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Australasian Journal of Philosophy

The objectivity of quantum probabilities

Henry Krips

Published Dec 1, 1989• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

(1989). The objectivity of quantum probabilities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 67, No. 4, pp. 423-431.
DOI
10.1080/00048408912343941

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