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Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science

Toward a General Mathematical Theory of Behavior

Edward W. Barankin

Published Jan 1, 1971• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This author has been engaged over the past several years in the effort to develop certain basic intuitions into a fully mathematical theory. These evolving intuitions first began with the idea that the economist's notion of utility might more truly be represented mathematically by a normed measure on the commodity space rather than by a point function, the value of the measure on a particular set of goods having the sense of a relative propensity of the individual to select a good in that set. With this idea there came in turn, quite naturally, the insight that utility and probability are one and the same thing. And accordingly it emerged that the theory we were seeking would not be restricted to the economic behavior of human beings, nor even to the behavior in general of human beings: it would pertain, in utmost generality, to all behavior of all systems. Thus, it must affirm that all behavior is the evolution of stochastic processes, and that all systems are stochastic processes. Consistent with this the structural elements of stochastic processes are seen as the fundamental, objective, real entities, the ultimate building-blocks of reality. These are eventualities and acts and-according to the traditional mathematical representation of stochastic processes, also-probabilities. This structural aspect of the theory under development puts into sharp evidence its wide divergence from the classical scientific conception of reality. Our intensive search failed to discover a dynamical law for the proposed new theory within the mathematical context of the traditional, σ-field-real-valued-measure representation of stochastic processes. We therefore have gone on to a higher level of possible mathematical representation. This particular representation would have collections of eventualities represented by lattices of certain configurations in a unitary space. Closed linear manifolds are among these configurations, and indeed the formalism of quantum mechanics falls into the context of this representation. But the general lattice element in the kinds of lattices being investigated is more complicated than a linear manifold, being heuristically comparable with an acute-angle cone of vectors. These configurations are formulated by means of a ƒlanking relation between linear manifolds. One such lattice has been developed. Others are currently being sought through variations on the notion of flanking. The fact that probabilities present themselves in the unitary space representation-as is familiar from quantum mechanics-as parameters of the relationship between linear manifolds suggests that probability is not a fundamental structural concept. It is consequently indicated that eventualities and acts alone are the basic elements of real structure. Accordingly, the dynamical law must be formulable in terms of these elements only. There is a natural suggestion of what the law might look like. Even at the present early stage of development of the new theory being sought it is possible to cite many pieces of empirical evidence vouching for its exclusive validity. Such evidence is particularly noteworthy in the domain of human behavior.

DOI
10.4288/jafpos1956.4.1

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Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. 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The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. 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Philosophy of physics, theory structure, and measurement theory

