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Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge

Projective expected utility: a subjective formulation

Pierfrancesco La Mura

Published Jul 6, 2009• 7 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Motivated by classical decision-theoretic paradoxes (Allais 1953, Ellsberg 1961), we introduce a projective generalization of expected utility along the lines of the quantum-mechanical generalization of probability theory. The resulting decision theory accommodates the paradoxes, while retaining significant simplicity and tractability. In particular, every finite game within this larger class of preferences still has an equilibrium.

DOI
10.1145/1562814.1562840

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Motivated by classical decision-theoretic paradoxes (Allais 1953, Ellsberg 1961), we introduce a projective generalization of expected utility along the lines of the quantum-mechanical generalization of probability theory. The resulting decision theory accommodates the paradoxes, while retaining significant simplicity and tractability. In particular, every finite game within this larger class of preferences still has an equilibrium.
The Ellsberg and Machina paradoxes reveal that expected utility theory is problematical when real subjects take decisions under uncertainty. Suitable generalizations of expected utility exist which attempt to solve the Ellsberg paradox, but none of them provides a satisfactory solution of the Machina paradox. In this paper we elaborate a quantum model in Hilbert space describing the Ellsberg situation and also the Machina situation, and show that we can model the specific aspect of the Machina situation that is unable to be modeled within the existing generalizations of expected utility.
In this paper, we introduce a new model of selection behavior under risk that describes an essential cognitive process for comparing values of objects and making a selection decision. This model is constructed by the quantum-like approach that employs the state representation specific to quantum theory, which has the mathematical framework beyond the classical probability theory. We show that our quantum approach can clearly explain the famous examples of anomalies for the expected utility theory, the Ellsberg paradox, the Machina paradox and the disparity between WTA and WTP. Further, we point out that our model mathematically specifies the characteristics of the probability weighting function and the value function, which are basic concepts in the prospect theory.
We test a simple quantum decision model of the Ellsberg paradox. We find that the theoretical predictions of the model are in conformity with our experimental results. The predictions of our quantum model are not statistically significantly different from those of the source dependent model. The source dependent model requires the specification of probability weighting functions in order to fit the evidence. On the other hand, our quantum model makes no recourse to probability weighting functions. This suggests that much of what is normally attributed to probability weighting may actually be due to quantum probability. When we replace quantum probability by Kolmogorov probability in our model, then the Ellsberg paradox reemerges. Hence, we make essential use of quantum probability theory. All our development uses no more than standard linear algebra and real numbers, which are very familiar to economists. This makes our paper accessible to a wider audience than the quantum community. JEL Classification: D01, D81, D91
Can quantum theory provide new answers to puzzling results from decision research that have resisted formal explanations so far? This chapter presents several new contributions that quantum theory provides to decision research. However, in order to locate where quantum theory can make an important new contribution, we first need to provide some necessary background on decision theory and what has already been accomplished. Decision science is a highly developed field that has produced a variety of sophisticated mathematical theories (Gilboa, 2009; Wakker, 2010). Some of these theories are rational theories, which prescribe optimal ways to make decisions. Others are psychological theories that describe the way people actually make decisions. One of the most important rational decision theories is von Neumannn and Morgenstern's expected utility (EU) theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Expected utility theory is designed for decisions under risk ; that is, a choice among actions defined as an objective probability distribution over possible payoffs. An important extension of (EU) theory is Savage's (1954) subjective expected utility (SEU) theory . This extends utility theory to decisions under uncertainty ; that is, a choice among actions defined as functions that map un-certain events into payoffs, and the events may not have objective probabilities. A more general theory designed for decisions under both uncertainty and risk was presented by Anscombe and Aumann (1963). All of these theories are rational, in the sense that they are based on a small set of compelling axioms and the prescribed action logically follows from the axioms.
Quantum decision theory, advanced earlier by the authors, and illustrated for lotteries with gains, is generalized to the games containing lotteries with gains as well as losses. The mathematical structure of the approach is based on the theory of quantum measurements, which makes this approach relevant both for the description of decision making of humans and the creation of artificial quantum intelligence. General rules are formulated allowing for the explicit calculation of quantum probabilities representing the fraction of decision makers preferring the considered prospects. This provides a method to quantitatively predict decision-maker choices, including the cases of games with high uncertainty for which the classical expected utility theory fails. The approach is applied to experimental results obtained on a set of lottery gambles with gains and losses. Our predictions, involving no fitting parameters, are in very good agreement with experimental data. The use of quantum decision making in game theory is described. A principal scheme of creating quantum artificial intelligence is suggested.
The Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes show that the expected utility hypothesis and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are violated in real life decisions.The popular explanation in terms of ambiguity aversion is not completely accepted.On the other hand, we have recently introduced a notion of contextual risk to mathematically capture what is known as ambiguity in the economics literature.Situations in which contextual risk occurs cannot be modeled by Kolmogorovian classical probabilistic structures, but a non-Kolmogorovian framework with a quantum-like structure is needed.We prove in this paper that the contextual risk approach can be applied to the Ellsberg paradox, and elaborate a sphere model within our hidden measurement formalism which reveals that it is the overall conceptual landscape that is responsible of the disagreement between actual human decisions and the predictions of expected utility theory, which generates the paradox.This result points to the presence of a quantum conceptual layer in human thought which is superposed to the usually assumed classical logical layer.