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Science China Information Sciences

Security model and modular design of fair authentication key exchange protocols

Dengguo Feng, Weidong Chen

Published Feb 1, 2010• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s11432-010-0033-9

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We prcscnt a general framework for constructing and analyzing authentication protocols in realistic models of communication networks.This framework provides a sound formalization for the authentication problem and suggests simple and attractive design principles for general authentication and key exchange protocols.The key element in our appronch io a modular treatment of the authentication problem in cryptographic protocols; thii applies to the definition of accurity, to the design of the protocols, and to their analysis.In particulnr, following this modular approach, we show how to systematically transform solutions that work in a model of idaalizcd authenticated communications into solutions that are secure in the realistic setting of communication channels controlled by an active adversary.Using these principles we construct and prove the security of simple and practical authentication and key-exchange protocols.In particular, we provide a security analysis of aomo well-known key exchange protocols (e.g.authenticated Dlfllc-Hcllman key exchange), and of some of the techniques underlying the design of several authentication protocols that are currently being deployed on a large scale for the Intornot Protocol and other applications.

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Abstract. In 2001, Canetti and Krawczyk proposed a security model (CKmodel) for authentication protocols. They also gave an indistinguishabilitybased definition for key exchange protocols. Since then the model has almost exclusively been used for analyzing key exchange protocols, although it can be applied to authentication protocols in general. The model not only captures a large class of attacks but also provides a modular approach to the design of authentication protocols. However, the model does not capture the property of Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resilience. Until now, analysis concerning this property has mostly been done heuristically and restricted to key exchange protocols only. Previous attempts on formalizing KCI have mostly been done in some ad hoc manner and additional proofs have to be given specifically for the security of KCI resilience. In this paper, we propose an extension to the CK-model, which allows, for the first time, the KCI attacks to be considered in authentication protocols in general, rather than restricted to key exchange protocols, and no more additional proofs are required specifically for KCI security. With the revival of interest in identity-based (ID-based) cryptography, there have been many new ID-based key exchange protocols proposed. Despite the fact that some of them have been proven in some restricted versions of a model proposed by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 and some others have been proven in the original CK-model, there is no rigorous model specifically for ID-based key exchange security. In particular, forward secrecy against compromised Key Generation Server (KGS-FS) has never been captured even though this notion is more important and stronger than the perfect forward secrecy in ID-based key exchange. For this, we further extend our model to ID-based setting and capture the property of KGS-FS for ID-based key exchange security. 1

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We present a general framework for constructing and analyzing authentication protocols in realistic models of communication networks. This framework provides a sound formalization for the authentication problem and suggests simple and attractive design principles for general authentication and key exchange protocols. The key element in our approach is a modular treatment of the authentication problem in cryptographic protocols; this applies to the definition of security, to the design of the protocols, and to their analysis. In particular, following this modular approach, we show how to systematically transform solutions that work in a model of idealized authenticated communications into solutions that are secure in the realistic setting of communication channels controlled by an active adversary. Using these principles we construct and prove the security of simple and practical authentication and key-exchange protocols. In particular, we provide a security analysis of some well-known key exchange protocols (e.g. authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange), and of some of the techniques underlying the design of several authentication protocols that are currently being
We prcscnt a general framework for constructing and analyzing authentication protocols in realistic models of communication networks.This framework provides a sound formalization for the authentication problem and suggests simple and attractive design principles for general authentication and key exchange protocols.The key element in our appronch io a modular treatment of the authentication problem in cryptographic protocols; thii applies to the definition of accurity, to the design of the protocols, and to their analysis.In particulnr, following this modular approach, we show how to systematically transform solutions that work in a model of idaalizcd authenticated communications into solutions that are secure in the realistic setting of communication channels controlled by an active adversary.Using these principles we construct and prove the security of simple and practical authentication and key-exchange protocols.In particular, we provide a security analysis of aomo well-known key exchange protocols (e.g.authenticated Dlfllc-Hcllman key exchange), and of some of the techniques underlying the design of several authentication protocols that are currently being deployed on a large scale for the Intornot Protocol and other applications.
Abstract. In 2001, Canetti and Krawczyk proposed a security model (CKmodel) for authentication protocols. They also gave an indistinguishabilitybased definition for key exchange protocols. Since then the model has almost exclusively been used for analyzing key exchange protocols, although it can be applied to authentication protocols in general. The model not only captures a large class of attacks but also provides a modular approach to the design of authentication protocols. However, the model does not capture the property of Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resilience. Until now, analysis concerning this property has mostly been done heuristically and restricted to key exchange protocols only. Previous attempts on formalizing KCI have mostly been done in some ad hoc manner and additional proofs have to be given specifically for the security of KCI resilience. In this paper, we propose an extension to the CK-model, which allows, for the first time, the KCI attacks to be considered in authentication protocols in general, rather than restricted to key exchange protocols, and no more additional proofs are required specifically for KCI security. With the revival of interest in identity-based (ID-based) cryptography, there have been many new ID-based key exchange protocols proposed. Despite the fact that some of them have been proven in some restricted versions of a model proposed by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 and some others have been proven in the original CK-model, there is no rigorous model specifically for ID-based key exchange security. In particular, forward secrecy against compromised Key Generation Server (KGS-FS) has never been captured even though this notion is more important and stronger than the perfect forward secrecy in ID-based key exchange. For this, we further extend our model to ID-based setting and capture the property of KGS-FS for ID-based key exchange security. 1