Patrick Suppes, Paul Humphreys

Volume 1: Introduction P. Humphreys. Part I: Probability. Some Contributions to Formal Theory of Probability K. Popper, D. Miller. Elementary Non-Archimedean Representations of Probability for Decision Theory and Games P.J. Hammond. Random Sequences and Hypotheses Tests R. Chuaqui. Changing Probability Judgements I. Levi. Upper and Lower Probability T.L. Fine. Some Connections between Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Nonadditive Probability P. Mongin. On the Properties of Conditional Independence W. Spohn. Qualitative Probabilities Revisited Z. Domotor. The Monks' Vote: a Dialogue on Unidimensional Probabilistic Geometry J.-C. Falmagne. Part II: Probabilistic Causality. Probabilistic Causation without Probability P.W. Holland. Causal Tendency, Necessitivity and Sufficientivity: an Updated Review I.J. Good. Practical Causal Generalizations E.W. Adams. In Place of Regression C. Glymour, P. Spirtes, R. Scheines. Testing Probabilistic Causality D. Costantini. Psychologistic Aspects of Suppes' Definition of Causality P. Legrenzi, M. Sonino. Name Index. Subject Index. Volume 2: Part III: Philosophy of Physics. Probability and Quantum Theory B. Loewer. Schrodinger's Version of EPR, and its Problems A. Fine. Classical Field Magnitudes J. Vuillemin. Quantity, Representation and Geometry B. Mundy. Numerical Experimentation P. Humphreys. Part IV: Theory Structure. Theories and Theoretical Models R. Wojcicki. Suppes Predicates and the Construction of Unsolvable Problems in the Axiomatized Sciences N.C.A. da Costa, F.A. Doria. Structural Explanation J.D. Sneed. Part V: Measurement Theory. Fifteen Problems concerning the Representational Theory of Measurement R.D. Luce, L. Narens. The Meaningfulness of Ordinal Comparisons for General Order Relational Systems F.S. Roberts, Z.S. Rosenbaum. Theories as Nets: the Case of Combinatorial Measurement Theory C.U. Moulines, J.A. Diez. Name Index. Subject Index. Volume 3: Part VI: Philosophy of Language and Logic. Patrick Suppes' Contribution to the Philosophy of Language D. Follesdal. Open Problems in Relational Grammar M. Bottner. A Variable-Free Logic for Anaphora W.C. Purdy. Is Snow White? J. Moravcsik. Can there be Reasons for Putting Limitations on Classical Logic? P. Weingartner. Quantum Logic as a Logic of Identification J. Hintikka, I. Halonen. Logic and Probability in Quantum Mechanics M.L. dalla Chiara, R. Giuntini. Part VII: Learning Theory, Action Theory, and Robotics. From Stimulus-Sampling to Array-Similarity Theory W.K. Estes. Action as Seeing to it that Something is the Case R. Tuomela, G. Sandu. Command Satisfaction and the Acquisition of Habits C. Crangle. Part VIII: General Philosophy of Science. Some Observations on Patrick Suppes' Philosophy of Science M.C. Galavotti. Epilogue. Postscript P. Suppes. Chronological and Topical Bibliography of Patrick Suppes' Publications. Name Index. Subject Index.

