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Journal of Physics A Mathematical and Theoretical

A necessary condition for the security of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution

Adriana Marais, Thomas Konrad, Francesco Petruccione

Published Jun 24, 2010• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A necessary condition for the security of a quantum key distribution protocol is that Bob's measurement is described by non-commuting POVM elements. The differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocol is formalised, and this condition is shown to be met.
DOI
10.1088/1751-8113/43/30/305302

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