Empirical adequacy, formal explanation and understanding are distinct goals of science. While no a priori criterion for understanding should be laid down, there may be inherent limitations on the way we are able to understand explanations of physical phenomena. I examine several recent contributions to the exercise of fashioning an explanatory discourse to mold the formal explanation provided by quantum mechanics to our modes of understanding. The question is whether we are capable of truly understanding (or comprehending) quantum phenomena, as opposed to simply accepting the formalism and certain irreducible quantum correlations. The central issue is that of understanding versus merely redefining terms to paper over our ignorance.
Empirical adequacy, formal explanation and understanding are distinct goals of science. While no a priori criterion for understanding should be laid down, there may be inherent limitations on the way we are able to understand explanations of physical phenomena. I examine several recent contributions to the exercise of fashioning an explanatory discourse to mold the formal explanation provided by quantum mechanics to our modes of understanding. The question is whether we are capable of truly understanding (or comprehending) quantum phenomena, as opposed to simply accepting the formalism and certain irreducible quantum correlations. The central issue is that of understanding versus merely redefining terms to paper over our ignorance.
An understanding of quantum theory is manifested by the ability successfully and unproblematically to use it to further the scientific goals of prediction, explanation, and control of natural phenomena. An Interpretation seeks further to formulate or reformulate it as a fundamental theory that provides a self-contained description of the world. I critically review three prominent but radically different Interpretations of quantum theory (Bohmian mechanics, non-linear theories, Everettian quantum mechanics) and give my reasons for rejecting each as a way of understanding quantum theory. These include problems associated with non-locality, failure of relativistic invariance, empirical inaccessibility, and decision-making. We can achieve a satisfactory understanding of quantum theory and how it successfully advances the goals of science without providing an Interpretation of the theory.
Abstract Each formulation of quantum mechanics we consider in the book seeks to explain why we have determinate measurement records distributed according to the standard quantum statistics. The explanation we get relies on the metaphysical assumptions that underlie the particular theory. Metaphysics here does real explanatory work in accounting for our experience. While it is not at all clear what specific metaphysical commitments best explain our experience, one can distinguish between different types and degrees of empirical adequacy each formulation provides. Stronger notions of empirical adequacy might be characterized in terms of such things as the plausibility that one’s experience in fact supervenes on the sort of records a particular theory provides and the richness of the account of experience provided by the theory.
This paper deals with the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the nature of physical theory, and the future of physics. First, the question of why there are so many different interpretations of quantum mechanics proposed and accepted by outstanding quantum experts is treated. This requires a discussion of the relation between physics and philosophy and drawing a distinction between a physical formalism and a physical explanation. The Copenhagen interpretation is considered, criticized, and found to be unsatisfactory in some respects. Finally, an interpretation that contains ideas from previous interpretations but which may itself be new, is proposed. Hopefully, this is superior to the previous interpretations. It has, I believe, the advantage of logical clarity. In the process of doing this, I introduce a theory of levels of physical theory, according to which microscopic physical theory, as it develops in successive stages, becomes more and more adaptable to explaining—or at least taking cognizance of—fundamental biological or ultimately psychological phenomena.
What would a quantum theory of the social have to explain, and what might it contribute to our understanding of social reality? This conceptual working paper explores the possibility of a general social ontology grounded in elementary non-commutative operations of information and reaction. Its central question is not merely how social order, disorder, and transformation occur, but what makes social transformation possible in the first place. Drawing on the Principle of Insufficient Reason, the paper examines whether quantum-theoretical concepts may offer functionally equivalent explanatory strategies for social phenomena without presupposing that social reality consists of physical quantum objects. It introduces the hypothesis of a context-dependent constant of social action (κ) and investigates the conditions under which elementary information–reaction couplings might give rise to discrete social transitions, or social quanta of action. The paper further outlines the possibility of a social Born principle capable of relating formally specified social states to empirically testable probability distributions. It concludes by discussing the scope, limits, and prospects of this approach, including its implications for extending social ontology beyond the conventional boundaries of human society.
I explore whether it is possible to make sense of the quantum mechanical description of physical reality by taking the proper subject of physics to be correlation and only correlation, and by separating the problem of understanding the nature of quantum mechanics from the hard problem of understanding the nature of objective probability in individual systems, and the even harder problem of understanding the nature of conscious awareness. The resulting perspective on quantum mechanics is supported by some elementary but insufficiently emphasized theorems. Whether or not it is adequate as a new Weltanschauung, this point of view toward quantum mechanics provides a different perspective from which to teach the subject or explain its peculiar character to people in other fields.
Herein we are not interested in merely using dynamical systems theory, graph theory, information theory, etc., to model the relationship between brain dynamics and networks, and various states and degrees of conscious processes. We are interested in the question of how phenomenal conscious experience and fundamental physics are most deeply related. Any attempt to mathematically and formally model conscious experience and its relationship to physics must begin with some metaphysical assumption in mind about the nature of conscious experience, the nature of matter and the nature of the relationship between them. These days the most prominent metaphysical fixed points are strong emergence or some variant of panpsychism. In this paper we will detail another distinct metaphysical starting point known as neutral monism. In particular, we will focus on a variant of the neutral monism of William James and Bertrand Russell. Rather than starting with physics as fundamental, as both strong emergence and panpsychism do in their own way, our goal is to suggest how one might derive fundamental physics from neutral monism. Thus, starting with two axioms grounded in our characterization of neutral monism, we will sketch out a derivation of and explanation for some key features of relativity and quantum mechanics that suggest a unity between those two theories that is generally unappreciated. Our mode of explanation throughout will be of the principle as opposed to constructive variety in something like Einstein's sense of those terms. We will argue throughout that a bias towards property dualism and a bias toward reductive dynamical and constructive explanation lead to the hard problem and the explanatory gap in consciousness studies, and lead to serious unresolved problems in fundamental physics, such as the measurement problem and the mystery of entanglement in quantum mechanics and lack of progress in producing an empirically well-grounded theory of quantum gravity. We hope to show that given our take on neutral monism and all that follows from it, the aforementioned problems can be satisfactorily resolved leaving us with a far more intuitive and commonsense model of the relationship between conscious experience and physics.