Kluwer Academic Publishers eBooks•Jan 1, 1994•2 citations
This author has been engaged over the past several years in the effort to develop certain basic intuitions into a fully mathematical theory. These evolving intuitions first began with the idea that the economist's notion of utility might more truly be represented mathematically by a normed measure on the commodity space rather than by a point function, the value of the measure on a particular set of goods having the sense of a relative propensity of the individual to select a good in that set. With this idea there came in turn, quite naturally, the insight that utility and probability are one and the same thing. And accordingly it emerged that the theory we were seeking would not be restricted to the economic behavior of human beings, nor even to the behavior in general of human beings: it would pertain, in utmost generality, to all behavior of all systems. Thus, it must affirm that all behavior is the evolution of stochastic processes, and that all systems are stochastic processes. Consistent with this the structural elements of stochastic processes are seen as the fundamental, objective, real entities, the ultimate building-blocks of reality. These are eventualities and acts and-according to the traditional mathematical representation of stochastic processes, also-probabilities. This structural aspect of the theory under development puts into sharp evidence its wide divergence from the classical scientific conception of reality. Our intensive search failed to discover a dynamical law for the proposed new theory within the mathematical context of the traditional, σ-field-real-valued-measure representation of stochastic processes. We therefore have gone on to a higher level of possible mathematical representation. This particular representation would have collections of eventualities represented by lattices of certain configurations in a unitary space. Closed linear manifolds are among these configurations, and indeed the formalism of quantum mechanics falls into the context of this representation. But the general lattice element in the kinds of lattices being investigated is more complicated than a linear manifold, being heuristically comparable with an acute-angle cone of vectors. These configurations are formulated by means of a ƒlanking relation between linear manifolds. One such lattice has been developed. Others are currently being sought through variations on the notion of flanking. The fact that probabilities present themselves in the unitary space representation-as is familiar from quantum mechanics-as parameters of the relationship between linear manifolds suggests that probability is not a fundamental structural concept. It is consequently indicated that eventualities and acts alone are the basic elements of real structure. Accordingly, the dynamical law must be formulable in terms of these elements only. There is a natural suggestion of what the law might look like. Even at the present early stage of development of the new theory being sought it is possible to cite many pieces of empirical evidence vouching for its exclusive validity. Such evidence is particularly noteworthy in the domain of human behavior.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
In present-day physics the fundamental dynamical laws are taken as a time-translation-invariant and time-reversal-invariant one-parameter groups of automorphisms of the underlying mathematical structure. In this context-independent and empirically inaccessible description there is no past, present or future, hence no distinction between cause and effect. To get the familiar description in terms of causes and effects, the time-reversal symmetry of the fundamental dynamics has to be broken. Thereby one gets two representations, one satisfying the generally accepted rules of retarded causality (no effect can precede its cause). The other one describes the strange rules of advanced causality. For entangled (but not necessarily interacting) quantum systems the arrow of time must have the same direction for all subsystems. But for classical systems, or for classical subsystems of quantum systems, this argument does not hold. As a cosequence, classical systems allow the conceptual possibility of advanced causality in addition to retarded causality. Every mathematically formulated dynamics of statistically reproducible events can be extended to a description in terms of a one-parameter group of automorphisms of an enlarged mathematical structure which describes a fictitious hidden determinism. Consequently, randomness in the sense of mathematical probability theory is only a weak generalization of determinism. The popular ideas that in quantum theory there are gaps in the causal chain which allow the accommodation of the freedom of human action are fantasies which have no basis in present-day quantum mechanics. Quantum events are governed by strict statistical laws. Freedom of action is a constitutive necessity of all experimental science which requires a violation of the statistical predictions of physics. We conclude that the presently adopted first principles of theoretical physics can neither explain the autonomy of the psyche nor account for the freedom of action necessary for experimental science.
This thesis is concerned with the description, characterization, and structural analysis of general physical processes. While all of these questions are well understood in classical physics, the situation presents itself much murkier in the realm of quantum mechanics, where fundamental classical properties fail to hold. Here, we close this conceptual gap and provide the theoretical foundation for the description of processes in classical physics, quantum mechanics, and beyond. These findings, in turn, enable the experimental investigation of key properties of dynamical processes, like, for example, the existence of memory effects and their respective temporal structure.
