problem in measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution, and show it performs almost the same as the initial protocol with a trusted source. © 2019 The Author(s)

Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics•May 5, 2019•0 citations

Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution with Untrusted Sources

Chen Ming-juan, Xiang Liu

The security of the weak+vacuum decoy state protocol with untrusted sources is studied,and the effects of internal statistic fluctuation on the final key rate and the transmittance distance are discussed.The results showed that both the maximum safe transmission distance and final key generation rates are reduced when the statistic fluctuation is considered.

Hu'nan Shifan Daxue xuebao. Ziran kexue ban•Jan 1, 2011•0 citations
The security of a standard bidirectional ``plug-and-play'' quantum key distribution (QKD) system has been an open question for a long time. This is mainly because its source is equivalently controlled by an eavesdropper, which means the source is unknown and untrusted. Qualitative discussion on this subject has been made previously. In this paper, we solve this question directly by presenting the quantitative security analysis on a general class of QKD protocols whose sources are unknown and untrusted. The securities of standard Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, weak+vacuum\text{weak}+\text{vacuum}weak+vacuum decoy state protocol, and one-decoy state protocol, with unknown and untrusted sources are rigorously proved. We derive rigorous lower bounds to the secure key generation rates of the above three protocols. Our numerical simulation results show that QKD with an untrusted source gives a key generation rate that is close to that with a trusted source.
We present a passive approach to the security analysis of quantum key distribution (QKD) with an untrusted source. A complete proof of its unconditional security is also presented. This scheme has significant advantages in real-life implementations as it does not require fast optical switching or a quantum random number generator. The essential idea is to use a beam splitter to split each input pulse. We show that we can characterize the source using a cross-estimate technique without active routing of each pulse. We have derived analytical expressions for the passive estimation scheme. Moreover, using simulations, we have considered four real-life imperfections: additional loss introduced by the 'plug&play' structure, inefficiency of the intensity monitor noise of the intensity monitor, and statistical fluctuation introduced by finite data size. Our simulation results show that the passive estimate of an untrusted source remains useful in practice, despite these four imperfections. Also, we have performed preliminary experiments, confirming the utility of our proposal in real-life applications. Our proposal makes it possible to implement the 'plug&play' QKD with the security guaranteed, while keeping the implementation practical.