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American Journal of Physics

The many−worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. By Bryce S. DeWitt and Neill Graham

Robert V. Krotkov

Published Jan 1, 1975• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1119/1.10047

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Bryce DeWitt referee report on paper, "Everett's Theory and the 'Many Worlds' Interpretation"

Bryce Seligman DeWitt

Around 1988, Bryce DeWitt was asked to referee a paper by an author who argued that that DeWitt's version of Hugh Everett's theory was not true to Everett's original work. In his referee report, DeWitt offers to set the record straight about his interpretation of Everett's work. This is a copy of DeWitt's referee report. A version of the reviewed paper was subsequently published in 1990 in the American Journal of Physics. At the request of the DeWitt estate, the name of the author of the paper has been redacted. For further details see Byrne, P. (2010). The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III. Oxford University Press.

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AGAINST MANY-WORLDS INTERPRETATIONS

Adrian Kent

This is a critical review of the literature on many-worlds interpretations, MWI, with arguments drawn partly from earlier critiques by Bell and Stein. The essential postulates involved in various MWI are extracted, and their consistency with the evident physical world is examined. Arguments are presented against MWI proposed by Everett, Graham and DeWitt. The relevance of frequency operators to MWI is examined; it is argued that frequency operator theorems of Hartle and Farhi-Goldstone-Gutmann do not in themselves provide a probability interpretation for quantum mechanics, and thus neither support existing MWI nor would be useful in constructing new MWI. Comments are made on papers by Geroch and Deutsch that advocate MWI. It is concluded that no plausible set of axioms exists for an MWI that describes known physics.

arXiv:gr-qc/9703089•International Journal of Modern Physics A•May 10, 1990•181 citations
Around 1988, Bryce DeWitt was asked to referee a paper by an author who argued that that DeWitt's version of Hugh Everett's theory was not true to Everett's original work. In his referee report, DeWitt offers to set the record straight about his interpretation of Everett's work. This is a copy of DeWitt's referee report. A version of the reviewed paper was subsequently published in 1990 in the American Journal of Physics. At the request of the DeWitt estate, the name of the author of the paper has been redacted. For further details see Byrne, P. (2010). The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III. Oxford University Press.
This is a critical review of the literature on many-worlds interpretations, MWI, with arguments drawn partly from earlier critiques by Bell and Stein. The essential postulates involved in various MWI are extracted, and their consistency with the evident physical world is examined. Arguments are presented against MWI proposed by Everett, Graham and DeWitt. The relevance of frequency operators to MWI is examined; it is argued that frequency operator theorems of Hartle and Farhi-Goldstone-Gutmann do not in themselves provide a probability interpretation for quantum mechanics, and thus neither support existing MWI nor would be useful in constructing new MWI. Comments are made on papers by Geroch and Deutsch that advocate MWI. It is concluded that no plausible set of axioms exists for an MWI that describes known physics.