The general view is that all fundamental physical laws should be formulated within the framework given by quantum mechanics (QM). In a sense, QM therefore has the character of a metaphysical theory. Consequently, if it is possible to derive QM from more basic principles, these principles should be of general, philosophical nature. Here, we derive the formalism of QM from well-motivated epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong predictions. First, an epistemic formalism is developed, using concepts like knowledge and potential knowledge, identifying a physical state SSS with the potential knowledge of the physical world. It is demonstrated that QM emerges from this formalism. However, Hilbert spaces, wave functions and probabilities are defined in certain well-defined observational contexts only. This means that the epistemic formalism is broader than QM. In the fundamental layer of description, the physical state SSS is a subset of a state space S={Z}\mathcal{S}=\{Z\}S={Z}, such that SSS always contains many elements ZZZ. These elements correspond to unattainable states of complete knowledge of the world. The evolution of SSS cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements ZZZ, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of SSS is described in terms of sequential time n∈Nn\in \mathbf{\mathbb{N}}n∈N, which is updated according to n→n+1n\rightarrow n+1n→n+1 each time an event occurs, each time potential knowledge changes. Sequential time nnn can be separated from relational time ttt, which describes distances between events in space-time. There is an entire space-time associated with each nnn, in which ttt represents the knowledge at sequential time nnn about the temporal relations between present and past events.
In a deterministic theory, one can deduce the state of the universe at any one time from the dynamical laws that govern its evolution and its state at any other time.In particular, one can deduce from the conditions that obtained at some early boundary condition for the universe, its state at all subsequent times.It is a piece of well-received philosophical common sense that there is no room in a deterministic theory for objective probabilities.Arguments will be given below that this piece of philosophical common sense is mistaken, and that a probability measure over the space of physically possible trajectories is an indispensable component of any theory -deterministic or otherwise -that can be used as a basis for prediction or receive confirmation from the evidence.Phase space is the central representational space in physics.It is the space within which all of the states pertaining to a system are represented, and it encodes all of the general information that we have about those states.To take an obvious example (less obvious examples will be given below) the fact that a pair of quantities are represented by different dimensions in phase space encodes the fact that they represent separate degrees of freedom.Physically possible histories are represented by trajectories through phase space and in a deterministic theory, when dealing with a closed system, there is (no more than) one trajectory through each point.Since the universe as a whole is the only truly closed system, this means there is one trajectory through each point in the phase space of the universe.Probabilities may be invoked in applications of theory, when the state of a system or the values of external variables are not known with full precision, but they are eliminable given complete knowledge.And they don't appear in the statement of the laws.The laws serve simply to identify the physically allowable trajectories.About Newtonian dynamics, Laplace famously said "given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it -an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis -it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, and the past, would be present to its eyes."ii It is a short step from this to the idea that probabilities invoked in classical contexts are subjective rather than objective.If they represent anything, it is facts about our epistemic states, not facts about the world.iii Popper, and Lewis, and other influential figures have endorsed this view, categorically rejecting any role for objective probabilities indeterministic contexts.In Popper's words:
Volume 1: Introduction P. Humphreys. Part I: Probability. Some Contributions to Formal Theory of Probability K. Popper, D. Miller. Elementary Non-Archimedean Representations of Probability for Decision Theory and Games P.J. Hammond. Random Sequences and Hypotheses Tests R. Chuaqui. Changing Probability Judgements I. Levi. Upper and Lower Probability T.L. Fine. Some Connections between Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Nonadditive Probability P. Mongin. On the Properties of Conditional Independence W. Spohn. Qualitative Probabilities Revisited Z. Domotor. The Monks' Vote: a Dialogue on Unidimensional Probabilistic Geometry J.-C. Falmagne. Part II: Probabilistic Causality. Probabilistic Causation without Probability P.W. Holland. Causal Tendency, Necessitivity and Sufficientivity: an Updated Review I.J. Good. Practical Causal Generalizations E.W. Adams. In Place of Regression C. Glymour, P. Spirtes, R. Scheines. Testing Probabilistic Causality D. Costantini. Psychologistic Aspects of Suppes' Definition of Causality P. Legrenzi, M. Sonino. Name Index. Subject Index. Volume 2: Part III: Philosophy of Physics. Probability and Quantum Theory B. Loewer. Schrodinger's Version of EPR, and its Problems A. Fine. Classical Field Magnitudes J. Vuillemin. Quantity, Representation and Geometry B. Mundy. Numerical Experimentation P. Humphreys. Part IV: Theory Structure. Theories and Theoretical Models R. Wojcicki. Suppes Predicates and the Construction of Unsolvable Problems in the Axiomatized Sciences N.C.A. da Costa, F.A. Doria. Structural Explanation J.D. Sneed. Part V: Measurement Theory. Fifteen Problems concerning the Representational Theory of Measurement R.D. Luce, L. Narens. The Meaningfulness of Ordinal Comparisons for General Order Relational Systems F.S. Roberts, Z.S. Rosenbaum. Theories as Nets: the Case of Combinatorial Measurement Theory C.U. Moulines, J.A. Diez. Name Index. Subject Index. Volume 3: Part VI: Philosophy of Language and Logic. Patrick Suppes' Contribution to the Philosophy of Language D. Follesdal. Open Problems in Relational Grammar M. Bottner. A Variable-Free Logic for Anaphora W.C. Purdy. Is Snow White? J. Moravcsik. Can there be Reasons for Putting Limitations on Classical Logic? P. Weingartner. Quantum Logic as a Logic of Identification J. Hintikka, I. Halonen. Logic and Probability in Quantum Mechanics M.L. dalla Chiara, R. Giuntini. Part VII: Learning Theory, Action Theory, and Robotics. From Stimulus-Sampling to Array-Similarity Theory W.K. Estes. Action as Seeing to it that Something is the Case R. Tuomela, G. Sandu. Command Satisfaction and the Acquisition of Habits C. Crangle. Part VIII: General Philosophy of Science. Some Observations on Patrick Suppes' Philosophy of Science M.C. Galavotti. Epilogue. Postscript P. Suppes. Chronological and Topical Bibliography of Patrick Suppes' Publications. Name Index. Subject Index.