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Physical Review Letters

Comment on "Consistent Inference of Probabilities for Reproducible Experiments"

Abner Shimony

Published Aug 26, 1985• 10 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.55.1030

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Robert B. Griffiths, James B. Hartle

In a recent paper Kent has pointed out that in consistent histories quantum theory it is possible, given initial and final states, to construct two different consistent families of histories, in each of which there is a proposition that can be inferred with probability one, and such that the projectors representing these two propositions are mutually orthogonal. In this note we stress that, according to the rules of consistent history reasoning two such propositions are not contrary in the usual logical sense namely, that one can infer that if one is true then the other is false, and both could be false. No single consistent family contains both propositions, together with the initial and final states, and hence the propositions cannot be logically compared. Consistent histories quantum theory is logically consistent, consistent with experiment as far as is known, consistent with the usual quantum predictions for measurements, and applicable to the most general physical systems. It may not be the only theory with these properties, but in our opinion, it is the most promising among present possibilities.

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Objective probabilities, quantum counterfactuals, and the ABL rule: Apropos of Kastner's comment

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The ABL rule is derived and shown to be a tool of standard quantum mechanics. Objections by Kastner [quant-ph/0003098v3] and others to the counterfactual use of the ABL rule are shown to be groundless. In particular, this use is not restricted in the way Kastner has claimed. A variant of the three-box experiment due to Vaidman is discussed. It is argued that Born probabilities (and hence state vectors or density operators) are not the right basis for drawing ontological inferences. What quantum mechanics is trying to tell us about the world must be inferred from the objective ABL probabilities that are assigned to counterfactuals. The correct inferences, however, will remain incomprensible until a prevalent but inconsistent way of thinking about the temporal aspect of the world is rejected.

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Reaffirming a Challenge to Bohmian Mechanics

Jan Klaers, Violetta Sharoglazova, Marius Puplauskis

In our work [Sharoglazova et al., Nature 643, 67-72 (2025)], we reported the first measurement of the speed of tunnelling particles by comparing two orthogonal motions in a coupled-waveguide system. Here we respond to objections raised in comments, referee reports, preprints, and articles. In particular, we distinguish two questions that are often conflated: whether Bohmian mechanics reproduces the measured density, and whether the standard guiding equation assigns the correct state of motion to the particles. The first point follows under the usual quantum equilibrium assumptions. By contrast, identifying the guiding velocity with particle motion is an additional physical postulate, since the standard guiding equation does not follow from the Schrödinger equation alone. We argue that, in the evanescent regime, the state of motion assigned by the standard guiding equation is in disagreement with the speed following from our experiments. To make the distinction explicit, we also present a bidirectional Bohmian model that reproduces the same stationary density while assigning finite speeds compatible with the speed inferred in the evanescent regime.

quant-pharXiv:2509.06584•Sep 9, 2025•7 citations
In a recent paper Kent has pointed out that in consistent histories quantum theory it is possible, given initial and final states, to construct two different consistent families of histories, in each of which there is a proposition that can be inferred with probability one, and such that the projectors representing these two propositions are mutually orthogonal. In this note we stress that, according to the rules of consistent history reasoning two such propositions are not contrary in the usual logical sense namely, that one can infer that if one is true then the other is false, and both could be false. No single consistent family contains both propositions, together with the initial and final states, and hence the propositions cannot be logically compared. Consistent histories quantum theory is logically consistent, consistent with experiment as far as is known, consistent with the usual quantum predictions for measurements, and applicable to the most general physical systems. It may not be the only theory with these properties, but in our opinion, it is the most promising among present possibilities.
The ABL rule is derived and shown to be a tool of standard quantum mechanics. Objections by Kastner [quant-ph/0003098v3] and others to the counterfactual use of the ABL rule are shown to be groundless. In particular, this use is not restricted in the way Kastner has claimed. A variant of the three-box experiment due to Vaidman is discussed. It is argued that Born probabilities (and hence state vectors or density operators) are not the right basis for drawing ontological inferences. What quantum mechanics is trying to tell us about the world must be inferred from the objective ABL probabilities that are assigned to counterfactuals. The correct inferences, however, will remain incomprensible until a prevalent but inconsistent way of thinking about the temporal aspect of the world is rejected.
In our work [Sharoglazova et al., Nature 643, 67-72 (2025)], we reported the first measurement of the speed of tunnelling particles by comparing two orthogonal motions in a coupled-waveguide system. Here we respond to objections raised in comments, referee reports, preprints, and articles. In particular, we distinguish two questions that are often conflated: whether Bohmian mechanics reproduces the measured density, and whether the standard guiding equation assigns the correct state of motion to the particles. The first point follows under the usual quantum equilibrium assumptions. By contrast, identifying the guiding velocity with particle motion is an additional physical postulate, since the standard guiding equation does not follow from the Schrödinger equation alone. We argue that, in the evanescent regime, the state of motion assigned by the standard guiding equation is in disagreement with the speed following from our experiments. To make the distinction explicit, we also present a bidirectional Bohmian model that reproduces the same stationary density while assigning finite speeds compatible with the speed inferred in the evanescent regime.